A paradox of privacy: unravelling the reasoning behind online location sharing by Zafeiropoulou, Aristea-Maria
University of Southampton Research Repository
ePrints Soton
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial 
research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be 
reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing 
from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold 
commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders.
  
 When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g.
AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name 
of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
A Paradox of Privacy: Unravelling the
Reasoning behind Online Location
Sharing
by
Aristea Maria Zafeiropoulou
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the
Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering
School of Electronics and Computer Science
November 2014

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
ABSTRACT
FACULTY OF PHYSICAL SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING
SCHOOL OF ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE
Doctor of Philosophy
by Aristea Maria Zafeiropoulou
With the emergence of web applications that enabled user-generated content and social
interactions, the Web became a place where people can engage in a number of new
activities. With the success of smart enabled devices people now actively share their
location data through various applications. However, as this thesis reveals, location
plays a primal role in linking and inferring new information about people, often without
their knowledge or consent. Due to this inferential power of location data new privacy
concerns arise, as the actual affordances of their data are far greater than people are
even aware of. Regardless of the numerous controversies around privacy, people keep
on sharing their data on the Web. However, privacy systems themselves (and the ways
in which individuals express their preferences) have changed very little. This thesis ar-
gues that understanding the mechanisms that people employ in their privacy decisions
can provide fundamental insight for the design of privacy systems. The main focus of
this thesis is to understand the underlying reasons why people share their location and
whether their disclosure behaviour is paradoxical when compared with their stated atti-
tudes towards location sharing. The first part of this thesis involves a study comprising
of an online survey that addresses these two issues. The findings provide supporting
evidence that people’s location sharing decisions are indeed paradoxical in comparison
with their stated attitudes and that privacy decision-making can be seen as a process
of structuration, in the sense that people’s decisions are tempered by contextual factors
(external structures). The second part comprises of a series of focus groups that act
as a follow-up study and aim to explore in more detail the underlying reasons behind
people’s sharing decisions. The findings show that people’s decisions are influenced by
a number of different contextual factors, grouped together into three main categories;
social capital, trust in the application and functionality. Based on the outcomes of the
two studies, a conceptual model was developed, called the Isorropic Model, that points
out the prominent role of context in privacy decision-making and stresses the need for
more dynamic privacy systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Privacy was, he said, a very valuable thing. Everyone wanted a place where they could be
alone occasionally. And when they had such a place, it was only common courtesy in
anyone else who knew of it to keep his knowledge to himself.
—George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty Four
As the Web has evolved into an entity where people share their private lives by publish-
ing content online, the boundaries between privacy and publicity have blurred. Privacy
protection on the Web is a rather challenging topic. For example, it is common knowl-
edge that Web companies are looking to collect data about their users. Gomez et al.
(2009) found that the majority of the most visited websites use personal information
for customised advertising, and a large number of technology companies (e.g. Facebook,
Google, Yahoo, Microsoft) share their customer data with a large number of their af-
filiated companies (the average number of subsidiaries was 297, the median was 93).
As a result, online privacy has become a subject of heated debate with many groups
fighting for the protection of people’s data (such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation1
and Privacy International2) and representatives of companies claiming that the end of
privacy is here3.
In the last few years numerous privacy-related issues have appeared in the news, such
as the continuous changes in the privacy settings of Facebook or the iPhone location
tracking incident4; in 2011 researchers discovered that iPhones track all the moves of
their users, logging all the information in a single file. A more recent study highlighted
people’s lack of control over their data by recovering a huge amount of personal data
from second-hand Android phones5. The list of news stories raising the alarm is endless;
1www.eff.org
2www.privacyinternational.org
3http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy/
Privacy no longer a social norm, says Facebook founder, The Guardian
4http://petewarden.github.com/iPhoneTracker
5http://blog.avast.com/2014/07/08/tens-of-thousands-of-americans-sell-themselves-online-every-day
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yet many Web users do not seem to actively think about the long-term effects of their
online data sharing and the privacy-related issues that emerge on the Web. According to
a survey by Microsoft, less than half of adults and children consider the effects of their
online actions on their personal reputation and even less contemplate on the effects
these may have in the long run (Brackenbury and Wong, 2013). Still, a report from the
Pew Research Centre finds that many Americans faced privacy breaches in 2014. More
particularly, 18% of them had important personal information stolen, whereas 21% of
them had an email or social networking account compromised6.
At an individual level privacy is fundamental, as it enables people to maintain their social
relationships. People behave differently in different contexts (e.g. at home with their
family, or at work with their colleagues). Rachels (1975) provides a detailed account
of why privacy is important, where he stresses that different behavioural patterns are
associated with different relationships. Depending on the context people may regard
certain aspects about them as private, thus a privacy violation may have minor or
major implications for them (e.g. losing their job).
As society struggles to understand and manage the privacy issues that have come up with
the emergence of digital technologies, the pace of technological innovation continues to
increase. The advent of the Social Web and Web 2.0 has caused numerous concerns over
people’s privacy on a global scale. Although the Web was initially invented with a hu-
manitarian vision — a place where people could meet and interact freely — latest reports
reveal that it has been used as a tool for global surveillance. Surveillance mechanisms
are often associated with Michel Foucault’s panopticon, a concept used metaphorically
that is based on Jeremy Bentham’s original idea of a prison where prisoners are watched
without them knowing when this actually happens. For Foucault modern societies often
exercise panoptic mechanisms in an attempt to watch and regulate people (Foucault,
1977).
In 2013 a story regarding online global surveillance broke down turning suspicions of
online surveillance into reality and sparking a worldwide controversy. Classified docu-
ments from the National Security Agency of the United States (NSA) were leaked to
the press revealing that NSA intercepts the communications of people across the globe.
The story raises a number of issues regarding surveillance and privacy, the limits of the
law, business-government relations, and of course international relations. In essence,
it reminds us how important is our need for privacy. The latest news story on this
case suggests that photos of people’s faces are harvested through various sources (from
emails and social media accounts to video chats) at an unprecedented scale to be used
in facial recognition programmes7. Although users consider these mediums to be private
(we debate on this later on in this thesis) and therefore expect a level of privacy, in a
6http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/14/more-online-americans-say-theyve-
experienced-a-personal-data-breach/
7http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html/
NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images, New York Times
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scenario where they did not publish their data online, NSA would not have access to
them. Similarly, the success of social network sites and other web applications depends
on people’s willingness to publish content in these places. With time, though, people are
also becoming increasingly dependent on these applications, as online sharing becomes
part of their daily routine. In that sense, the question that we raise is to what extent
do people consider the long-term consequences of their online sharing decisions and the
potential effects to their privacy.
1.1 Focus of this thesis
This thesis aims to explore the underlying reasoning behind people’s privacy decision-
making. The main hypothesis of this research is the following:
The privacy paradox applies to location data, yet it does not adequately describe the
distance between people’s beliefs regarding their data and the actual affordances of their
data. Privacy disclosure decisions around location can be understood based on discrete
factors, including agency and structures, that are mitigated by context.
The privacy paradox is a term used to describe the inconsistency that is often observed
between people’s self-professed privacy attitudes and their actual disclosure behaviours.
The actual affordances of people’s data refer to the ways systems make use of people’s
data in practice.
Agency refers to people’s capacity to act independently, whereas structure refers to the
rules and resources that shape people’s behaviour.
Context refers to the dynamic social settings under which a privacy disclosure decision
takes place.
The hypothesis was broken down into a number of research questions:
1. What are the affordances of location data and to what extent are people aware of
them?
The first question explores the ways that systems manipulate location data and
people’s level of awareness of these affordances. The motivation behind this is
that location is part of someone’s physical context, therefore inferences based on
location can take place. Thus, it would be of particular interest to analyse in detail
the extent to which inferences do take place as well as the extent to which people
are aware of these.
4 Chapter 1 Introduction
2. How do people perceive and value their location privacy in theory?
This question aims to explore people’s attitudes towards the privacy of their loca-
tion data.
3. How do people value their location data in practice during the privacy trade-off?
This question focuses on people’s actual disclosure decisions and how they evaluate
the costs and the benefits of their decisions. The combination of the last two
research questions aims to investigate whether people’s disclosure behaviours are
paradoxical when compared to their privacy attitudes.
4. To what extent do people act as agents and to what extent are they influenced by
certain structures during the privacy trade-off?
This question aims to uncover the extent to which people are constrained not to
act entirely freely by certain structures.
5. Can we develop a model of privacy that takes into account the contextual and
dynamic nature of location privacy?
This question was created based on the outcomes of the studies that addressed
the previous research questions. The development of a model that places the
contextual and dynamic nature of privacy at the centre of its attention can offer
valuable support to people’s privacy decisions.
6. What are the key factors of this model?
It is particularly important to identify the key factors of this model based on the
actual reasoning mechanisms behind people’s privacy decisions.
The first part of this research addresses the first research question. It sheds light upon
the various potential contextual elements related to location sharing and brings them
together in a study of privacy decision-making. More specifically, it involves the de-
velopment of a framework for analysis of location data, which is later on employed in
the analysis of the data used in a set of technical systems. The analysis highlights the
primal role of location data as a starting point for aggregating and inferring other types
of data often without the users’ knowledge or consent. The analysis is followed by the
development of a conceptual model, called the Distance Model of Belief, Behaviour and
Affordance, which distinguishes two major disconnects related to privacy decisions. The
first stresses people’s lack of awareness regarding the ways systems can manipulate their
data (e.g. location-based inferences), whereas the second stresses another important
issue which is people’s paradoxical disclosure behaviour which are often in conflict with
their privacy attitudes, a phenomenon known as the privacy paradox.
The main part of the thesis aims to answer the following three research questions —
i.e. questions 2, 3, and 4 — therefore it explores why people trade their privacy on
the Web, a concept known as the privacy trade-off, and whether privacy decisions are
paradoxical when compared with their stated privacy attitudes. We argue that this
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study is important, because understanding the mechanisms that people employ during
their privacy decisions can provide fundamental insight for the design of privacy systems
— in agreement with Knijnenburg (2013). In this context, the research also investigates
the extent to which they act based on their own free will (as free agents) and to what
extent they are influenced by certain structures during this trade-off. An example of a
structure could be the reputation a system that requests their location has among other
users.
An online survey was conducted aiming to address these questions. Hoping to investigate
in more depth people’s paradoxical behaviours, we developed a set of simple scenarios
from people’s every day use of web applications. We wished to explore people’s responses
in each of these scenarios, as well as their justifications behind these responses. The sur-
vey was completed by 150 participants, and the results were analysed both quantitatively
and qualitatively.
Following the outcomes of the survey, a series of focus groups took place aiming to gain a
deeper insight into people’s privacy disclosure mechanisms. Three separate focus group
sessions took place, followed by a qualitative analysis of the transcribed discussions.
Both analyses (of the survey data, and the data from the focus groups) uncover a plethora
of different contextual factors that influence people’s decisions. Based on the outcomes
of the qualitative analyses of the survey and the focus groups we develop the Isorropic
Model, which addresses the remaining two research questions — i.e. questions 5, and 6.
The Isorropic Model has important consequences for the understanding of how privacy
disclosure decisions are made, and indicates a direction for new privacy systems and
interfaces, that emphasise the primacy of context in dynamic disclosure decisions.
1.2 Publications
Parts of the work presented in this thesis have been published as individual research
papers. The list below includes a summary of these publications:
• Privacy Implications of Location and Contextual Data on the Social Web ACM
Web Science Conference 2011 (Zafeiropoulou et al., 2011).
This paper, presented as a poster paper at ACM WebSci’11, argues for the pri-
vacy concerns that are raised from online location sharing that have effects beyond
location, since other contextual information can be inferred through location in-
formation.
• Location Data and Privacy: A Framework for Analysis Reseaux sociaux: Culture
politique et ingenierie des reseaux sociaux (Zafeiropoulou et al., 2012).
This paper, published as a book chapter, presents the framework for analysis of
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location data as well as the analysis of a set of technical systems based on the
properties of the framework. The results point out the primal role of location
information as a starting point for aggregating and inferring other types of infor-
mation.
• Unpicking the Privacy Paradox: Can Structuration Theory Help to Explain Location-
Based Privacy Decisions? ACM Web Science Conference 2013 (Zafeiropoulou
et al., 2013).
This paper, presented as a full paper at ACM WebSci’13, describes the study into
privacy and location sharing that comprises of an online survey. The quantitative
analysis of the data shows the presence of the privacy paradox on location infor-
mation, whereas the qualitative analysis sheds light on the factors that lie behind
it.
Another paper has been submitted and is currently considered by reviewers. This paper,
entitled To Share or Not to Share: The Isorropic Model of Contextual Privacy Decisions,
aims to explain people’s privacy decision mechanisms through the development of a
conceptual model, called the Isorropic Model. The model is based on the outcomes
of the previous study (the online survey) combined with the outcomes of a study that
comprises of a series of focus groups. The findings stress the role of social capital, trust
in the application, and functionality of the application in privacy decision-making, but
also highlight that context plays a primary role in disclosure decisions.
1.3 Document outline
The research presented in this thesis contributes to the field of online privacy decision-
making and in particular it explores the underlying reasoning behind people’s location
sharing on the Web as well as the relationship between people’s attitudes towards privacy
and their actual sharing behaviour. This thesis is outlined as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the topic of this thesis by describing background literature on the
definition and nature of privacy in the pre-Web but also in the Web era, along with the
theories that deal with privacy decision-making that are relevant to this research.
Chapter 3 focuses on privacy decision-making on the Social Web and offers a broad
review of current research in this area, including research on social interactions in social
network sites, demographic differences, the role of trust in privacy decision-making, and,
finally, online privacy management.
The contributions of this thesis are presented in Chapters 4 to 7. Chapter 4 introduces
the concept of location privacy and the role of context in location sharing. It continues
with the presentation of a framework for analysis of location and contextual data in a set
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of technical systems. The chapter concludes with the presentation of a theoretical model
of privacy, called the Distance Model of Belief, Behaviour and Affordance (DMBBA).
The model points out a disconnect between people’s privacy attitudes, their disclosure
behaviours, and the actual affordances of their data by online applications.
Chapter 5 explores the relationship between people’s attitudes towards privacy and their
location sharing behaviours. To that purpose we conduct an online survey that addresses
a set of relevant research questions. The full cycle of this study is described in detail,
along with the findings of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the survey data.
Chapter 6 presents the follow-up work of the survey, which consists of a series of focus
groups aiming to explore in more depth how people articulate their privacy attitudes
and sharing decisions. The chapter presents all the steps we undertake in this study,
followed by a detailed description of the findings of the qualitative analysis of the study
data.
Chapter 7 aims to bring together the findings of the two main studies. It begins with
a discussion of the main findings of these studies (survey and focus groups). With that
in mind, we revisit the findings of the two studies and group their themes together.
Through the interpretation of their findings we develop a conceptual model that aims
to depict the privacy trade-off, which we call the Isorropic Model for privacy decisions.
The model hopes to untangle the complex nature of online privacy decisions and inform
privacy systems regarding the underlying mechanisms of privacy decision-making.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by offering a summary of the research, outlining
its main contributions and proposing potential future work paths.

Chapter 2
Privacy Attitudes and Disclosure
Behaviours
Τα εν οικω μη εν δημω.a
aWhat happens in one’s house should not be broadcast in public.
—Ancient Greek proverb
In the past few years privacy has become a topic of attention and debate in our global
society. However, privacy is a rather old concept that roots back to the origins of western
civilisation. In ancient Greece, a popular proverb stated that what happens in one’s
house (oikos) should not be made public (demos), showing that already at that time
there was a clear distinction between private and public. Compared to the laws of the
polis, one’s oikos had its own internal rules and was part of one’s private life. In modern
Greek, the word for privacy is “idiotikotita”, stemming from the word “idiotis”, which
in ancient times referred to a person who did not participate in the commons, i.e. the
polis — in comparison with someone who did take part, called “politis”. Paradoxically,
this word is used today with an entirely different meaning in several indo-european
languages.
With the advent of Web technologies, privacy has become a topic of controversy. For
instance, the popularity of social network sites has blurred the boundaries between public
and private. People share personal content online, yet their audiences are not any more
small and distinct, instead a number of different parties can access a single person’s
information. Instead of a complete separation between the public and the private, in
the online world the relationship between these two spheres is less clear.
During the last decades, the public-private duality has been studied from different fields,
such as sociology, psychology and law. This chapter presents different privacy-related
theories before and after the Web. We present a review of the main theoretical ap-
proaches to privacy in social interactions before the Web and then introduce the concept
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of online privacy. Finally, we review several theoretical approaches to privacy decision-
making on the Web.
2.1 Us and them
The definition of privacy has always been a subject of debate; privacy is a rather elusive
concept since it has neither static nor objective nature (Margulis, 2011). What one
person regards as private, another person may regard as public and with time both
may change their minds on the matter. The most common but also narrow definition
of privacy is “the right to be let alone” employed by Warren and Brandeis at the end
of the 19th century, who referred to press photography as a privacy issue (Warren and
Brandeis, 1890). Today privacy violations coming from the practices of the press are
often far more intrusive (e.g. the Leveson inquiry1).
Alan Westin, a pioneering privacy scholar, developed one of the most popular privacy
theories. He regarded privacy as a state, “a voluntary and temporary withdrawal of
a person from the general society” with four sub-states; solitude, intimacy, anonymity
and reserve. His theory also suggested that “privacy is the claim of individuals, groups,
or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967). Westin conducted over 30
surveys in 40 years (between 1978 to 2004) that investigated consumer attitudes to
privacy. He classified consumers into three groups: the privacy fundamentalists (i.e.
privacy concerned who choose privacy over benefits), the pragmatic (i.e. people who
weigh the benefits against the costs of their privacy decisions), and the unconcerned
(i.e. trustful and not concerned about privacy). Based on the outcomes of his surveys,
approximately 25% of Americans belong to the first group, 57% to the second group and
18% belong to the unconcerned (Kumaraguru and Cranor, 2005).
A well-known approach towards privacy was taken a number of decades ago by Irwin
Altman, a social psychologist, who viewed privacy as a social process and identified a
set of basic characteristics (Altman, 1975).
• It can be distinguished between desired and achieved privacy. This highlights the
fact that people do not often achieve their desired levels of privacy.
• Privacy is an interpersonal boundary-control process, and
• an input and output process. These two characteristics point out that it is control-
based and regulated by human interactions.
• Privacy is an optimising process, i.e. there is potential for improving one’s privacy.
1www.levesoninquiry.org.uk
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• It is a dialectic process. At a certain time the individual may want to interact
with others, but other times they may want to be let alone.
• One of the most significant characteristics of privacy is that it is a dynamic process,
in other words it changes over time.
• The last characteristic is that privacy involves a variety of social units, from the
individual (self versus other people) to several social groups (one group against
another) and so on.
Altman’s approach to privacy is considered to be one of the best-articulated theories
and has been extensively used in privacy research ever since. It differentiates itself from
Westin’s theory, as it focuses on the social interaction aspect of privacy (Margulis, 2011)
and views privacy as a dynamic process rather than a state.
Sociologist Zygmund Bauman also focused on the interactions between the individual
and others — us and them — and highlighted the potential privacy issues. To the
eyes of each individual, people belong to one of three groups. The first group refers
to people the individual interacts with on a frequent basis (friends and family), the
second includes people that the individual meets on occasion (doctor, professor and so
on), whereas the third group refers to all the people that the individual knows, but
never meets. Any attempt from members of the second group to come closer to the
individual and overcome the boundaries of their functional relationship can be regarded
by the individual as a privacy breach (Bauman, 1990). Similarly to Bauman, Altman
divides people to three groups: friends, strangers that the individual is expected to
interact with, and strangers with no expected interaction. Altman uses a diagram to
illustrate the expected interactions individuals may have with members of the three
groups (Altman, 1975). Figure 2.1 represents Altman’s diagram; curve A represents the
reactions of the individual as someone from the first group approaches them (a friend),
curve B the relationships with strangers the individual interacts with, and curve C the
relationships with complete strangers (no expected interaction). As the diagram shows,
the closer people from the last two groups attempt to come to someone’s personal space,
the more negative is the reaction of the individual.
In this context, Goffman stresses the importance of body language as a means of convey-
ing information in people’s interactions with one another (Gofman, 1963). In the case
of privacy protection when the individual feels that someone enters his personal space
he may express discomfort verbally but also through body language. The question that
is now raised refers to what happens in a similar scenario on the Web. When the online
dimension is put into play, the context collapses, as there are no physical interactions for
the users to signal the discomfort provoked by a privacy breach. This raises the question
of how people express discomfort in the online world taking into account that the tradi-
tional channels are absent. The principal way of expressing discomfort is by controlling
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Figure 2.1: Altman’s Graph on hypothesised relationships between personal space
and reactions.
the access to their online personal space; this happens mainly through the management
of their privacy settings, a topic that we will discuss later on in the following sections.
2.1.1 Concepts associated with privacy
Privacy is a term commonly employed by people in a variety of situations; however
often people misuse the term in cases where they actually mean closely related concepts
to privacy such as security, anonymity, or control. These concepts are associated with
privacy, yet they are not synonymous to privacy. For instance, security is often confused
with privacy. Camp discusses thoroughly the relationship between the two notions;
privacy requires security, since without security the individual cannot control access to
information about himself (Camp, 1999). Anonymity is also a notion confused with
privacy. Although related they do not have the same meaning. Westin distinguished
anonymity as a state of privacy - along with reserve, solitude and intimacy (Westin,
1967).
In fact, not only is there an epistemological difference between privacy, anonymity, and
security, but also in practice they are opposing concepts. There is an on-going debate
between privacy, anonymity and security that focuses on whether more security justifies
less privacy and anonymity. The work of authorities would have been much simpler if
there was no anonymity online, because cybercriminals would be easier tracked. On the
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other hand, anonymity is a powerful asset for free speech. In a world without anonymity
there would be many cases where due to ambiguities people could be exposed — Lessig
discusses this topic thoroughly in his well-known book Code v2.0 (Lessig, 2006). The
SurPRISE project2 re-examines the relationship between security and privacy, which is
usually labelled as a trade-off. In cases where security measures and technologies involve
data collection about people, questions are raised regarding privacy violations.
Privacy is often perceived as control (Margulis, 2011). For example, both privacy theories
of Altman (1975) and Westin (1967) lie on the control of the individual over their
information. Most scholars though argue that control is one of the factors that shape
privacy (e.g. Smith et al., 2011; Margulis, 2011; Levin and Snchez Abril, 2009) and it
should not be confused with privacy.
As already noted above, the relationship between privacy and all these associated con-
cepts is often under debate. This is another reason why there is disagreement on accept-
ing a single definition of privacy, and in fact it constitutes an obstacle in defining privacy
(Margulis, 2003). In addition to this, the fact that privacy is studied from a number
of different perspectives (law, psychology, economics and so on) that provide different
insights make the acceptance of a single definition of privacy even harder (Pavlou, 2011).
2.2 Why is online privacy a subject of interest
Since the inception of the World Wide Web a number of privacy-related issues have arisen
and as Web technologies continue to evolve these issues continue to grow. During the
past decade the emergence of online social network sites allowed people to share a variety
of information about themselves. In addition to this, the advent of the smartphone era
has increased this sharing trend by allowing people to be almost permanently connected
via these devices. Apart from the exciting opportunities that arose with the exchange of
people’s data in real time, concerns over people’s privacy and safety came to the surface.
The previous section focused on privacy as a general concept. However, online privacy
raises a number of new issues, as there is a lack of physical space (for example there
are no bodily actions) and interactions are not face-to-face any more; instead they are
mediated through the Web. Privacy decisions do not only have a short-term effect but
a long-term one; information published on the Web are stored indefinitely (Palen and
Dourish, 2003). Audiences can also be significantly large and invisible, in the sense
that a number of different parties can access a single person’s information without the
necessity of a direct interaction with this person (boyd, 2008). Yet, the Web has become
a part of our every-day life; we use the Web to communicate and interact with other
people, to do our shopping, to access our bank accounts, to watch films, and many other
2surprise-project.eu
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activities. In that sense, the boundaries between life online and life oﬄine have become
rather blurred (Turkle, 1995); we could even claim that there is no distinction between
them any more.
Building upon Altman’s theory (which was discussed in the previous section), Palen
and Dourish (2003) developed a theory with a particular focus on online privacy. By
reflecting on privacy’s multidimensional and dynamic nature they considered three new
privacy dimensions: the disclosure boundary (i.e. deciding what to disclose in dif-
ferent contexts), the identity boundary (i.e. managing self-presentation with different
audiences), and the temporal boundary (i.e. current actions and their effect on future
situations). It is important to note that these boundaries are dynamic and they change
as the context changes.
This brings the question of what are the reasonable expectations of privacy in the online
world. McArthur (2001) addressed this by highlighting that the social norms and the
context surrounding a piece of information affect the extent to which the privacy expecta-
tions are reasonable. In the pre-Web era these expectations were more easily identifiable;
it is reasonable to expect privacy at home but not in public spaces. McArthur argues
that the World Wide Web is a transparent public environment; therefore expecting pri-
vacy in that domain is unreasonable. Similarly, Waldo et al. (2010) suggest that at a
time when online surveillance is possible — and following the Snowden revelations it
actually happens at a global scale — nobody should have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. And as the famous quote from Scott McNealy, co-founder of Sun Microsystems,
says “You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it”. Surprisingly, this quote dates back
to 1999, yet several leading figures of tech giants have also made similar statements (e.g.
Mark Zuckerberg and Eric Schmidt).
Still, most people wish to have control over their information (Coles-kemp et al., 2010)
and the current legal framework looks out to support them (e.g. it supports people’s
expectations not to be under surveillance). In tandem with this, the Web has evolved into
an entity where people publish a variety of information about themselves (e.g. details
about their personal life in social network sites, their financial details, etc.). Boyd
calls online social spaces networked publics, meaning that they are constructed through
networked technologies and at the same time they are the communities emerging from
the intersection of people, technology, and practice (boyd, 2008). O’Hara and Shadbolt
(2008) call spaces, like the Web, that are neither entirely public nor private privatised
spaces. Several studies have provided evidence that people do expect a certain amount
of privacy even in these space (e.g boyd, 2008; Burkell et al., 2014), even though they do
recognise that these spaces are not private. Cheung (2009) argues against the reasonable
expectation of privacy and supports that it is rather insufficient to use as the standard
in privacy protection given the nature of networked publics. Researchers also express
concerns over people’s excessive online social contacts and call this phenomenon digital
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crowding (Joinson et al., 2011). As we will explore later on, privacy in public is rather
important for individuals and there is significant research going on in this area.
This variety of information that people share online can potentially be stigmatising for
them (Nosko et al., 2010). The findings from project KnowPrivacy from the University of
California revealed that most of the top 50 websites collect personal data for customised
advertising, and many of the well-known technology companies potentially share that
data with hundreds of their affiliated companies (Gomez et al., 2009). This thesis raises
the issue of the lack of awareness that people have regarding the actual affordances
of their data. In addition to this, it explores the relationship between people’s privacy
attitudes and their actual behaviour. The following section is devoted in reviewing these
topics.
2.3 Privacy decision-making
The mechanisms that people employ when making online sharing decisions are the main
focus of this research. In the following section we present the theoretical background
employed to approach these mechanisms.
2.3.1 The privacy paradox
The privacy paradox refers to the inconsistency that is often observed between people’s
sharing intentions and their actual disclosure practices (Norberg et al., 2007). The sig-
nificance of the paradox lies on the fact that it raises a number of questions concerning
people’s online privacy behaviour, such as what are the contributing factors that make
people decide to share information about themselves online and to what extent do peo-
ple make these decisions rationally. The authors found that behavioural intention to
disclose is influenced by risk but actual disclosure is not. This implies that perceived
risk influences behavioural intentions but it is not strong enough to influence the actual
disclosure behaviour.
Several studies have investigated people’s paradoxical behaviour online. An experiment
with a virtual shopping bot (conducted before social network sites became widely pop-
ular) found that although participants stated that privacy was important to them, they
tended to disclose personal information to the bot (Spiekermann et al., 2001). A similar
experiment confirmed the existence of the paradox and categorised its participants into
four distinct groups; the privacy fundamentalists, the marginally concerned, the iden-
tity concerned (i.e. concerned about data such as their name and email), and the profile
averse (i.e. concerned about revealing information such as their interests and hobbies)
(Berendt et al., 2005). A more recent study that employed a mobile application, ver-
ified in practice that indeed there is a weak relationship between people’s intentions
16 Chapter 2 Privacy Attitudes and Disclosure Behaviours
and actual disclosure behaviours (Keith et al., 2013). Through an online experiment
where participants were initially asked privacy-related questions and then participated
in an e-commerce scenario, Jensen et al. (2005) showed that apart from the fact that
people have paradoxical behaviours, they do not have accurate perceptions of their own
knowledge and understanding of online privacy.
At this point it should be noted that conducting research methods to study the privacy
paradox is a challenging mission. Its study requires the investigation of people’s privacy-
related attitudes but also their privacy disclosure behaviour. According to Norberg et al.
(2007), there are a number of challenges that are of particular relevance:
• Privacy perceptions vary widely among different people and are highly contextual.
• Different researchers use different research methods to evaluate privacy phenom-
ena.
• So far, researchers have focused on privacy attitudes, intentions, and concerns, but
not on the actual privacy disclosure mechanisms that individuals employ.
A number of studies have verified the existence of the paradox (e.g. Buckel and Thiesse,
2013; Keith et al., 2013). The above-mentioned issues, however, constitute significant
limitations for conducting research in this topic. In fact, it is rather challenging to
investigate people’s privacy behaviour in the context of an experiment, simply because
participants are aware that it is an experiment — even if they have been purposefully
misguided by the researchers. For example, the fact that many experiments take place in
a university may make the participants more trustful (Berendt et al., 2005). Taking all
the above-mentioned issues into account, it appears that there is a number of challenges
needed to be addressed in order to study the underlying reasons and mechanisms of the
privacy paradox in online environments.
Some studies question the existence of a dichotomy between attitudes and behaviour for
two main reasons. First, a few studies showed that there are cases where there is no
discrepancy between people’s attitudes and behaviours. For example, a pen-and-paper
experiment that explored the monetary value of privacy found that participants with
strong privacy concerns were willing to pay for their privacy, but they were also willing
to accept more money for it (Grossklags et al., 2007). Studies exploring privacy in social
network sites found that perceived privacy concerns do discourage people from online
sharing, however these concerns can be mitigated when people feel in control of their
privacy (Krasnova et al., 2010; Stutzman et al., 2011; Vitak, 2012).
Second, some scholars criticise the concept of the paradox as inaccurate. Preibusch
(2013) suspects that the paradox is “an inaccurate interpretation of observable phe-
nomena”. Shklovski et al. (2014) used two separate studies — a series of interviews
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exploring people’s response to tracking and data leakage, and a survey focused on peo-
ple’s privacy attitudes towards data collection by applications — and found evidence
for the privacy paradox. However, they questioned whether the privacy paradox may
obscure the relationship between privacy disclosure and digital technologies. With that
in mind they used the notion of learned helplessness to explain their findings. This
notion is often employed to explain the process by which people come to accept certain
situations by considering them as irreversible regardless of their own attempts to reverse
them (Abramson et al., 1978). In this case, regardless of people’s attitudes towards data
collection and leakage, they still continue to download applications, because they accept
that the situation will not change regardless of their own actions. Learned helplessness
is an interesting notion, however it can easily be argued that people often use the argu-
ment “this is how things are” as an excuse to compensate for actually willing to trade
their data in exchange for innovative services.
The privacy paradox serves a specific purpose as a concept; it raises the issue of the
complex nature of privacy decision-making in our digital world. People do not have
complete privacy simply by entering a private space online (e.g. their personal account in
a web application), there is always an abstract feeling that there is an invisible audience
that has access to one’s private space. In fact, as we described earlier, this space is not
really private; the Web is a privatised space. Potential entities that access one’s space can
be the system itself, a third party application or any other person that may gain access
to that space. Due to this abstract nature of online space, attitudes towards online
privacy vary; according to Westin (1967) people range from privacy fundamentalists
to unconcerned. The privacy paradox sheds light upon the fact that people’s sharing
behaviours are often in conflict with their privacy attitudes. Certainly, the nature of
their online behaviours is rather complex and the interplay between these behaviours
and the way applications use their information is not trivial either, therefore they require
further study. In tandem with this, as described earlier, some studies have shown that
there are cases where privacy concerns may discourage disclosures. This also stresses
the complexity of privacy behaviours. This thesis aims to explore the complex nature
of privacy decisions and the reasoning behind them. In that sense, the paradox is an
important concept because it acts as a starting point for the research presented here, as
it raises all these issues, it highlights their magnitude and calls for further investigation.
2.3.2 The privacy trade-off
The second important concept regarding privacy decision-making is the so-called privacy
trade-off, also known as the privacy calculus. The trade-off shows that privacy decisions
are based on a cost-benefit examination (Acquisti, 2009); to what extent are people
willing to release their data online in exchange for a particular service.
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The privacy trade-off along with the underlying reasons behind the privacy paradox can
be related to the ways people make consumer decisions, therefore studies on this topic
have provided input into privacy research. Consumers make a cost-benefit examination
to assess the outcomes of the release of their information (e.g. Hann et al., 2002; Hui
et al., 2006, 2007; Dinev and Hart, 2006; Li et al., 2011a; Kehr et al., 2013). Bearing in
mind that the tangible and intangible consequences of privacy are not easy to estimate,
a number of factors may influence privacy decisions (Acquisti, 2009). According to
Bettman et al. (1998), people are influenced by a set of preferences, which are often
constructed on the spot, during the decision process — instead of predefined preferences.
Predefined preferences usually come with experience with the decision environment (on
the Web that could be a routine activity on a specific application), although situational
factors may still influence decisions.
The privacy trade-off can be viewed as a form of social contract that governs privacy
decision-making. The concept of social contract has long been employed to explain the
expected behaviour during a transaction and its outcomes. The terms of the agreement
are based on the assumptions that the involving parties acknowledge the existence of
bounded rationality and recognise the need for a moral fabric (Dunfee et al., 1999).
Fairness is fundamental in social contracts, as it empowers individuals with control and
assures that all parties will adhere to the terms of the agreement (Culnan and Bies,
2003). In an online experiment investigating the willingness of participants to disclose
information about themselves it was found that fairness (i.e. the collected data will be
used for the intended purpose and nothing else) has a strong positive impact on people’s
disclosure decisions (Malheiros et al., 2013).
Acquisti and Grossklags stress a number of issues that help explain people’s privacy
decision-making. Incomplete information is a first issue, as people are expected to make
privacy decisions with limited and asymmetric information — meaning lack of informa-
tion about the possible outcomes after releasing one’s data (Acquisti and Grossklags,
2005, 2007). For example, this lack of information can be on the access rights of third
parties to a person’s information but also on the individual’s privacy protection levels
from third party access (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2007). Bounded rationality (Bettman
et al., 1998) presents an additional challenge to this (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005,
2007), since people tend to make simplified decisions by choosing the path that requires
the minimum cognitive effort but also minimum negative emotion instead of using mech-
anisms based on rationality. People also tend to focus more on the short-term effects
of their privacy decisions rather than the long-term ones. Hyperbolic discounting refers
to people’s tendency to focus on immediate gratification rather than the potential long-
term risks (O’Donogue and Rabin, 2000; Acquisti, 2004; Acquisti and Grossklags, 2004).
For instance, a recent study by Microsoft on online reputation showed that only less than
half of Americans think on the long-term consequences that their online activities may
have on their reputation (Brackenbury and Wong, 2013). Hyperbolic discounting creates
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a conflict between today’s preferences and future preferences (Laibson, 1997). Immediate
gratification is obviously a concept directly related to discounting, as it points out that
people look for the immediate benefits of their trade-off. In that sense, people under-
indulge in cases where the costs are immediate and the benefits are in the long-term
(e.g. procrastination), whereas people over-indulge in the opposite cases because the
benefits are immediate (O’Donogue and Rabin, 2000). Another privacy-related issue is
the merger of different audiences into one single group, known as context collapse. It is
a common characteristic among many web applications such as Facebook (boyd, 2008;
Marwick and boyd, 2010; Vitak, 2012).
Several other psychological biases may play a role in people’s decision making. Acquisti
and Grossklags (2007) suggested a number of simplistic and paradoxical biases, such
as overconfidence, the valence effect, rational ignorance, status quo bias, reciprocity
and fairness, and inequity aversion. The valence effect refers to the belief that privacy
invasions can only happen to other people but not to the individual himself, whereas
rational ignorance appears in cases where deep understanding of a situation to form a
rational decision requires much more effort than simply accepting its benefits. Status quo
bias stresses the fact that people do not like changes and they prefer things to remain
the same (e.g. not changing their privacy settings). Reciprocity and fairness refer to
people’s aspiration to act fairly in their trade-offs. Closely related to this concept is
inequity aversion, which deals with people’s discontent when they feel that others are
unfairly getting rewards they do not deserve.
Other factors that may also influence privacy decisions are economic benefits (i.e. in-
formation in exchange for monetary rewards) (e.g. Hann et al., 2002; Hui et al., 2007)
and incentives towards price discrimination (e.g. vouchers), given the condition that
the information required to disclose is relevant to the purpose of the trade-off (Odlyzko,
2003; Li et al., 2010). Several studies that conduct experiments using monetary benefits
show varying outcomes on privacy decisions. Although people tend to be willing to
accept to give away their privacy in exchange for benefits, studies have shown that they
are not as willing to pay in order to protect it (Grossklags et al., 2007; Acquisti et al.,
2009). However, people’s willingness to pay for privacy may change when there are
clear indications of privacy protection. A study based on an online shopping experiment
showed that people are willing to pay a premium to shop from websites that are more
privacy protective (Tsai et al., 2010). Several studies have shown that when people feel
comfortable and in control they are likely to share their information online. A study
that used location-based coupons showed that TRUSTe3 seals and legal statements on
people’s had a positive effect on sharing decisions (Xu et al., 2009). However, an earlier
study had slightly different results; privacy statements made more participants to dis-
close their personal information but TRUSTe privacy seals did not (Hui et al., 2007). An
experiment that provided people with feedback — regarding past requests from other
3Company that provides privacy seals to websites.
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users to see their location — revealed that through feedback provision people felt more
comfortable, and in turn more willing to share their data (Tsai et al., 2009). Brandi-
marte et al. (2012) ran a study consisting of three separate experiments that showed
that when people have the perception of being in control over the access to their data,
they tend to reveal more sensitive information, even though in reality they become more
exposed. Wiese et al. (2011) ran an online survey where participants were asked to share
information with others in several scenarios and found that when someone feels close to
someone else they are more willing to share information with them. On the other hand, a
study that used disclosure justification messages (i.e. justifying to the participants why
they ask for their data) in an online experiment with a recommender system hoping to
observe more disclosure, revealed instead that the justifications turned the participants
to be less satisfied with their interaction with the system and did not increase disclosure
(Knijnenburg and Kobsa, 2013a). Finally, a recent study with an experiment where
participants bought a DVD from two separate online shops found that they were not
willing to pay for privacy in cases where there was e1 discount at the shop that asked
for personal information. In addition to this, they found that even in the case where
there was no discount at the shop that requested personal information only half of the
participants used the shop that did not (Beresford et al., 2012).
All these studies highlight a significant issue, which is that people do not make privacy
decisions based on rational and consistent mechanisms (Acquisti et al., 2009). People
trade their information based on a set of contextual and heuristically defined preferences,
rather than a rational evaluation of the consequences of their decision.
2.3.3 Structuration theory and the privacy trade-off
The privacy trade-off as a process of decision-making may also be linked to a theory,
developed by Anthony Giddens, known as structuration theory. Norberg’s study showed
that behavioural intention is governed by risk, whereas actual disclosure is not (Norberg
et al., 2007), as described in a previous section, which can potentially be understood
through the application of this theory.
Structuration is a social theory that frames behaviour as a balance between structure
and agency, where the structure refers to the rules and resources that shape people’s
behaviour, whereas the agency refers to people’s ability to act based on their free choices
(Giddens, 1984). Giddens uses language as an analogy to rules pointing out that people
react strongly when others disrespect the rules of a language. Similarly, people are
assumed to meet their social expectations. Resources are the frames of reference where
rules are carried out. They can be allocative, establishing control over things (e.g.
someone’s land) or authoritative, establishing command over others (e.g. someone’s
social status). Structure is seen by Giddens as a source of constraint on people’s free
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choices. In that way the number of choices that are available to people is constrained
through structures.
The relationship between agents and structures has been the subject of a long dispute
among sociologists. Bourdieu (1977) constructed a theoretical model of social practice
in which he introduced the concepts of habitus and field. Habitus expresses the way in
which agents develop attitudes and dispositions, but also the ways in which they engage
in practices (Webb et al., 2002). In that sense, habitus is embodied in agents and it
is an unconscious formation (Adams, 2006). A field is “a structured system of social
positions — occupied by either individuals or institutions — the nature of which defines
the situation for their occupants [...] a field is structured internally in terms of power
relations” (Jenkins, 2002). As agents move across different fields, they incorporate into
their habitus the structures of those fields. Bourdieu’s theory offers a view in which
agents do not really intervene in the way that the world works (Jenkins, 2002).
Giddens offered a new approach to this subject. At the core of the theory of structuration
lies the notion of duality of structure; structures are the medium for decision making but
at the same time they are the outcome of the agents’ decision-making. In Giddens’ own
words “social structures are both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same
time are the very medium of this constitution”. In that sense structure has a dynamic
nature that is reproduced through practice.
Structuration theory suggests three ways that structures become embedded in social
interactions:
• Communication of meaning. People make use of interpretive schemes (e.g. a
person who wears a white coat is a doctor).
• Use of power. People make use of resources involving structures of domination (e.g.
a person who wears a badge is a police officer and has the authority to exercise
certain power).
• Application of sanctions. People make use of societal norms involving structures
of legitimation (e.g. people are expected to be formally dressed at a wedding).
According to Giddens, humans are reflexive individuals in the sense that we have dif-
ferent levels of consciousness that affect the way we behave in different contexts. In
contrast to Bourdieu, reflexivity is an important feature of structuration theory. Gid-
dens distinguishes two important levels of consciousness. The first level of consciousness
is called discursive consciousness; at this level people are able to reflect and justify their
actions and knowledge. The second is called practical consciousness; it includes all the
cases where people know how certain things are in practice (knowledge of rules) but
cannot describe them in a discursive way. For example, we take for granted that a dog is
a dog and a cat is a cat. Practical consciousness enables people to go on with their daily
22 Chapter 2 Privacy Attitudes and Disclosure Behaviours
routines. Through the repetition of people’s routines these structures are continuously
recreated (the duality of structure). Therefore, the concept of practical consciousness is
principal in structuration theory. At this point a question regarding privacy decision-
making is raised; to what extent are privacy decisions part of discursive consciousness
and to what extent are they part of practical consciousness?
This theory has the advantage of being a rather abstract theory; as a result it can be
integrated into different contexts — although Giddens himself intended it to remain
theoretical. Stones (2005) develops an approach called strong structuration theory that
overcomes the abstract nature of the theory and places it in situ, and calls for empirical
research to be conducted using structuration. “It (structuration) can focus on any set of
surface appearances and make our understanding of them richer and more meaningful
by elaborating upon the structures and agents involved and placing them in relevant
networks of social and historical relations”. In this research we use structuration in
attempt to understand the privacy trade-off on the Web.
Giddens’ theory has already been used and expanded to understand the relationship
between technology and people. Jones and Karsten (2008) provide an in-depth review of
papers in the field of Information Systems that employ structuration. Orlikowski (1992)
introduced the “duality of technology”, where technology obtains structural properties:
it is the product of people and it is the people who apply a meaning to it, however when
it is used in practice it becomes institutionalised. Adaptive Structuration Theory was
also based on the work of Giddens and focused on the relationship between “information
technologies, social structures and human interaction” in order to challenge what was
perceived as a technocratic view of technology usage (Desanctis and Scott, 1994).
Although structuration has been applied to different technology domains, to the best of
the author’s knowledge it has not been used in the sphere of privacy on the Web.
With regards to online privacy, structuration theory would suggest that people are con-
strained by structures (such as trust or social expectations) when making privacy deci-
sions and therefore do not act entirely as free agents. Here, we will go through a number
of different examples where structuration could be applied. For example, the constraint
could potentially account for the differences between their stated privacy attitudes, and
their actual privacy behaviour. An example of such a structure could be the privacy
settings that a specific online application applies as standard and every user is expected
to follow (establishing a strong norm). At the same time though the privacy settings
can be changed, depending on the feedback they received from people’s use of them.
Structuration theory could potentially explain the results of John et al. (2011), who
found that a professional looking website raises more privacy concerns than an unpro-
fessional site. The change of context had significant impact on the sharing decisions of
their participants. A web-based survey on Flickr users showed that community-specific
privacy concerns do affect people to choose more restrictive privacy settings, whereas
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trust in other members and the community’s information sharing norms decrease pri-
vacy concerns (Nov and Wattal, 2009). In both studies, the structures that govern the
respective applications had an immediate effect on people’s privacy concerns. In the
first study through the interpretive scheme participants acknowledged whether these
were professional looking websites or not, whereas in the second study the structures of
legitimation showed that the sharing norms that govern Flickr expect users to perform
certain actions (upload photos in this case).
This research aims to investigate whether there is evidence that indicates that the privacy
trade-off can be related to the theory of structuration. In other words, this thesis will
explore whether people are influenced by a set of structures when they make privacy
decisions that causes them to deviate from their previously stated beliefs and whether
those decisions could potential reinforce or create new influential structures.
2.3.4 Cognitive dissonance and the privacy trade-off
In the late 1950s Leon Festinger, an American social psychologist, developed a theory
known as cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is a psychological state of tension
that occurs whenever an individual is faced with a situation that is in conflict with their
belief system. According to this theory, people are naturally driven to find a balance
between their beliefs and actions to avoid the dissonance. Festinger suggested three paths
that help people to overcome dissonance. The first one is by changing their beliefs, the
second by changing their actions, and the third path by changing their perception of
their actions (Festinger, 1962).
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) tested this theory with a classic experiment in which all
participants were instructed to perform a tedious task. However, at the end of the task
some of them were offered $20 to describe the task to the next participant, who was in
reality an actor, as an exciting experience. The remaining participants were only offered
$1 for the same task. Naturally, due to the money offered to them the participants of
the first group were strongly motivated to describe the task in a favourable way, in fact
lie, whereas the participants of the second group were not. Surprisingly though, in the
process of promoting the task as something interesting, the participants of the second
group actually changed their own opinions and claimed that it was indeed interesting;
thus showing signs of cognitive dissonance.
A simple example to understand this theory is smoking. Although people are aware that
smoking causes serious health problems, they still do smoke:
“The person who continues to smoke, knowing that it is bad for his health, may also
feel (a) he enjoys smoking so much it is worth it; (b) the chances of his health suffering
are not as serious as some would make out; (c) he can’t always avoid every possible
dangerous contingency and still live; and (d) perhaps even if he stopped smoking he
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would put on weight which is equally bad for his health. So, continuing to smoke is, after
all, consistent with his ideas about smoking” (Festinger, 1957).
In the almost six decades of its existence, a number of different experiments using Fes-
tinger’s theory have taken place. For example Brehm’s well-known free-choice paradigm
(Brehm, 1956), the experiment on the effect of punishment on cognitive dissonance
(Aronson and Carlsmith, 1963; Aronson, 1997), as well as more recent studies on the
origins of cognitive dissonance (Egan et al., 2007), and studies taking a neuroscience
perspective (Jarcho et al., 2011; Izuma et al., 2010). Over the years the theory has ma-
tured through the various criticisms and revisions but also through the different areas
it has been applied to (Cooper, 2007; Metin and Metin Camgoz, 2011). For the pur-
poses of this thesis, we will try to view privacy disclosure decisions through a cognitive
dissonance lens.
Similarly to the previously mentioned example, cognitive dissonance can be connected
to the privacy trade-off. Individuals who share their data knowing there are potential
implications to their privacy may also feel that they enjoy sharing aspects of their lives
with their online friends, or that there is only a small likelihood that their privacy
would be seriously violated, or that even if they stopped sharing at any moment, their
information is already online (due to data persistence on the Web). In that sense, data
sharing is consistent with their ideas about privacy.
In the case of privacy decisions, cognitive dissonance may occur in two separate cases.
The first case deals with the privacy paradox, which was described in the previous section.
The paradox stresses the existence of a discrepancy between people’s privacy attitudes
and their actual disclosure behaviour. In a similar way, cognitive dissonance deals with
conflicting attitudes and behaviours. In the case of the privacy paradox, it may occur
when people attempt to justify their disclosure behaviour when in discordance with
their privacy attitudes. Festinger stresses that dissonance is a usual phenomenon when
people form an opinion or make a decision; it is inevitable when they decide to act in one
way but their knowledge and beliefs point to another direction. In that way cognitive
dissonance can be a useful tool in understanding people’s paradoxical behaviours in
privacy decision-making. As we saw in the section on the privacy paradox, Shklovski
et al. (2014) used the notion of learned helplessness to justify their findings and criticise
the paradox. However, cognitive dissonance can explain the reason behind people’s
paradoxical behaviour; in the case of the study by Shklovski et al. (2014), the excuse
that people accept that the situation will not change regardless of their own actions
could easily serve a means to reduce the dissonance caused by their actions.
The second case deals with situations where people might have regretted their privacy
decisions. In this case people decide to share their data online and later on they experi-
ence tension between their sharing behaviour and their beliefs. Regretting the sharing of
their data can be seen as a means to minimise the cognitive dissonance that was raised
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by this action. However, their action cannot be easily taken back, since their data may
be stored indefinitely. Several studies on online sharing behaviour in social network sites
have found that signs of regret are common when study participants are asked to justify
their past online disclosure decisions (Sleeper et al., 2013b,a; Patil et al., 2012; Wang
et al., 2011).
2.4 Conclusion
Privacy is a concept that has long been under study. Yet, with the success of the World
Wide Web it has come to the surface again as an urgent research topic. This chapter
began with a review of privacy theories prior to the emergence of the Web. An extensive
review of a number of theories related to privacy decision-making along with empirical
studies that explore these followed. These theories offer the theoretical background for
the research presented in this thesis. The next chapter explores how privacy decision-
making is a relevant topic to the Social Web.

Chapter 3
Privacy and the Social Web
With the emergence of web applications that enabled user-generated content and social
interactions, the Web became a place where people perform a number of activities (from
online shopping and gaming to posting personal details in social network sites). The sets
of relationships that connect people across the Web constitute, what we call today, the
Social Web (Halpin and Tuffield, 2010). Important components of the Social Web are
social network sites; defined by Ellison and boyd (2013) as “networked communication
platforms in which participants a) have uniquely identifiable profiles that consist of user-
supplied content, content provided by other users, and/or system-provided data, b) can
publicly articulate connections that can be viewed and traversed by others, and c) can
consume, produce, and/or interact with streams of user-generated content provided by
their connections on the site”.
Privacy on the Social Web has been acknowledged as an area of significant concern
especially when it comes to user awareness of privacy risks and their ability to manage
personal information (Loukides and Gkoulalas-Divanis, 2009). It requires the utmost
attention of privacy scholars as it brings out a new dimension to online privacy, and
that is identity. It refers to the social identity people use on the Web, but also the
identity that is constructed by the presentation of oneself. The Web is no longer as it
used to be at its early days — an entity with a small number of users and even fewer
content providers. Instead, it has grown to become part of everyone’s daily routines,
a place where people present themselves through content sharing and interacting with
others.
This chapter provides an overview of the current state of privacy research on the Social
Web. It explores a number of different topics, such as human interactions online and
their relationship to privacy, the demographics of privacy, but it also hopes unveil the
relationship between trust and privacy online. The chapter continues with an overview
of empirical, but also technical approaches to privacy management.
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3.1 Interactions in the Social Web
In the Social Web every user leaves their footprint that is stored permanently in digital
format. O’Hara (2010) calls this tendency of personal information sharing Intimacy 2.0.
Intimacy is an essential part of people’s lives as it fulfils the human desire for relationship
establishment. Social network sites provide an ideal ground for this, as they enable
people — especially young people — to maintain friendships but also to explore their
identities (Clarke, 2009; Livingstone, 2008). For instance, through a series of interviews
Livingstone (2008) observed differences in the way teenagers present themselves in social
networks as they grow older (from a more elaborate, stylistic identity at a younger age
to a more plain identity focused on connecting with others in their late teenage years).
3.1.1 Self-presentation
Self-presentation is not a new concept and definitely not solely related to the Web; it was
thoroughly investigated by sociologist Erving Goffman, who studied human behaviour
in social interactions and affirmed that people wish to control the way others perceive
them during their face-to-face interactions (Goffman, 1959). Goffman approached this
topic with an analogy, more specifically by analysing theatrical performances. Similarly
to theatrical performances, in social interactions each person is a performer who projects
a conception of himself. In different contexts a person may give different performances.
In addition to this, the performer tries to control the impression he gives to others.
However, as the author points out, during each performance when the performer gives
an expression at the same time he also gives off another expression to his audiences.
In other words, the performer projects two different expressions of himself; their first
expression is intentional, whereas the second one unintentional. In that sense, a process
does take place, which consists of the following steps: a person gives a performance to
an audience, the audience interprets his performance, and finally the person adjusts his
performance based on the feedback of the audience. This process is called impression
management.
The Web has offered an outstanding opportunity for people to present themselves to
others and receive feedback on their performances. Similarly to Goffman’s theatrical
performances, on the Social Web people try to present a certain image of themselves
and they often underestimate the fact that they give off a different impression to their
audiences, which makes them look self-important (Barash et al., 2010). As studies have
shown, other people (i.e. online audiences) do indeed influence and challenge a person’s
self-presentation in the Social Web in a way similar to oﬄine interactions (Litt et al.,
2014). Even before the Social Web, scholars explored the formation of identities through
digital technologies. For instance, in the 1990s Sherry Turkle explored how multi-user
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domains (multi-player real-time virtual worlds, mainly text-based) helped people ex-
plore aspects of their selves (Turkle, 1995). However, as boyd (2014) points out, in
social network sites people communicate with others that they often know from physical
settings and present themselves in contexts that are closely related to unmediated social
communities.
In face-to-face performances the “personal front” of the performer includes a number of
characteristics such as clothing, gender, age, and so on. In addition to this, as already
stated in the previous chapter, body language may also be used to convey information.
In online interactions, however, there is a lack of physical presence. Instead interactions
take place through the exchange of different types of digital content (messages, photos
etc.). The norm “one body, one identity” does not apply to the Web. In complete
contrast to that, an individual may have multiple online personas (Donath, 1999). How-
ever, with the advent of social network sites and Facebook in particular, people started
developing profiles under their real names (although fake profiles can still be created).
This feature of social networks empowers people to construct digital identities and can
be particularly useful for teenagers who are at an age of identity establishment.
Another difference between Web and physical performances is that the first can happen
with great ease — with a click of the mouse — and may be projected to multiple
audiences simultaneously. For example, people can easily show that they are at a specific
location — and possibly reveal their activity in real-time as well as the people they are
with — that would increase the potential for social interaction by simply doing a check-in
through their social network account (Wang and Stefanone, 2013).
However, the lack of a visible audience complicates online interactions. The issue with
invisible audiences is that often people underestimate the size of their audience (boyd,
2008). For instance, a study at the early days of Facebook showed that misconceptions
about one’s visibility within the network are common (Acquisti and Gross, 2006). A more
recent study from Stanford University and Facebook followed 220.000 users of this social
network site over a monthly period. They found that users hugely underestimated the
size of their audience by a third of its actual size. In fact, each post reached instantly 35%
of their friends and 61% of them over a month (Bernstein et al., 2013). Yet, in some cases
people may decide not to share content online precisely because of the potentially large
audiences, using self-censorship as a means to control their self-presentation (Sleeper
et al., 2013a).
Self-presentation is often related to narcissistic traits and social network sites provide a
new window of opportunity for people to promote themselves (Carpenter, 2012). A study
comparing users with non-users of Facebook revealed that indeed users tended to be
more narcissistic than non-users (Ryan and Xenos, 2011). In that sense, social network
sites are ideal spaces because people can have hundreds of connections (hence a large
audience) and be in complete control of the content they post (e.g. photos of themselves)
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(Mehdizadeh, 2010). Studies have also revealed that the ways through which narcissists
portray themselves in these spaces are similar to the ways they portray themselves
oﬄine (Buffardi and Campbell, 2008). Their main characteristics are higher levels of
social interaction and more frequent publication of self-promoting content (Mehdizadeh,
2010; Ong et al., 2011), methods that can also be employed oﬄine.
3.1.2 Social capital
The feedback people receive through their online interactions is not only related to self-
promotion but may in fact offer them a number of significant benefits. Such benefits
can be emotional support, advice, new information and ideas and so on. For instance,
Vitak (2012) studied self-presentation in social network sites through the form of self-
disclosures (e.g. status updates) and stressed that it has an important role for relation-
ship maintenance. All these benefits are part of what is called social capital. Bourdieu
(1986) describes social capital as the total of the actual or potential resources people
may benefit from through their social network. Ellison et al. (2011) note that it can be
viewed as a form of capital embedded in social relationships. Since social capital deals
with social relationships, it can be of benefit to more than one person (Schmid, 2000).
In fact, it may offer benefits not only to individuals but also to social groups (Lin et al.,
2001).
Social capital is a long-studied concept in sociology — key contributors include Bourdieu
(1986) and Coleman (1988) — but it has also been explored in other research areas such
as economics, politics, and management (e.g. Adler and Kwon, 2002; Sander, 2002;
Putnam, 2000; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). As a consequence, numerous definitions
of this concept exist (e.g. Adler and Kwon, 2002, have listed several key definitions from
different scholars), yet they all agree that social capital deals with social relations and
their potential benefits. Coleman (1988) highlights the beneficial nature of social capital
by stating that it is productive, since it enables the achievement of certain ends which
would not have been made possible without it. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) distinguish
between three dimensions of social capital: the structural (i.e. the structure of the social
network), the relational (i.e. the social relations), and the cognitive dimension (i.e. the
shared interpretive schemes of the people within the network).
Apart from the lack of a commonly acknowledged definition there is also a lot of con-
troversy over the appropriateness of the use of the word “capital” in the term. Often
researchers point out a clash between its usage in the concept of social capital and the
classic meaning of the word “capital” in economics. According to Smith and Kulynych
(2002) this word offers a too broad, pervasive, and honorific meaning to the concept.
Similarly, an issue for economists is that it cannot be measured in monetary terms
(Solow, 2001; Piazza-Georgi, 2002). A number of different scholars have debated over
Chapter 3 Privacy and the Social Web 31
this, some have even offered alternative terms to replace it, but this debate is still on-
going (e.g. Piazza-Georgi, 2002; Smith and Kulynych, 2002; Lin et al., 2001; Portes,
2000).
Several researchers have focused mostly on the positive aspects of social capital. How-
ever, it may also have undesirable effects. Portes (2000) points out some potential
unwanted outcomes such as exclusion of outsiders (i.e. it has benefits only for people
within the group), excess claims on group members (i.e. a free-rider problem emerges),
restrictions on individual freedoms (i.e. members need to conform to the group), and
downward levelling norms (i.e. not promoting social mobility in order to sustain group
cohesion).
This thesis focuses on the role of social capital in the Social Web in particular. During
the past few years a number of studies have focused on the existence of social capital in
online environments and especially in social network sites. Indeed these spaces offer a
perfect ground for building and maintaining one’s social capital (Hampton et al., 2011;
Steinfield et al., 2008; Chiu et al., 2006). Studies often make a distinction between two
forms of social capital, bonding and bridging social capital (Vitak, 2012; Burke et al.,
2011; Ellison et al., 2007; Williams, 2006). Putnam (2000) presented in detail these two
distinctive kinds of social capital in his book “Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival
of American Community”. The first refers mostly to the emotional support offered
by close relationships (strong ties); research has shown that we increasingly use social
network sites to keep up with people close to us. A survey of the Pew Research Centre
found that Internet users and especially social network users get more social support
than non-users — in terms of emotional support, companionship, and tangible support
(Hampton et al., 2011).
Bridging social capital refers to access to new information that is offered by weaker
connections; as Granovetter (1983) suggested weak ties act as bridges between network
segments. For example, a Facebook study showed that people engage themselves in
information seeking strategies to learn more about acquaintances that they know little
about (i.e. their weak ties) (Ellison et al., 2011). Burke et al. (2011) found that different
types of activities on Facebook can have different effects on bridging social capital by
showing that receiving messages from friends is associated with an increase in bridging
social capital, whereas other activities do not have similar effects (the other activities
they studied were passive reading of news, and simple status updates). Yet, the study
also showed that passive reading of other people’s news does offer support to people with
poor communication skills. Other studies have indicated that social network sites may
help people with low self-esteem (more than people with high self-esteem) to overcome
their barriers and build large networks — which are sources of bridging social capital
(Steinfield et al., 2008). However, sometimes this can happen by sharing exaggerated
information about themselves (Zywica and Danowski, 2008).
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There is a lack of research regarding the interplay between privacy attitudes, disclosure
behaviours and social capital. Stutzman et al. (2012b) also highlighted this gap and
studied this triadic relationship using an online survey targeted to social network users.
Their findings suggest that privacy has an indirect relationship with social capital, as it
influences directly disclosure behaviours, which in turn bring out social capital outcomes.
This thesis will address the role of social capital in disclosure decisions and privacy
management in Chapter 6.
3.2 The demographics of privacy
A significant amount of research has focused on questions that are raised on people’s at-
titudes and behaviour online with regards to privacy. Social network sites, in particular,
have provided new ground for research both as a topic of study but also as a medium
for data collection.
Many studies have focused on different demographics (e.g. age, gender) and their impact
on people’s privacy attitudes and behaviour. For instance, a topic of great interest and
debate is the use of online services and especially social network sites from young people.
The following sections explore differences in privacy attitudes based on demographics.
3.2.1 Gender differences
Both men and women use the Web on a regular basis to a similar degree. According
to Pew Research Centre, in 2011 80% men and 76% women in the USA were on the
internet (Zickuhr and Smith, 2012), percentages that by 2013 escalated to 85% and 84%
respectively (Zickuhr, 2013b).
With regards to online privacy, research has often provided evidence that women tend
to have more privacy concerns than men (Wills and Zeljkovic, 2011; Hoy and Milne,
2010; Fogel and Nehmad, 2009; Youn and Hall, 2008), and in fact are more likely to be
more private online. Several studies show that women who use social network sites are
more likely to have their profiles set as private compared to men (Madden, 2012; Lewis
et al., 2008). An early study on Facebook (Facebook was launched in 2004 the study
took place in 2006) showed that women at the early years of this social network did not
share specific information about themselves, such as their sexual orientation, address
and phone number (Acquisti and Gross, 2006). A more recent study that crawled
479K Facebook profiles found that men share more publicly personal information in
comparison with women, yet the difference between them was small (Farahbakhsh et al.,
2013). Another study found that men and women of equal digital skills tend to equally
share their content online (Hargittai and Walejko, 2008). Still, Quercia et al. (2012)
found that women are more likely to share information about themselves less publicly
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than men. Significantly, women are more likely to take certain measurements to protect
their privacy (Thelwall, 2011). For example, they are more likely to read privacy policies
before creating an account in a social network site, “untag” themselves from photos,
and be careful about whom they friend (Hoy and Milne, 2010). However, both men and
women are equally likely to search for their digital footprint (Madden and Smith, 2010).
3.2.2 Young people
A long debate has taken place regarding the attitudes towards online disclosures and
privacy management from different age groups. For a long time it was a common claim
that young people do not care about privacy. Prensky (2001) coined the term digital
natives to refer to young people that grew up in the current digital era — also known
as the net generation (Tapscott, 2009, 1998) among other terms — distinguishing them
in that way from older generations, known as digital immigrants. Palfrey and Gasser
(2008) differentiated these two groups between people who were born after 1980 and
grew up with the Web and people who were already adults at the time. To the eyes of
the digital immigrants online privacy is viewed as a complete oxymoron. Parents and
educators are the ones who should offer the appropriate guidance to younger generations;
however the problem of digital literacy in the older generations constitutes an obstacle
to its realisation. As a consequence, the solution to the issue of guidance often lies on
younger generations themselves (Palfrey and Gasser, 2008).
The use of the terms digital immigrants and digital natives has often been criticised
by the research community. Several researchers disagree with their use and state that
there are multifaceted factors that affect people’s digital skills, hence it is fundamental to
conduct empirical research aiming to understand people’s online attitudes and behaviour
(e.g. Buckingham, 2008; Hargittai, 2010; Jones and Czerniewicz, 2010; Jones et al., 2010;
Margaryan et al., 2011; Koutropoulos, 2014).
Recent research has also found that the claim that young people do not care about
privacy does not hold in practice (Blank et al., 2014; Marwick et al., 2010; Hoofnagle
et al., 2010; Christofides et al., 2011). Sanchez Abril (2007) use the analogy of car
drivers to illustrate the fact that the so-called digital natives do expect a certain level
of privacy even though they are in a public online place. Reports on social media usage
show that nowadays teenagers and young adults have more private settings on Facebook
compared to the past, however they do share a lot of information about themselves with
large networks of online friends (Christofides et al., 2011; Stutzman et al., 2012a; Madden
et al., 2013; Tessem and Nyre, 2013). Surprisingly, most teenagers are not very concerned
about third-party access to their data (Madden et al., 2013). A Facebook study on young
students (aged between 18–25) found that they care to manage their social privacy (i.e.
how others view them), but they have little concern about institutional privacy (i.e.
what applications do with their data) (Young and Quan-Haase, 2013).
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3.3 The role of trust in privacy decision-making
This section focuses on the role of trust in the Social Web and especially on its relation-
ship with privacy concerns and disclosure behaviours. Because of this, we look at trust
from the perspective of the users; trust emerges when users believe that a specific web
application is competent, benevolent and honest in handling their personal information
(McKnight et al., 2002).
Beldad et al. (2011) suggest several aspects that may influence people’s trust in an
application; the existence of a privacy statement (even if they do not actually read it),
the use of security measures, and its reputation. A study on people’s willingness to share
information with applications (with a focus on Foursquare1) found that frequent users
are more confident and more inclined to share information (Tessem and Nyre, 2013).
Other studies have reached similar results; they all agree that the frequent usage of
social network sites has positive effects on people’s confidence with online sharing, as
well as their trust in these applications (Fogel and Nehmad, 2009; Frye and Dornisch,
2010; Lin and Liu, 2012).
The relationship between these three constructs — privacy concerns, trust, and disclo-
sure behaviours — is rather complex and delicate, as pointed out by several researchers
(e.g. Joinson et al., 2010; Taddei and Contena, 2013). When Norberg et al. (2007) in-
troduced the concept of the privacy paradox they also started their experiment with
the hypothesis that behavioural intention to disclose is influenced by risk, whereas ac-
tual disclosure is based on trust heuristics (i.e. trust has a direct influence on privacy
behaviour). However, their results did not offer sufficient evidence to support the hy-
pothesis that trust does influence actual behaviour. Since then, there has been a sub-
stantial number of studies (mostly survey-based and some experiment-based) that has
provided evidence that trust does indeed decrease privacy concerns (Joinson et al., 2010;
Taddei and Contena, 2013) and influence in a positive way sharing intentions (Lin and
Liu, 2012; Zimmer et al., 2010; Dwyer et al., 2007), and disclosure decisions (Mesch,
2012; Krasnova et al., 2010). However, studies have come out with contradicting results
regarding the extent of that influence; whether trust influences directly or indirectly
sharing intentions and behavioural disclosures (Taddei and Contena, 2013).
Krasnova et al. (2010) found that perceived control over one’s information also plays a
role in privacy decision-making, as the sense of control has a positive influence on trust,
which in turn reduces perceived privacy risk. In conjunction with this, an earlier study
found that risk awareness reduces trust and increases the demand for control (Olivero
and Lunt, 2004). The relationship between trust and control was also confirmed by
Taddei and Contena (2013), yet their study found that perceived privacy risks do not
affect disclosure behaviours directly.
1foursquare.com
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Taking all the above-mentioned into consideration, the role of trust in privacy decision-
making appears to be complex, and therefore requires further analysis, as studies often
come to different results regarding the importance of its role. However, it is commonly
acknowledged that trust does indeed play a role in the privacy decision-making process.
This means that systems need to provide an environment where a sense of trust does
emerge.
3.4 Privacy management issues
A number of studies have focused on privacy management in social networks. They
depict a mixed picture of users who are concerned about privacy but struggle to set
appropriate preferences and whose behaviour does not necessarily follow that concern.
For example, in a US-nationwide survey 58% of the participants stated that they have
private profiles in social networks, and at the same time 50% of the participants expressed
difficulties in managing their privacy settings (Madden, 2012). A survey focusing on
Facebook that was conducted twice with the same group of young people (in 2009 and
2010), revealed that being a regular user often coincided with more regular changes in
their privacy settings (boyd and Hargittai, 2010). Another study showed that people who
have a personal experience of privacy invasions are more willing to change their privacy
settings than others (Debatin et al., 2009). A seven-year long study on Facebook in the
USA found that with time people share more online, yet they do make their content more
private. More specifically, the study collected Facebook profile data (such as home town,
birth date, contact information, and interests) and found that with time the amount of
profile data displayed publicly on the network decreased. Apparently, as time passes
Facebook requests more data from its users, but the users are less likely to show their
content to strangers (Stutzman et al., 2012a).
Still, the study revealed another major issue; with the current state of things all third
parties (Facebook, advertisers, third party applications) collect even more data about
the users (Stutzman et al., 2012a). To make things worse, there is a lack of user aware-
ness regarding third party access to their data as well as potential data manipulations
(Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2008). For instance, the TRUSTe Internet of Things Privacy
Index found that only 47% of people in the UK 2 and 59% of people in the US 3 know
that smart devices can collect details about their personal activities. In addition to
this, the latest Pew Internet Report found that most American teenagers do not have
strong concerns regarding third-party access to their data (Madden et al., 2013), which
indicates the existence of another paradox. As systems and other third parties contin-
uously collect information about people, people themselves are either unaware of these
2http://www.truste.com/gb-internet-of-things-index-2014/
TRUSTe Internet of Things Privacy Index - GB Edition
3http://www.truste.com/us-internet-of-things-index-2014/
TRUSTe Internet of Things Privacy Index - US Edition
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affordances of their data or they are not even concerned about this issue and continue
exchanging their information with these systems.
Another question that needs to be addressed refers to whether people are indeed satisfied
with the current privacy settings. The main reason behind this is that people’s internal
privacy preferences often do not match the ones offered to them (boyd and Hargittai,
2010; Madejski et al., 2012). In other words, the ways in which systems expect peo-
ple to express their privacy preferences, which are mostly access-control based, do not
match people’s actual privacy decision-making. A Facebook study showed in practice
the mismatch between participants’ sharing intentions and potential privacy breaches
by comparing their reported privacy preferences, their actual privacy settings and their
posts (Madejski et al., 2012). Another Facebook survey focused on people’s privacy set-
tings and the audiences of photos they posted online also highlighted the issues people
are having with managing their privacy settings. The study revealed that approximately
half of the photos were posted with the default settings making them visible to everyone
on the social network; even in photos where the settings were modified, only 37% of the
time did the settings match the expectations of the participants and often the audience
of the photos was bigger than expected (Liu et al., 2011). A study on Google+ showed
that 85.7% of the participants (who are active Google+ users) occasionally share posts
publicly (Kairam et al., 2012). This means that the issue of privacy management of peo-
ple’s day-to-day disclosure behaviour in different applications — e.g. Facebook posts,
location check-ins, tweets with location — is rather complex, therefore it requires a more
analytical approach. It also poses challenging questions for researchers and practitioners
on how to develop privacy systems that can capture people’s actual privacy preferences.
In order to succeed in that it appears indispensable to study the underlying mechanisms
of people’s privacy decision-making.
3.5 Approaches to privacy management
A number of initiatives have approached the issue of online privacy from different areas
of computer science (e.g. security engineering, machine learning, human-computer inter-
action). One way of classifying the various studies is through three research paradigms;
privacy as control (e.g. privacy settings), privacy as confidentiality (e.g. anonymous
communications), and privacy as practice (e.g. transparent systems) (Diaz and Guerses,
2012; Danezis and Guerses, 2010). Apart from the technical approaches, policy makers
and authorities have also taken steps to preserve people’s privacy through legal pro-
cesses. Several of these approaches apply directly to the Social Web and we will look
into them in the following subsections.
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3.5.1 Privacy settings
In recent years a common approach to privacy management is audience segregation
(van den Berg and Leenes, 2010). Several studies have developed tools aiming to assist
users at grouping audiences and using separate privacy settings per group (Mazzia et al.,
2012; Amershi et al., 2012; Egelman et al., 2011; Lipford et al., 2010, 2008; Reeder et al.,
2008; Adu-oppong et al., 2010). For example, a study where participants were offered
choices to deny-or-allow access to certain people to their online posts (e.g. a person from
another group who potentially should not see the post) assisted them in dealing with
fewer audience issues (Egelman et al., 2011). Some experiments also use justifications,
which inform the user about the privacy preferences of other users (their online social
circle), hoping to assist the user in making better informed privacy decisions (Besmer
et al., 2010; Patil et al., 2011).
A more dynamic approach to the issue of privacy settings is offered by studies that
employ recommender systems based on machine learning techniques. Such an example
is the approach developed by Fang and LeFevre (2010), who used a machine learning
algorithm that requires minimum user input, instead it is mostly based on community
characteristics (e.g. studying the emergence of different communities on the user’s net-
work, looking at profile data of friends of the user). Similarly to this approach, Li et al.
(2011c) developed SPAC, a tool that makes inferences about privacy preferences based
on the user’s profile and past privacy settings. Ghazinour et al. (2013) developed a rec-
ommender system, called YourPrivacyProtector, which uses collaborative filtering based
on the similarity between the privacy settings of the user and those of other users. Li
et al. (2011b) developed a dynamic trust-based system that uses community detection
algorithms to identify trust relations and enables users to choose privacy preferences
(audience selection) on-the-fly to their posts.
All these studies are useful, as they provide deeper insight into the technical nature of
privacy management. Yet, many of them lack an understanding of the nature of privacy
decision-making and the reasonable expectations of privacy; therefore a more holistic
approach to privacy is necessary. In addition to this, the above-mentioned systems
address the issue of privacy preferences, but do not focus on disclosure behaviours,
which are highly dynamic and contextual, as we will discuss in the following chapter.
The problem of privacy becomes even greater when applications use automatic disclo-
sure of information about the users (such as someone’s location as part of their post).
According to Vihavainen et al. (2014) users are faced with three issues because of this;
lack of sensitivity to situational factors, insufficient control over the specifics of the dis-
closed content as well as complete lack of control over disclosure to service providers and
third parties.
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Another approach to privacy management is offered by nudges. Nudges are a method
of designing systems that provide information to users so that they can make informed
privacy choices without diminishing their freedom (Acquisti, 2009). Such an approach
would make people aware of potential biases or cognitive overload that can influence
their decisions (Balebako et al., 2011). Wang et al. (2013) introduced three nudges and
tested them on Facebook: the picture nudge, the timer nudge and sentiment nudge. The
picture nudge showed user profile pictures of people that would be in the audience of
the post, the timer nudge called for a time delay until the post was actually submitted,
whereas the sentiment nudge displayed a notice based on the overall sentiment of the
post. The nudges appeared in real time when users made a privacy decision taking into
account unexpected audiences, and user regrets that people often experience after they
have posted something. Among the three nudges (tested with a small set of participants)
the picture nudge was the most successful, as it managed to address rather successfully
the issue of invisible audiences without causing annoyance to the users. It should be
noted that at the time of writing this thesis, Facebook itself announced the release of a
“privacy checker” feature that prompts users to review their privacy settings (e.g. check
the audiences of their posts) 4.
One of the advantages of nudges is timing. It has been shown — in the context of a
research experiment though — that timing of privacy-related information may impact
privacy decisions (Egelman et al., 2009). An experiment that used privacy notices fol-
lowed by misdirections (e.g. in the form of time delays) instead of allowing participants
to make their privacy decisions immediately, found that these misdirections reduced
the impact of the privacy notices in the decisions (Adjerid et al., 2013). Although
nudges have obvious advantages to people’s choices, they do not offer a personalised and
context-based solution, but instead a rather generic solution (Knijnenburg, 2013).
3.5.2 Transparency and accountability
Transparency and accountability are often proposed as a means of addressing online
privacy. Instead of focusing on methods of personal information concealment, it is sug-
gested to make the information transparent to everyone (O’Hara and Shadbolt, 2010).
Transparency provides a useful solution when coupled with information accountability,
in other words the transparent use of information in order to determine whether it is
handled appropriately as defined by a set of rules that hold the individual accountable
of possible misuse (Weitzner et al., 2008). Transparent and accountable systems enable
not only authorities and institutions but also individuals to be aware of the online in-
formation flow. In his book The Transparent Society, Brin (1998) argues that people
wish to see what others are up to, yet they are not willing to hold others accountable
4http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/10849164/Facebook-in-new-privacy-push.html/
Facebook in new privacy push, The Telegraph
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of their own activities. As a consequence, transparency can offer a fair means of ac-
cessing information, since access to information is universal. There is still one challenge
to overcome, since systems usually enforce accountability on users but not on “power
structures” (e.g. authorities, organisations). According to the author, a possible solu-
tion is the development of technologies that enforce accountability to power structures
and prevent them from enforcing accountability to citizens. Solove (2004) criticised this
approach arguing that to make this feasible, people need to have the same capacities as
power structures.
Transparency principles have been proposed from a number of different stakeholders;
technical experts (e.g. Weitzner et al., 2008), legal scholars (e.g. Solove, 2004), but
also authorities — Reding (2011) in the European Commission, and the Privacy Bill of
Rights by the Obama administration. Several countries have also made significant steps
by putting forward transparency programmes (e.g. data.gov.uk and data.gov). These
programmes promoted the release of public government data online to be accessible
by anyone interested. Transparency is also one of the seven foundational principles of
Privacy by Design, a well-known initiative that aims to ensure that institutions operate
with respect to people’s privacy (Cavoukian, 2010).
We focus on the prospects of using transparent methods in privacy decision-making on
the Web. Transparency and accountability can, to a certain extent, address the issue
of limited information and help users make better informed privacy decisions. These
can be fruitful approaches, as they ask for people’s informed consent by making them
aware of others who may have access to data about them, potential data manipulations,
and data about others that the individuals themselves may encounter (Po¨tzsch, 2009).
Still, their privacy decisions may suffer from other biases such as hyperbolic discounting
and bounded rationality. As we also described in the previous section, simple changes
(such as delays) in the framing of privacy notices, can reduce significantly the impact
of the privacy notices in people’s privacy decisions and in some cases they may even
make the participants disclose more information than intended (Adjerid et al., 2013).
Apart from this, even when information about data manipulation practices is disclosed
appropriately to the users, privacy notices do not offer a practical solution due to their
level of detail, and subsequently end up having the opposite effect than the intended
one. This is what Nissenbaum (2011) calls the transparency paradox. Studies have found
that reading privacy policies is extremely time consuming and in a language that not all
users can understand, therefore impractical (Mcdonald and Cranor, 2008; Jensen and
Potts, 2004).
Another problem with transparency is that it is often used as an alibi for data collection.
The problem stems from the fact that the vast amount of data about people that are
stored persistently online can be manipulated in several ways (by the systems themselves
or other third parties) beyond user knowledge. For instance, a major concern is the fact
that through online data, a number of inferences can take place to reveal more data
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about people. To illustrate this with an example, a recent study found that based on
easily accessible data (such as Facebook Likes) a number of sensitive information can be
automatically inferred such as ethnicity, sexual orientation, political views etc. (Kosinski
et al., 2013). As Nissenbaum (2011) argues, for a given moment only a snapshot of the
information flows can be grasped, since these flows are in a constant change (due to the
emergence of new analytics and services etc.). In that sense, the affordances of people’s
data make the issue of transparency and accountability even more difficult.
Transparency is a fundamental principle, as it assists individuals into making informed
privacy decisions as well as it allows them to be held accountable of the practices of
institutions. However, is not self-sufficient; instead it should be combined with other
technical and legal approaches (e.g. Privacy by Design). For example, Garg et al. (2013)
point out how transparent privacy mechanisms for information sharing can take place by
viewing privacy as a community good that needs to be preserved through community-
established norms.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter was devoted to a review of on-going privacy research on the Social Web.
The Social Web has turned into a new disembodied digital social network that mirrors
the traditional, physical, one. It provides a space for social interactions through which
people can explore their identities and increase their social capital. Privacy on the
Social Web is a topic of paramount importance for the research community and society
in general, since people have the tendency to share personal aspects of their lives without
a proper awareness of the affordances of their data. In that sense, people do not take
into account what happens with their data once they have released it (e.g. third party
tracking issues). This issue becomes even greater, as current privacy systems do not
support the actual privacy-decision process. As a result, people are likely to make
poorly informed sharing decisions, and in turn their privacy is often violated without
their knowledge. To that purpose, we discussed two initiatives that can assist people
in making better-informed privacy decisions. Transparency holds the users accountable
of the affordances of their data, whereas more sophisticated privacy settings provide a
better support to the users in managing their audiences.
Chapter 4
Privacy and the Social Web: A
Framework for Analysing
Location Data
Over the past few years a new trend of location sharing has emerged. Applications
prompt users to share their real-time location in a variety of ways, such as posts or
photos in social network sites tagged with one’s location or in exchange for innovative
services (e.g. map navigation). The success of smart enabled devices was fundamental
in this, because they offered applications the opportunity to access people’s location
through their GPS coordinates. 74% of smartphone owners in the United States get
directions or other information based on their real-time location (Zickuhr, 2013a). Along
with the benefits of location sharing strong concerns about people’s privacy arose.
This chapter focuses on location information on the Social Web and the emerging privacy
issues. The main argument that we build is that location privacy should be considered as
part of a greater contextual or situational privacy. The first section provides a discussion
and a background literature on this topic, whereas the second section presents a survey
of technical systems that use location data. The third and final section introduces
a conceptual model regarding the current state of privacy by bringing together the
outcomes of the survey along with background research.
4.1 Location privacy and the Social Web
Current technologies on the Social Web offer people the opportunity to share their
location data in real time; this includes features of social network sites such as Face-
book (geolocated posts, photos and so on), Twitter (tweets with one’s location), but
41
42 Chapter 4 Privacy and the Social Web: A Framework for Analysing Location Data
also location-based applications, such as Foursquare. The popularity of these applica-
tions has grown significantly in the last decade. According to the latest reports from the
Pew Research Centre, 40% of Americans access social network sites through their smart-
phones1. These devices play a fundamental role in the development of such applications,
as they are able to track their owner’s location traces through their GPS coordinates.
74% of smartphone owners in the United States share their location either in exchange
for directions or information based on location (Zickuhr, 2013a). In addition to this,
there is a notable growth in the number of social media users who manage their accounts
to include location in their posts — 30% of users (Zickuhr, 2013a). Research has also
found that more active social media users are also more likely to share their location
data, among other data about them (Tessem and Nyre, 2013). As studies regarding
online location sharing reveal, the underlying motivations for this trend are strongly
related to self-presentation, the opportunities to connect with other people but also to
gain access to certain services — e.g. collecting vouchers (Patil et al., 2012; Lindqvist
et al., 2011). This is also confirmed by statistics that reveal that 56% of young people
are willing to exchange their location for coupons and deals (Lebo, 2013). Wang and Ste-
fanone (2013) argue that location sharing “involves the announcement of a simultaneous
presence of locations, activities, as well as social actors, thus increasing the potential for
social interaction and impression to be developed”. This trend is expected to continue
to increase in the forthcoming years.
Along with the many advantages of these technologies a number of serious concerns
emerge. The exposure of the exact geographic location of people poses privacy concerns,
as it reduces significantly their anonymity (Karpf, 2009). With the advent of mobile Web
applications concerns with regards to a special type of privacy have arisen, known as
location privacy. Location privacy on the Web deals with the issues that may appear
when people’s location data are released to Web applications. It has been defined as a
particular type of information privacy that focuses on the need of individuals to decide
when and how others may access their personal location information (Duckham and
Kulik, 2006). From a technical standpoint, location privacy deals with the capability of
a mobile node (i.e. mobile device or router) to conceal the relation between the location
information of the device and its personal identifiable information from third parties
(Liu, 2009). At this point it should be clarified that when we talk about location, we
talk about a category of information that encompasses different levels of accuracy; from
GPS coordinates (i.e. high accuracy) to a semantic name of a place, such as the name of
a city (e.g. London) or a more “personal” name of a location (e.g. John’s restaurant).
Still, location data always refers to a specific area on the map no matter the level of
accuracy or the semantic ambiguity of this data.
Location privacy has been studied in the field of Ubiquitous Computing and over the
last years in Participatory Sensing (Burke et al., 2006), also known as Social Sensing
1http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/
Chapter 4 Privacy and the Social Web: A Framework for Analysing Location Data 43
(Aggarwal and Abdelzaher, 2013), an area that focuses on data collection through the
combination of social networks and sensor applications (e.g. GPS applications). The
successful spread of social network sites in smartphone and tablet devices has turned
location privacy to a pressing issue in the Social Web. Enthusiastic users of such ap-
plications have the tendency to over-share information, giving away a plethora of easily
available information about themselves (Rose, 2011). Due to this over-sharing of infor-
mation, people’s location can now become traceable, often without them actively giving
it away. For example, Mahmud et al. (2014) developed an algorithm that uses a set
of statistical and heuristics classifiers to infer Twitter users’ home location (at different
granularities) based on the content of their tweets (e.g. looking for names of locations)
and tweeting behaviour (number of tweets per time may indicate time zone). In addi-
tion to this, research has shown that people can potentially be tracked through their
smartphones and tablets at all times; even in cases where the location settings in their
devices are off (Dey et al., 2014). Their sensors offer a means of tracking, as they leave
fingerprints, which act similarly to browser cookies, due to some flaws in the hardware
manufacturing process. Significantly, the Electronic Frontier Foundation developed an
application that tested how unique is a user’s web browser based on a set of charac-
teristics (browsers plug-ins, time zone, screen resolution etc.), and revealed that in fact
browsers leave their own fingerprints that can potentially be unique (Eckersley, 2010).
These studies show in practice that from the moment people use a digital device they
constantly leave their fingerprints through various ways, offering ground for potential
tracking mechanisms.
4.1.1 Privacy attitudes towards location sharing
A number of studies have focused on privacy attitudes as well as on the privacy settings
of web applications. Benisch et al. (2011) studied people’s location sharing attitudes and
found out that more complex privacy settings encourage people to share more. Another
study revealed that people prefer to use combinations of simple privacy mechanisms,
instead of a single one that does not meet all privacy needs (Burghardt et al., 2009). With
regards to the level of concern towards location sharing, different studies have different
outcomes. Barkhuus et al. (2008) observed that their participants had little concern over
privacy when using an experimental location-based social network application. However,
this study took place at the early days of location-based applications (for example the
first iPhone was released in 2007) and it was based on a research application. On the
other hand, a study that collected data from commercial location-based applications
found that smartphone users are more concerned about their privacy than other Web
users, especially in the context of online social networking (Li and Chen, 2010). In
addition to this, a survey focusing on third party tracking, showed that 63% of their
participants are concerned about that type of monitoring, whereas 50% are concerned
about their location being monitored (Wills and Zeljkovic, 2011). These concerns can be
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partially mitigated: Tsai et al. (2009) revealed that providing feedback to the users of
a location sharing application reduces their privacy concerns, and further studies have
shown that when users have a choice between different privacy settings but also between
different location granularities, they feel more comfortable at sharing (Tang et al., 2012).
People’s sharing attitudes towards location sharing vary and they are influenced by a
number of factors. As explained in the previous chapter, several studies have shown that
often privacy behaviours differ based on demographics. For instance, a survey focused
on Brighkite 2 users (a commercial location-based social network) showed that factors
like age, gender, mobility and geographic area influence users privacy concerns (Li and
Chen, 2010). A comparative study between USA and China also highlighted differences
(and similarities) between privacy preferences in location sharing between people from
the two countries and also gender differences (Lin et al., 2013). It also appears that
the preferences of the users are different depending on the purpose of location sharing;
whether it is in exchange for a service or for social purposes (Tang et al., 2010). In
an experiment involving a location-based application, people made decisions based on
the perceived privacy and benefits from the available options, a result that is in line
with the theory of the privacy trade-off (Knijnenburg and Kobsa, 2013b). A study
in Locaccino (a location-based application developed by Carnegie Mellon University)
showed that participants felt more comfortable sharing their location when in places
with higher entropy (Toch et al., 2010). This also implies that participants did go
through an evaluation of the pros and cons of sharing their location at locations with
different entropy. It should be noted that location entropy is a measure of the diversity
of people who visit a given location (Cranshaw et al., 2010).
4.1.2 The two roles of context in location sharing
This section aims to analyse the role of context in location sharing by looking at this
concept from two different perspectives; a technical one that highlights the relationship
between context and location data, and a social one that addresses the social context
where a privacy decision takes place.
4.1.2.1 Context as a technical concept
Location information is part of a person’s physical context (Duckham and Kulik, 2006).
As a result, through location information other contextual information that refers to an
individual may be inferred. Anonymisation techniques are a common means of securing
user identity. However, latest research indicates that they are not sufficient at preserving
the security of the data. An example that shows the potential of location data in
de-anonymisation is the experiment conducted by de Montjoye et al. (2013). They
2brightkite.com
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showed that with a dataset of location data they could uniquely identify 95% of the
people in a large anonymised data set (approximately 1.5M users of a mobile phone
operator). Several studies take advantage of the vast amount of location data that is
now available by studying human mobility patterns (e.g. Noulas et al., 2012; Song et al.,
2010; Cho et al., 2011). Song et al. (2010) managed to predict 93% of human mobility by
studying people’s mobility patterns and the entropy of their locations in an anonymised
dataset. This outcome makes sense if we take into consideration that people travel in
repeated patterns of mobility, therefore we can infer their future movements. Similar
conclusions were reached by Cho et al. (2011), who studied three separate datasets and
found common mobility patterns. Another study showed that social ties can be inferred
by co-located photos uploaded in Flickr (Crandall et al., 2010). A similar example
is Flap, a system that combines user location, content of messages and patterns in
friendship formation in a large dataset to infer social ties (Sadilek et al., 2012). Flap also
makes predictions about future locations based on their friends’ locations. An interesting
observation, stemming from this study is that other people can easily undermine the
privacy of the individual. In the case of Flap the third parties were friends of the
individual, however they can be any people connected to the same access point (e.g. in
public hotspots) (Vratonjic et al., 2013). From these experiments it is apparent that
the large datasets that Web applications currently offer an exceptional opportunity for
inference mechanisms.
Other data that can be inferred through the publication of location data include people’s
activities, real-time emotional and physiological status (Riboni et al., 2009), and co-
location (i.e. the presence of other people in the same location). Another example of
a location-based inference refers to location entropy, which was described earlier. The
entropy of the locations a person visits can indicate the number of social ties a person
has within a network (Cranshaw et al., 2010). An interesting example is the application
developed by Madan et al. (2010) that aims to predict people’s health status not based
on a health diagnosis but using sensors collecting location and communication-related
data instead. A number of data such as co-location, entropy of interactions with others,
and time of interactions helped researchers identify behavioural changes due to health
issues. This means that not only can location generate inferences on other types of
data, but when aggregated with other available information (e.g. metadata) even more
powerful inferences can take place. An important aspect that needs to be taken into
consideration when it comes to data inferences is the existence of historical data, due
to the persistence of online data, which can help generate more inferences, such as
predicting future user locations (Ruiz Vicente et al., 2011).
This plethora of contextual information that can be inferred through people’s location in
combination with the increase of applications that ask for people’s location pose massive
concerns about people’s privacy. Scholars from various backgrounds have discussed the
role of context in privacy management. Dourish (2004) distinguishes two approaches
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towards the understanding of context in research; a technical approach, commonly used
in Ubiquitous Computing and Human-Computer Interaction and an approach drawn
from social science. In Ubiquitous Computing context refers to “the location of use,
the collection of nearby people, hosts, and accessible devices as well as changes to these
aspects over time” (Schilit et al., 1994). The matters we have discussed so far focus on
the technical aspects of context, the next section explores its social aspects.
4.1.2.2 Context as a social concept
It is suggested by several scholars that context is a more complex concept than it is often
suggested in research. Dourish (2004) describes it as “an emergent property of occasions
of interaction, rather than a stable, objective set of features that externally characterise
activity”. He argues that research — in particular Human-Computer Interaction studies
— should treat context as an interactional concept focusing on questions such as “how
and why, in the course of their interactions, do people achieve and maintain a mutual
understanding of the context for their actions?”. In that sense, context is not static, but
rather a dynamic concept generated and related to a specific activity. Similarly, Mancini
et al. (2009) frame context in mobile privacy as place instead of space — space is a term
more commonly used in Ubiquitous Computing. Space includes parameters such as GPS
location, time, activities etc., whereas place include more subjective parameters related
to social interactions and relationships.
In her popular book Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social
Life, Nissenbaum (2010) describes social context as a structured social setting with
dynamic characteristics and introduces the theory of contextual integrity. This theory
offers a particularly useful means of understanding privacy expectations in a specific
context. Contextual integrity refers to the desirable means of information release and
it can be preserved when information appears only in an appropriate context and when
its distribution is in line with the contextual norms of information flow. This theory
describes accurately how privacy depends on context. As Palen and Dourish (2003) point
out, the boundaries of privacy move dynamically as the context changes. Key aspects
of the context-relative informational norms are the context, the actors (i.e. senders and
recipients of information, and information subjects), the attributes (i.e. information
types), and the transmission principles (i.e. constraints on the flow of information from
one party to another in a specific context, e.g. information confidentiality between all
actors).
Contextual integrity is a rather challenging task in today’s digital world, because the
contextual norms can easily be ignored by online applications (Barkhuus, 2012). The
transmission principles are often disregarded, the contexts are much more diverse and
complex than oﬄine and there are also numerous issues concerning the actors taking
part in information sharing. For instance, the audiences who have access (or may have
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in the future) to people’s online content are often different to the ones perceived by the
individual when making a privacy decision. These audiences may include people outside
of someone’s network of friends in the case of a social network application, employers and
colleagues, but they can also be third party applications. This issue was also highlighted
by a study whose participants had negative reactions once they realised that their data
was leaked and tracked by the applications they were using in their mobile phones — in
fact they found it “creepy” (Shklovski et al., 2014).
Several studies have employed Nissenbaum’s theory aiming to point out major privacy
issues triggered by the use of popular web applications. Shi et al. (2013) provided a
practical example of the key aspects of the theory through a qualitative study of friend-
ship pages on Facebook (i.e. pages that show all the interactions between two Facebook
friends, such as their wall posts, common tagged photos, comments they share etc.).
Hull et al. (2010) analysed Facebook Applications (i.e. applications developed by third
parties) and NewsFeed (i.e. a constantly updating list of stories from Facebook users)
using Nissenbaum’s theory and suggested design changes in order to make information
flows more transparent to the users. Zimmer (2008) used contextual integrity in an
attempt to illustrate how Google has changed personal information flows by collecting
digital dossiers over its users.
4.1.2.3 Combining the two approaches
Taking both approaches towards context into account, we can assume that context in
location sharing has a double role. First, it has a technical role, meaning that it refers to
all the information than can be inferred through someone’s location. Secondly, it has a
social role that refers to the dynamic social settings under which information is shared.
The fact that privacy decisions do not only affect location data, but also other contextual
data raises even more privacy issues. A study that analysed three different datasets
showed that for different types of information people have varying degrees of disclosure
(Knijnenburg et al., 2013). This leads to the acknowledgement that privacy decisions
are multidimensional. They are dependent on a set of parameters, such as the given
context of the decision, other contextual information that can potentially be inferred
(time, duration, activity and so on), but also on the type of information released (in our
case this is location, however numerous other information can be inferred). Apart from
the multidimensionality of privacy decisions, it is of prime importance to stress that
data is not any more ephemeral; the Web has converted contextual information into a
permanent, globally and also easily accessed type of information. Grudin (2001) points
out that the ability to control how information about oneself is interpreted in different
contexts is either limited or in some cases completely absent. In the case of location
data, when people trade their location with a system to what extent are they aware of
the actual affordances of their location data?
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Online data is persistent and privacy decisions are multidimensional, and it is rather
easy to use location data to infer other types of contextual data. This implies that
systems have now the ability to infer new information about people (possibly without
their knowledge or consent) although in many cases people themselves would potentially
not wish to disclose this information. Taking Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity
into account, most inferences (if not all) that take place based on location data constitute
privacy violations, since location data is used in ways outside of the contextual norms of
the original transaction (unless the purpose of the information was clearly stated during
the trade-off of the information). All these issues stress the fact that as technology
advances, privacy becomes more complex and more precarious to handle. In the following
section we will go through a survey of technical systems aiming to uncover the issues
that are raised by location sharing decisions in a number of different systems.
4.2 Analysing location data and privacy
This section presents a structured analysis of how a set of technical systems deal with
location data. It aims to understand the contextual elements of location privacy as
described previously. Based on the background literature it appears that location privacy
has a number of characteristics that mark it out from other privacy issues:
• Contextual data inferred through location includes information that can support
surveillance, like tracking individuals and their activities.
• Location data deals with an individual’s real-time location.
The Web is a place where people can easily mask themselves; as the famous cartoon
from the New Yorker says “on the Internet nobody knows you’re a dog”. Location
data, however does not promote anonymity, as it enables systems to locate people
explicitly in real-time — also argued by Cooper et al. (2010). A study, for example,
showed that human mobility traces are rather unique by identifying 95% of the
individuals in an anonymised dataset of location data (de Montjoye et al., 2013).
• Location sharing is not mainly employed by individuals as a means of persona
building, as location data is usually published in exchange for a service (such as
directions, new information). However, as this thesis later shows, in the case of so-
cial network sites individuals may share their location for impression management
purposes.
In the previous section we presented context from a technical but also a social perspec-
tive. On the technical side we pointed out a number of contextual information that
can be inferred through the exposure of location data. The purpose of this study is
to investigate in more detail the relationship between location data and context from a
Chapter 4 Privacy and the Social Web: A Framework for Analysing Location Data 49
technical viewpoint. Given that at least a number of different contextual information
can be inferred we aim to take a deeper look at the inferences that systems make based
on location data. With that in mind, we develop a framework for analysis of location and
its inferred data. Following that, we use the framework in practice in order to analyse a
sample of technical systems presented in recent literature. This can potentially provide
us with a clear idea of the actual affordances of location data.
4.2.1 Methodology
The foundation for the development of the framework was the analysis of technical sys-
tems that deal with location data. The first step was the selection of the systems that
would be included in the analysis. Bearing in mind that the aim was to address the
scope of location privacy we analysed all the systems presented in three years (2008,
2009, 2010) of ACM Ubiquitous Computing and ACM Mobile Human Computer Inter-
action conferences 3. The list of papers used in the analysis can be found in Appendix A.
We selected papers from these conferences, because they are premier conferences in Ubiq-
uitous and Mobile Computing. As a consequence they are regarded as good predictors
of future trends in this field.
The methodology we used includes a number of steps. Initially, any systems that deal
with location data were selected for the analysis. Following that, a second selection
process took place based on a set of criteria:
• The paper contains a commercial or research system.
• The paper focuses on location and contextual data.
• The exposed data are retrieved from hands-on experience with the system (either
in the context of an experiment or real life usage).
• The exposed data refer to people.
• The paper is either a full or short paper of the conference.
Based on those criteria 32 research papers were selected, and 32 different systems identi-
fied. Following that step, we identified the location and contextual data exposed in each
system based on a set of characteristics. In other words, a data category was selected
for further analysis if it fulfilled at least one of the following characteristics:
• Explicitly discussed location data.
• Explicitly discussed contextual data.
3This analysis took place in 2011; hence the selected years of the systems
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• Only data categories that were explicitly discussed in a paper were included in the
analysis. Data categories that were not explicitly discussed, but could be inferred
from the context were not included.
We use the term data category as a means of grouping together different types of data
that refer to the same topic. In that sense, data categories spanned from location data
(e.g. GPS coordinates, name of a city) to co-location and health data (e.g. user’s health
status). After the selection of data categories in all the papers of the selected sample, we
analysed each data category based on a set of data properties, which are described in the
following section. Finally, we conducted a numerical analysis of all the data categories in
the selected papers, followed by an analysis of the numerical results. 164 data categories
were identified in all the systems.
4.2.2 Data properties
This study aimed to analyse in depth the inferences that systems can make based on
people’s location data. We wished to answer questions that would help us understand
deeper these inference mechanisms. These are presented in Table 4.1.
Question
1. How complex is the inference mechanism?
2. Is this information linked to a specific individual?
3. Has the individual given their consent?
4. How good is the quality of this information?
5. Who has access to this information?
6. Who is the source of this information?
Table 4.1: Questions addressed.
Based on these questions we developed a set of properties that aim to provide a deeper
insight into that data and highlight the implications of exposing location and contex-
tual information. Furthermore, these properties highlight the richness of the analysed
information and the possibilities they have for profiling. An initial set of properties was
defined based on the background literature and later refined with a small set of research
papers retrieved from the Proceedings of the Mobile Human Computer Interaction con-
ferences. In other words, the set of properties was used to analyse a set of data from a
test sample of systems. In that way, this initial analysis verified the selected properties.
These properties are useful as they manage to show not only what data can be inferred
and aggregated, but they also address all the questions included in Table 4.1. Table 4.2
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contains all the properties that were used in the analysis, and they are explained in the
following subsections.
Data
Degree
Personally
Identifiable
Data
User
Consent
Data
Quality
Data
Access
Data
Source
1st Degree Directly Explicit Accurate User User
2nd Degree Indirectly Implicit Complete User Friend System
3rd Degree Heuristically Timely 3rd Party User Friend
Non
Identifiable
Everyone 3rd Party
Table 4.2: Data Properties.
4.2.2.1 Data degree
Looking at the different systems presented in these conferences it quickly became evi-
dent that some systems made simple inferences based on the users’ location, whereas
others used more sophisticated inference mechanisms. For example, Herbst et al. (2008)
developed a mobile mixed reality game where the location of each participant was used
to examine how close they were at a point of interest, therefore the inference was rather
simple to make. On the other hand, Cranshaw et al. (2010) collected user location data
from a social network site in order to develop a model that predicted friendships be-
tween people. Evidently, this was a far more complex inference mechanism requiring an
algorithm to infer the new information.
Inspired by the background literature, where the issue of data inferences based on lo-
cation was raised; the first property used in the analysis looks at how complex is an
inference. Therefore, we called it data degree (Zafeiropoulou et al., 2012). This property
addresses Question 1 in Table 4.1. With that in mind, location and contextual data can
be classified into different degrees of data based on the complexity of the inference that
generated them.
• 1st degree of data. It refers to data that are not inferred through the system
but are explicitly provided. For instance, in a location-based application the users
explicitly declare their geographical location.
• 2nd degree of data. Data that are implicitly inferred, e.g. the co-location
between two users.
• 3rd degree of data. Data that require inferences with more complex heuristics
based on 1st and 2nd degree data. This may require the retrieval of data from a
range of users.
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The concept behind this classification of data can be further explained through the
following scenario.
Scenario: Finding Alice
Alice is a regular smartphone user and allows her phone to update her location through
a location-based application on a daily basis.
Mary, a friend of Alice, also a smartphone user and has the exact same functionality
set in her own phone.
A third party collects and stores the tracks of users of this specific application. As a
consequence, it is aware of the movements of Alice and Mary. The application also
identifies and calculates the number of co-locations between the users. If the number
of co-locations between any two users is significant, it is inferred that these two people
are socially related. Apparently, Alice and Mary are often in the same location. Conse-
quently, it is inferred that these two users are socially connected.
Overall, this scenario demonstrates the potential inference of several contextual elements
in practice:
• location
• co-location
• activity
• social tie
• geographical hotspots
The above-mentioned contextual elements can be classified into different degrees of data
based on their inference complexity. Location data is explicitly declared (i.e. no
inference is required) and consequently belongs to the 1st degree of data. The 2nd
degree of data refers to data that are inferred from location data, such as activity and
co-location. In addition to this, the inference of co-location information makes use
of data from Alice and from another user who is known to Alice (in this case Mary’s
data). The 3rd degree of data makes use of more complex heuristics, such as making
inferences by combining Alice’s data with the data from thousands of other users of the
application who are unknown to Alice. An example could be the identification of social
ties of users based on the number of co-location data between pairs of users. In the
above scenario, the social tie between Alice and Mary could be inferred in that way.
Another example could be the identification of geographical hotspots based on the
users’ location tracking.
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4.2.2.2 Personally identifiable data
The second property addresses an issue that is of paramount importance when it comes
to people’s privacy. This issue refers to the use of personally identifiable information
(PII), which includes any piece of data that identifies uniquely a particular person. It
addresses Question 2, which was presented in Table 4.1. The location data we discuss in
our analysis relates strictly to a device rather than a person. In that sense location data
can potentially be personally identifiable information, especially in cases where they are
combined with other pieces of information.
The reason behind the use of this property is that we wished to distinguish the data
that were linked to individuals from anonymous data.
• Directly Identifiable Data. An individual is explicitly related to a piece of
information. For example, in the case that a user shares their real-time location
with a social network application, that location data is considered as directly
identifiable.
• Indirectly Identifiable Data. It can be easily inferred that an individual is
related to a piece of information.
• Heuristically Identifiable Data. It can be heuristically inferred with some
probability that an individual is related to a piece of information. For example, a
location keyword (i.e. the semantic name used by people to describe a location) can
be heuristically identifiable by combining a set of heuristics (e.g. Lin et al. (2010)
used machine learning algorithms to associate users with location keywords).
• Non Identifiable Data. A piece of information is not related to any individual.
For example, time-stamp information was regarded as non-identifiable information.
4.2.2.3 User consent
A question that was raised at the end of the previous section focused on the extent to
which people are aware of the affordances of their data. This question was also included
in Table 4.1. With that in mind we developed the property user consent.
This property places its focus on whether the individual is asked to provide their consent
before their location data is retrieved or published. User consent may be given not only
explicitly but also implicitly, in cases where the user is not directly asked to give
out their data, but the data are published with their full knowledge and the user does
not take any action against it. User consent is only legally required for data that are PII.
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4.2.2.4 Data quality
Another property that plays a significant role in location data exposure is the quality of
the data (Question 4 in Table 4.1). The better the quality of data, the more accurate
the inferences made upon it will be and consequently greater the threat to privacy.
Data quality was calculated based on a set of three different characteristics that are
commonly used in data quality studies (Wang et al., 2008; Wang and Strong, 1996),
which are accuracy, completeness and timeliness:
• Accurate Data. The data is precise and objective.
• Complete Data. The data is complete in the sense that no values are missing
from it or there is nothing to be added to it.
• Timely Data. The data is current and not out-of-date.
4.2.2.5 Data access
As part of our investigation into the different types of data that are inferred based
on location, we also wished to identify who had access to that data (Question 5 in
Table 4.1). As shown in Figure 4.1 there are a number of different entities who may
have access to the data. In addition to this, they might have different types of access
(read/edit/disseminate). It is assumed that the system has always access to the data.
The sample is adequately described by a hierarchy, as shown in the figure, but of course
it may be that a more complex structure is appropriate for a wider sample — for example
a system might provide access to the data to itself and third party systems, but not to
the user or their contacts.
Figure 4.1: Who has access to data.
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4.2.2.6 Data source
The final property dealt with the origin of the data and addressed Question 6 in Table 4.1.
There can be a number of different sources of data, such as the user, the system or even
friends of the user and 3rd parties.
4.2.3 Analysis
After selecting the data categories that appeared in all the selected systems, each of
the systems was analysed based on the properties described above and displayed at
Table 4.2. The next step was the analysis of the sample with the purpose to shed light
on how these systems handle people’s data.
First, we identified the different types of systems that make use of location data. As
Figure 4.2 shows a number of different types of systems use location data.
Figure 4.2: Types of systems identified in the analysis.
Half of the systems do make 3rd degree inferences, specifically 15 out of 30 (Figure 4.3).
We also identified systems that make 3rd degree inferences where the inferred data go
beyond the context of the person’s location, i.e. where the inferred data have no semantic
relation with the 1st degree location data. Such an example is the inference of social
ties between users based on the number of times they were co-located. Out of the 15
systems that make 3rd degree inferences, 5 use location data to make inferences beyond
location.
We undertook an analysis of the different properties along the dimension of the data
degree property. For each of the relevant properties, we analysed our sample to see
whether the systems treated inferred data (2nd and 3rd degree data) differently from
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Figure 4.3: Systems that make 3rd degree inferences.
the data that was released by the users (1st degree data). The detailed analysis table
can be found in Appendix A.
4.2.3.1 Personally identifiable data
Although there was considerable variation based on data degree, the majority of the
data in all cases was personally identifiable (Table 4.3). That means that most of the
information could easily be associated with a specific individual.
1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree
Directly 67% 56% 43%
Indirectly 11% 12% 7%
Heuristically 3% 6% 4%
Non Identifiable 18% 24% 39%
Table 4.3: Degree-based Analysis of Personally Identifiable Data.
4.2.3.2 User consent
With regards to 1st degree data most systems expected users themselves to expose their
data (e.g. user location), so it was taken for granted that the user consent was given.
However, when it came to 2nd and 3rd degree data there was not sufficient information
to suggest that the consent of the user was requested (Table 4.4).
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1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree
Explicit 69% 21% 18%
Implicit 15% 21% 18%
No Info 16% 44% 39%
Table 4.4: Degree-based Analysis of User Consent.
4.2.3.3 Data quality
Most of the systems were provided with high quality of 1st degree data in terms of
completeness, timeliness and accuracy, especially because the data of that degree are
user-generated. However, in many cases there was not sufficient information with regards
to the quality of 2nd and 3rd degree data (Table 4.5).
1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree
Good Quality 55% 18% 7%
Low Quality 9% 24% 43%
No Info 36% 59% 50%
Table 4.5: Degree-based Analysis of Data Quality.
4.2.3.4 Data access
As Table 4.6 shows, regardless the degree of the data the majority of the data in these
systems were available to the user who they refer to. Nevertheless, in most cases the
access rights of the user were not clear in the papers. It is worth pointing out that in
most of these systems there was no clear indication about 3rd party systems involved.
System User User Contact Everyone Unknown
1st degree 4% 63% 22% 5% 6%
2nd degree 15% 67% 18%
3rd degree 36% 46% 18%
Table 4.6: Degree-based Analysis of Data Access.
4.2.3.5 Data source
As expected 1st degree data were mostly user-generated, whereas 2nd and 3rd degree
were generated by the system (Table 4.7).
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System User Unknown
1st degree 47% 53%
2nd degree 79% 21%
3rd degree 93% 3% 4%
Table 4.7: Degree-based Analysis of Data Sources.
4.2.3.6 The role of location data
Finally, the analysis unveiled the role of location on the type of data that the analysed
systems publish. We looked at the data categories in each system and given the level
of inferences that took place based on location we characterised the role of location as
primary, secondary, or minor. In location-based systems location affects primarily the
type of location published, however location was not a key piece of data in all systems.
As Figure 4.4 shows, in more than half of the systems location plays a primary role on
the type of data that are published about a user. 25% of the systems are affected by
location data but not primarily, whereas 16% use location data only as metadata.
Figure 4.4: The Role of Location in the analysed systems.
4.2.4 Discussion
The results described in the previous section highlight the power of location data as a
starting point for aggregating and inferring data. For instance, Figure 4.3 illustrates
the level of inferences that take place in the analysed systems. According to the Figure
one third of the inferred data are inferences on an entirely new piece of information
about the user (e.g. social ties) and therefore have no semantic relation to location
data. Figure 4.4 confirms the role of location data as a catalyst for linking data across
the Web.
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As the results revealed, the majority of the data in the analysed systems could be
associated with a specific individual (Table 4.3). Although in the majority of the systems
the 1st degree data were exposed with the individual’s explicit consent, there was not
sufficient information to suggest that the consent of the users was requested before
making 2nd and 3rd degree inferences. This implies that only a minority of the systems
are explicitly concerned about privacy. The majority of the systems do not take privacy
into account and do not propose privacy mechanisms. As a consequence, it appears
that as the degree of the inferences moves from 1st to 3rd degree, the individual may
lose control over their data. According to Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity,
which was described in the previous section, many inferences that take place constitute
privacy violations, since in several systems location data is used in ways outside of the
contextual norms of the original transaction.
Taking into account these observations, it can be assumed that the exposure of location
data on the Web may cause a number of privacy related risks, as it enables a number
of inferences that include personally identifiable data. This framework allows a more
targeted investigation of the relations between the complex issues of consent, inference
and access. The framework addressed a number of questions that are related to the topic
such as “what level of complexity does a specific inference require”, “who has access to
this data” with the aim to assess these inferences. The framework can potentially be
employed to understand the potential privacy risks of large datasets containing inferred
data. Apart from the questions we addressed, there are other questions that can be
raised with relation to data inferences, such as “what is the computational cost of 3rd
degree inferences” or “how important is the functionality of the inferred information”.
However, in our analysis we decided to focus on a set of basic questions related to data
inferences that would allow us to explore the privacy-related issues that may arise.
At this point, the limitations of this analysis should also be pointed out. The majority of
the systems were research systems and not commercial systems. The data were collected
in many cases in the context of an experiment instead of real usage of the systems. In
addition to this, in many cases there was not sufficient or clear information to suggest
the quality of the data, the consent of the user or even whether the system took any
actions to anonymise the collected data.
This framework is intended to offer a method for analysing location data. We used it
in our attempt to unravel the complexity of location privacy. Above all, this framework
stresses the lack of awareness when inferences are made based on people’s location data;
people are not aware of the actual affordances of their location data.
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4.3 A Distance Model of Belief, Behaviour and Affordance
Based on the findings of the analysis, which was described in the previous section,
we developed a theoretical model called the Distance Model of Belief, Behaviour and
Affordance (DMBBA). The model demonstrates the distance between people’s beliefs
and their actual behaviour with regards to location privacy. Although this model is
based on the privacy paradox it adds a new aspect to the matter, which is the way
systems actually use people’s data and its distance from people’s beliefs with regards
to the privacy of their data. For instance, the analysis highlighted that systems may
easily infer whether two different users are co-located (Ruiz Vicente et al., 2011) as
well as whether they are friends in an online social network (Cranshaw et al., 2010).
Systems may also infer with a certain probability, whether a user is in a good state of
health (Madan et al., 2010). A question of significant importance emerges from these
observations: To what extent are users aware of these potential inferences when they
publish their location online?
Figure 4.5 illustrates the model as a diagram. The figure shows people’s perspectives
with regards to the handling of their data, but also systems’ perspectives with regards
to the ways through which they handle people’s data. The diagram consists of three
nodes: the left node refers to people’s beliefs with regards to the privacy of their data,
the central node refers to people’s actual disclosure behaviours and the right node refers
to the way systems use people’s data. The left node is linked with the other two nodes
with two arrows. Each of these represents the distance between people’s beliefs and
reality (in the case of the central node actual disclosure behaviour and in the case of
the right node the actual affordances of data). The first distance is called the “Belief-
Behaviour” distance, whereas the second one is called “Belief-Affordance distance”. The
second distance is evidently greater than the first one. The reason behind this is that
the affordances of people’s data are actually far greater than they are even aware of.
In that sense, the model aims to show that the “Belief-Affordance” distance is actually
more serious than the paradox indicates. The notion of distance in this model is not
used a quantitative measure, but as a means to emphasise the contrast between people’s
beliefs and reality.
4.3.1 The Belief-Behaviour distance
One of the focal points of this thesis is the Belief-Behaviour distance, which is the first
distance shown in Figure 4.5. It represents the distance between people’s attitudes
towards location privacy on the Web and their actual disclosure behaviour. According
to the privacy paradox there is a discrepancy between people’s privacy intentions and
their actual behaviour. Several research projects have provided evidence regarding a
paradoxical behaviour of people when it comes to privacy, which were presented in
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Figure 4.5: A Distance Model of Belief, Behaviour and Affordance (DMBBA).
detail in the Chapter 2, thus justifying the existence of the Belief-Behaviour distance.
This thesis investigates whether the paradox applies to location data as well. We will
explore this part of the model further in the following chapter.
The Belief-Behaviour distance is also consistent with the theory of cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1957), which was described in Chapter 2. Both of them highlight the is-
sue of conflicting beliefs and behaviours. As we explained in that chapter, Festinger’s
theory suggests that people have a strong inner motivation to find a balance between
contradicting attitudes and beliefs in order to be consistent internally, and hence avoid
dissonance. In the case of privacy decision-making people have certain attitudes towards
privacy, however their actual disclosure behaviour is often different from their stated at-
titudes. According to cognitive dissonance, people try to rationalise their disclosure
behaviour to avoid the tension caused by this discrepancy (e.g. the likelihood that their
privacy could be seriously violated is rather small). In that sense, the distance presented
on the left side of Figure 4.5 reflects the cognitive dissonance that arises from the conflict
we often observe between privacy attitudes and privacy behaviour.
4.3.2 The Belief-Affordance distance
Apart from the Belief-Behaviour distance, DMBBA explores people’s lack of awareness
regarding the actual affordances of their data. This is displayed in Figure 4.5 through
the distance between what people believe and the actual affordances of their data.
Usually applications make use of people’s location data explicitly with user consent,
however they are capable of further manipulating people’s data without the knowledge
of the users. The analysis described earlier highlighted the fact that simply by releasing
their location people empower applications to make a number of probabilistic inferences.
When people allow applications to access their location they should be aware of all the
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benefits but also the costs of each privacy trade-off. However, this is not the case
in reality. As we discussed in Chapter 2, people’s privacy decisions are restrained by
limited information about the outcomes of their trade-offs (Acquisti and Grossklags,
2005). Bounded rationality — the concept arising from limited information in decision
making — in the case of the Belief-Affordance distance causes a technological dissonance,
as people are unaware of the actual affordances of their data (compared to the Belief-
Behaviour distance that reflected a cognitive dissonance between people’s beliefs and
behaviour).
This distance highlights the importance of developing transparent systems. Lately, re-
searchers have begun developing methods and tools that can potentially assist people in
this matter (e.g. Krishnamurthy, 2013; Malandrino et al., 2013). It should be clarified
that transparency requires not only technical solutions but also policy frameworks. As
soon as people release their data to an application, they lose control over their data,
as the results of the analysis of the technical systems indicate. In tandem with this,
as we pointed out in the previous chapter (Chapter 3) the affordances of people’s data
make the issue of transparency more challenging. However, in a scenario where this issue
was appropriately addressed, and as a result the data manipulation by the systems was
completely transparent, the second distance of Figure 4.5 (between people’s beliefs and
the actual affordances of their data) would not exist.
The DMBBA model is not a complete description of disclosure decisions, but it does
however integrate all the points made in the previous chapter with regards to the privacy
trade-off with the privacy-related issues of location data, as well as provide a path to
develop this research further. By designing the DMBBA and raising the related issues,
this thesis aims to understand in more depth the nature of the two distances as described
in this model (Figure 4.5).
4.4 Conclusion
The first part of this chapter was a review of current research on location privacy on
the Social Web. The review also explored the role of context in location sharing. First,
due to the fact that location is part of someone’s physical context, it has the potential
to infer other contextual information. This is further studied in the second part of the
chapter. Second, context is also a social property related to the dynamic settings under
which a privacy decision takes place.
In the second part we investigated the scope of location and contextual privacy. To
that purpose we developed a framework for analysis of location and contextual data.
The framework was used to analyse location data exposed in a sample of 32 technical
systems. The outcomes of this analysis confirm the inferential power of location data.
It also raises the issue that several inferences produce non-contextual data (such as
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someone’s health status), which may cause further privacy concerns. We argue that
this important characteristic of location data has implications for privacy management
systems, as they can potentially fail at being transparent with their users regarding the
actual affordances of their data. As a consequence, people release their data online with
incomplete information regarding the actual usage of their data.
Bearing that in mind, we developed a theoretical model that connects this issue with the
privacy trade-off and cognitive dissonance, called DMBBA. The purpose of this model
was to uncover the issue that is raised from the existence of the two “distances”, people’s
beliefs regarding online privacy and their potential dissonance from the affordances of
their data. The following chapter focuses on the “Belief-Behaviour” distance of the
model, as it aims to investigate the paradoxical nature of privacy decisions and unfold
the reasoning behind these decisions.

Chapter 5
Uncovering Location-based
Disclosure Decisions
The framework presented in the previous chapter highlighted the primal role of location
data in making probabilistic inferences about other types of information. This chapter
takes a step further, as it attempts to focus on the perspective of the users. The research
objective is to gain a deeper understanding of the way in which people trade their data
in exchange for services, how they value their data in an abstract or objective sense, and
how they justify their decisions during the trade-off, based on the theories described in
Chapter 2. The methodology used comprises of the design and dissemination of a survey
followed by a quantitative and a qualitative analysis of the results. All the stages of the
study are described in detail in the following sections.
5.1 Methodology
We employed a survey in the form of an online questionnaire, in which participants
were prompted to answer questions regarding their attitudes towards online privacy
and their location sharing decisions. The survey was aimed at people who connect to
the Web through their mobile devices (i.e. smartphones or tablets) — it can be found
in Appendix B. It gained ethics approval by the University of Southampton Ethics
Committee 1 (Ethics reference number: 1521).
The design of the survey included several steps: a) mapping the research objectives
to survey questions to ensure coverage, b) designing real-life scenarios to elicit realistic
behaviour, and c) validation through a small pilot study. Table 5.1 illustrates the first
step, and more specifically it shows how the research questions were mapped to the
different types of questions in the survey.
1www.ergo.soton.ac.uk
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Research Question Survey Sections
How do people perceive and value their location
privacy in theory?
8 Likert-scale questions
How do people value their location data in prac-
tice during the privacy trade-off?
5 scenario-based questions using
multiple-choice
To what extent do people act as agents and to
what extent are they influenced by structures
during the trade-off?
5 qualitative questions on justify-
ing their choices (1 for each scenario
question)
Table 5.1: Mapping the research questions to survey questions.
The first section of the survey consists of a set of demographic questions with the hope
to explore potential differences in privacy attitudes based on demographics.
The second section of the survey included a set of scenario-based questions that aimed
to shed light on the privacy trade-off (second row in Table 5.1). Participants were asked
to choose from a set of Web-based applications the ones they use in practice (Wikipedia,
Facebook, IMDb, Twitter, and Foursquare). Depending on the applications they chose,
they were directed to different pages that contained a scenario-based question for each
of the chosen applications. A scenario was presented to them and then they were asked
to decide whether they would share their location in this context. They were prompted
to decide between three choices: “Yes”, “Maybe”, or “No”. For example, the following
is the Facebook scenario that was used in the survey:
“Consider the following scenario. You are visiting a friend (who is also your Facebook
friend) in another city. You are going to dinner in a very popular restaurant of that
city. Would you post your location on your Facebook wall?”
The scenario-based questions were used to explore people’s location sharing decisions,
and they were designed in this way to attract as spontaneous answers as possible. A
common challenge for empirical studies on privacy decision-making is to gather infor-
mation regarding the actual privacy disclosure mechanisms that individuals employ. In
that sense, survey methods cannot easily gather information about how people feel about
privacy in practice (Mancini et al., 2009). This survey therefore studies individual’s lo-
cation privacy behaviours by placing people in a real life scenario (i.e. in context). In
that sense, the questions were framed within scenarios from the participants’ every day
use of the Web. In addition to this, participants had also the opportunity to justify their
answers to the scenario-based questions (in the next section of the survey) in a way that
was concrete and situated in each scenario.
After they replied to all the scenario questions, participants were directed to the third
section in which they were asked to justify their answers (third row in Table 5.1). The
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justifications were open text fields, where participants could write free text. They al-
lowed us to better explore the mechanism of the privacy trade-off, as well as the extent
to which participants act as free agents in their privacy decision-making.
The final section of the survey contained the Likert-scale questions with regards to
location privacy attitudes and people’s privacy concerns (first row in Table 5.1). Up
until this section, none of the questions were explicitly privacy related. This was done
on purpose, as research has shown that the wording used in privacy-related surveys plays
a significant role in the way participants answer; questions that contain privacy-related
language have a strong effect on the way participants answer (Braunstein et al., 2011).
Prior to its dissemination we validated the survey with a pilot study, where a small
number of test participants answered the survey questions. The aim was to uncover any
ambiguities and ensure that the questionnaire was to be completed in a reasonable time
(ten to fifteen minutes). During this time we also made minor revisions to the wording
of the questions.
5.1.1 Analysis objectives
At this point we also planned the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the survey.
With regards to the quantitative analysis, calculating the simple mean for the Likert-
scale questions, could paint a picture of people’s stated privacy attitudes. These could
then be correlated with the responses to the scenario questions to see if stated privacy
attitudes could predict contextualised privacy decisions. In addition to this, we planned
a qualitative analysis of the justifications for each scenario to take place, in order to
explore the factors behind these decisions. Coding of the data was based on a qualitative
thematic analysis (Seale, 2004; Braun and Clarke, 2006) using NVivo 9.
In that sense, the main objectives of our analysis are the following:
• Statistical analysis of Likert-scale questions.
• Investigation of participants’ answers to the scenario-based questions. This may
provide insight into the relation of structuration and the privacy trade-off. To what
extent people act autonomously as agents and to what extent are they affected by
certain structures.
• Exploration of the privacy trade-off; why people decide to share or not their loca-
tion data with these applications (how they justify their location sharing decisions).
• Investigation of the privacy paradox; whether people’s answers to the scenario-
based questions reflect their answers to the Likert-scale questions.
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• Identification of potential gender differences in participant responses; do men share
more online than women as previous research has often pointed out (as presented
in Chapter 2).
5.2 Quantitative analysis
The survey was disseminated through online social media (Facebook, Twitter, and
LinkedIn), but also through the mailing list of the research group at the University
of Southampton. It remained open for 8 weeks and received 150 responses. This section
presents all the results of the statistical analysis.
5.2.1 Demographics
Among the 150 participants, the majority were male (90 participants, 60% of total);
however the number of female respondents was significant too (60 participants, 40% of
total).
Table 5.2 illustrates the age groups of the respondents. The majority of the respondents
were young people with ages between 18 to 34 years old.
Age group Number Percentage
18-25 39 26%
26-34 87 58%
35-43 16 10.7%
44-on 8 5.3%
Total 150 100%
Table 5.2: Age groups of participants.
Table 5.3 illustrates the countries that the majority of the participants came from. 56
participants came from the UK, 48 came from Greece — numbers that make sense if
we take into account that the research was undertaken by a Greek student living in the
UK — whereas the remaining 46 came from 25 other European, Asian, American and
African countries (and are not displayed in the table).
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Country Number Percentage
United Kingdom 56 37.3%
Greece 48 32%
India 6 4%
Spain 6 4%
United States 6 4%
Germany 3 2%
Saudi Arabia 3 2%
Table 5.3: Country of Origin.
5.2.2 Scenario-based questions
Before coming across the different scenarios, participants were prompted to choose what
type of applications they use in practice:
• Wikipedia
• Social Networks (Facebook, Google+, etc.)
• Movies, Music and Event Planner (IMDB, Flixster, etc.)
• Microblogging Applications (Twitter, Weibo etc.)
• Location-based Social Networks (Foursquare, Gowalla, etc.)
Application Type Number Percentage
Wikipedia 79 52.7%
Social Networks 126 84%
Movies, Music and Event Planner 56 37.3%
Microblogging Applications 66 44%
Location-based Social Network Sites 18 12%
Table 5.4: Applications used by participants in their every day life.
Table 5.4 illustrates the number of respondents who use each of these types of applica-
tions. Social network sites are by far the most popular applications, as 126 respondents
(out of 150 respondents overall) make use of them. Wikipedia is also very popular with
79 respondents out of 150 overall visiting it. 66 of the respondents use applications like
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Twitter, whereas 56 of the respondents use applications such as IMDb. Interestingly,
only 18 of the respondents use location-based social network sites (e.g. Foursquare).
Depending on which type of application they use, participants were directed to the
corresponding scenarios and were asked whether they would share their location data.
Table 5.5 illustrates participants’ answers to the scenario-based questions.
Application Yes Maybe No Total Answers
Wikipedia 54 8 14 76
Facebook 19 33 69 121
IMDb 29 4 21 54
Twitter 20 13 32 65
Foursquare 6 3 9 18
Table 5.5: Answers to the scenario-based questions.
Figure 5.1 illustrates participants’ answers from Table 5.5 as percentages in a stacked
bar chart and highlights which of the applications the participants trusted more with
their location data. Evidently, Wikipedia was the most trusted application, followed by
IMDb. On the other side, Facebook was by far the less trusted application. Twitter
and Foursquare users were almost equally divided between people who are negative
about sharing their location on these applications and people who are either positive or
thinking about sharing their location.
Figure 5.1: Percentages of answers to scenario-based questions.
5.2.3 Privacy attitudes
The last section of the survey includes theoretical questions regarding people’s privacy
perceptions using Likert-scale responses. 125 out of 150 participants completed the
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survey till the end and replied to all the theoretical questions.
The following figures illustrate participants’ answers to a set of questions regarding their
attitudes towards online privacy and location sharing.
Figure 5.2 shows the respondents’ replies to the following two questions that deal with
the way people control their online privacy:
• Question I. I believe I am able to take the appropriate steps to control when and
how my location is released online.
• Question II. When an application requests my location, I am fully aware of the
reasons why.
Each column in Figure 5.2 represents the number of participants who chose the corre-
sponding option.
Figure 5.2: Responses to Question I and II.
Similarly, Figure 5.3 shows people’s level of concern regarding their online privacy in
general as well as location privacy. The questions they were asked are the following:
• Question A. How concerned are you about threats to your online privacy?
• Question B. How concerned are you about the fact that your location might be
used for other purposes too?
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Figure 5.3: Participant concerns over their data.
As anticipated, the majority of the participants (approximately 80% for both questions)
replied to these questions that they are either very concerned or somewhat concerned.
More specifically, in Question A 40% of the participants answered they are very con-
cerned about threats to their online privacy, 40% replied that they are somewhat con-
cerned about their privacy, whereas only 17% answered that they are not very concerned.
With regards to Question B the majority of the participants (43%) replied that they
are somewhat concerned about threats to their location privacy and 37% answered that
they are very concerned.
Figure 5.4: Participant answers regarding Questions C and D.
Figure 5.4 illustrates participant responses to questions that deal with the management
of their privacy settings:
• Question C. Do you make use of the privacy settings offered by Web applications
to control access to your data?
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• Question D. In your mobile device do you ever have the location services setting
on?
In Question C the answers were distributed among all the possible choices. Still, the
majority (64%) stated that they use their privacy settings at least once a month. In
Question D the answers were also distributed among all the choices. The largest response
group (30%) answered that they are not sure or they never have the location settings on
in their devices, but a significant minority (48%) had location services on at least once
a month.
Figure 5.5 shows people’s responses to questions that deal with their online location
sharing attitudes:
• Question E. How often do you post your location in a social networking applica-
tion (Facebook, Twitter etc.)?
• Question F. Do you ever allow an application to determine your current location?
Figure 5.5: Participant answers regarding Questions E and F.
In Question E most participants answered “Never/Not sure”, whereas in Question F all
answers were distributed among all the options. In both questions only a very limited
number of people (3% for social networks and 6% for apps) published their location all
the time.
The final question was based on the outcomes of the study presented in the previous
chapter, which stressed the primal role of location data in inferring other types of infor-
mation. The question participants were asked was the following:
• Question G. Location-based websites may use your location to make assumptions
about you. Please indicate how important it is for you to control these assumptions
for each of the following types of information.
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Figure 5.6: Importance of controlling inferences made by applications regarding cer-
tain types of information
For any given type of information the answers varied; with the exception of people’s
home address. The vast majority of participants (86%) found it important to control
inferences based on their home address. However, as Figure 5.6 shows, for all types of
information the majority of the responses were either “Very important” or “Important”.
In particular, 77% of participants found it important to be able to control inferences
about their current health status, 63% about their interests, 79% about their every day
itinerary, 70% about their current activity, 61% about their co-located friends and 67%
inferences on their current location. These results show that regardless of their sharing
decisions, people wish to be able to control potential data inferences and aggregations.
5.2.4 The privacy paradox
By looking at all the graphs of the previous section it is evident that in most questions
participants’ answers were highly dispersed between all the possible options. However,
a number of observations were made:
• A majority of people are concerned about their privacy (80% responded concerned
or somewhat concerned).
• A majority of people use privacy settings (64% responded that they use privacy
settings at least once a month).
• A majority of people actively restrict access to their location (94% allow applica-
tions to access their location once a week or less, whereas 97% post location on
social networking sites once a week or less).
• A majority of people find it important to be able to control potential inferences
based on location on various types of information (77% on current health status,
63% on interests, 79% on every day itinerary, 70% on current activity, 86% on
home address, 61% on co-located friends and 67% on current location).
These findings are therefore in line with previous surveys on privacy attitudes. Existing
work on personal data also discusses the existence of a privacy paradox, i.e. a dichotomy
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between attitudes towards privacy and actual disclosure behaviour. This study aimed
to investigate whether the privacy paradox also applies to location data.
The relationship between the responses of the participants in Questions A and B (pre-
sented in the previous section) and their responses in the scenario-based questions, which
were presented in section 5.2.2, could verify the existence of the paradox. To test this
assumption, the different options in these two questions were transformed into numer-
ical variables to represent Concern, with values “Very concerned” = 3, “Somewhat
concerned” = 2, “Not very concerned” = 1, and “Not concerned at all” = 0. A new
variable was also introduced named WillingnessToShare, which was the score of each
participant’s answer in the three most popular scenarios (Facebook, Wikipedia, and
Twitter). The score was calculated based on the answers the participant gave in each
scenario (“Yes” = 2, “Maybe” = 1, and “No” = 0) divided by the number of answers.
For instance, if the participant answered “Yes” in the Facebook scenario, “Maybe” in the
Wikipedia scenario and they did not answer the Twitter scenario (because they don’t
use Twitter) the WillingnessToShare in this case would be 1.50.
Figure 5.7: Participant score with regards to location sharing.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the frequency of different scores between the participants ranging
from 0.00 to 2.00. 0.00 represents participants who answered “No” in all the scenarios,
whereas 2.00 that refers to participants who answered “Yes” in all the scenarios.
Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 illustrate two scatter plots, where WillingnessToShare is in the
horizontal axis and Concern (derived from Question A or B) is on the vertical axis. It is
worth pointing out that some points in these plots represent a single response, whereas
others represent many responses with the same values. A visual inspection of both plots
suggests that there is no correlation between these variables. However, we wanted to
test statistically the actual correlation between them. We executed the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality for all three variables — i.e. Question
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Figure 5.8: Plot between WillingnessToShare and Concern in Question A.
A, Question B, and WillingnessToShare — and discovered that in all cases the data is
not normally distributed (Sig. = 0.01). For this reason we conducted both a Pearson’s
and a Spearman’s correlation test (assuming that Spearman’s would be less sensitive to
outliers). The results of the correlation between Question A and Question B showed that
there is a moderate correlation between them, which is statistically significant (Pearson’s
r = 0.527, p = 0.001 and Spearman’s rs = 0.528, p = 0.001). In other words, people who
are concerned about privacy in general also tend to be concerned about the privacy of
their location data. However, the results of the correlation between WillingnessToShare
and Concern measured in Question A (Pearson’s r = 0.067, p = 0.492 and Spearman’s
rs = 0.073, p = 0.453), as well as in Question B (Pearson’s r = 0.103, p = 0.285 and
Spearman’s rs = 0.091, p = 0.348), were not statistically significant.
Figure 5.9: Plot between WillingnessToShare and Concern in Question B.
This finding supports the existence of the privacy paradox, since it shows that there
is no strong correlation between people’s attitudes towards privacy and their disclosure
decisions.
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5.2.5 Gender differences
As mentioned before, 90 participants were male whereas 60 were female. We wished
to identify potential differences between men and women in their responses, and more
specifically, whether women tend to be more private than men online, as several studies
have shown (see Chapter 3). To that purpose, we investigated separately the answers of
men and women in the scenario-based questions and revealed a few differences between
them.
Wikipedia. Table 5.6 shows the responses of male and female participants to the
Wikipedia scenario. It appears that a little over half of the male (58%) and a bit less
than half of the female (43%) participants use Wikipedia. According to the table, most
male participants were positive to the Wikipedia scenario (81%), however the majority
of female participants was much more hesitant to share their location in this scenario
(only 42% of female participants gave a positive answer). A chi-square test confirmed
this statement (chi− square = 15.214 with df = 3, p = 0.002).
Wikipedia
Answer Women Men
Yes 42% 81%
Maybe 12% 9.5%
No 35% 9.5%
Not answered 11% 0%
Total Responses 26 53
Table 5.6: Gender Differences in Wikipedia scenario.
Twitter. As Table 5.7 indicates the vast majority of female participants who replied to
the Twitter scenario gave a negative answer. On the other hand, the responses of male
participants varied greatly, with 39% answering “No”, 25% “Maybe”, and 34% “Yes”.
Approximately half of the male participants use Twitter (49%) whereas less than half
of the female participants (37%) are Twitter users. A chi-square test showed that there
is a relationship between the choice of answer in the Twitter scenario and the gender
(chi− square = 6.572 with df = 3, p = 0.087).
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Twitter
Answer Women Men
Yes 23% 34%
Maybe 9% 25%
No 68% 39%
Not answered 0% 2%
Total Responses 22 44
Table 5.7: Gender Differences in Twitter scenario.
IMDb. Table 5.8 shows the gender differences in the IMDb scenario. The differences in
the responses between the two genders were very small and according to the chi-square
test there is no relationship between the choice of answer in the IMDb scenario and the
gender (chi− square = 0.677 with df = 3, p = 0.879).
IMDb
Answer Women Men
Yes 45% 56%
Maybe 9% 6%
No 36% 38%
Not answered 10% 0%
Total Responses 22 34
Table 5.8: Gender Differences in IMDb scenario.
Facebook. Finally, Table 5.9 shows the gender differences in the Facebook scenario.
The majority of participants of both sexes gave negative answers and the chi-square
test showed that there is no relationship between the choice of answer in the Facebook
scenario and the gender (chi− square = 1.440 with df = 3, p = 0.696).
The results show that in comparison to male participants, female participants were
much more reluctant to share their location in Wikipedia and Twitter. In the rest of
the applications and their equivalent scenarios the gender did not have any relation with
the choice of answer (“Yes”, “Maybe”, or “No”).
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Facebook
Answer Women Men
Yes 13% 16%
Maybe 21% 30%
No 58% 52%
Not answered 8% 2%
Total Responses 53 73
Table 5.9: Gender Differences in Facebook scenario.
5.3 Qualitative analysis of survey results
Following the quantitative analysis of the survey results, we performed a qualitative
analysis of the participants’ justifications on the scenarios. For each scenario-based
question, participants were asked to justify their decision in a single open answer. The
analysis was based on the identification of themes followed by coding responses against
those themes. In total we recorded 303 justifications across the five scenarios, with an
average justification length of 18 words.
Quite often participants used the same or similar wording within their justifications.
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 illustrate two examples of top word occurrences in the two appli-
cations that had the greatest number of responses. The first one shows the most popular
word in the Facebook justifications, whereas the second one the most popular word in
the Wikipedia justifications. These diagrams show that while some words are common,
they are used in a wide range of ways, and although these diagrams provide interesting
examples of people’s reasoning, a more sophisticated thematic analysis was needed to
locate patterns.
At first, a familiarisation stage took place where we established and developed a thematic
framework for the analysis. For example, many participants stated that they would
post their location on Wikipedia, simply because it is a helpful and convenient service,
thus establishing the theme Application benefits. For many participants trust in the
service was very important; for instance, many trusted Wikipedia but not Facebook
— establishing a theme of Trust in the application. Each justification was then coded
against these themes with refinements and/or extensions of the thematic framework
where necessary. With the purpose of ensuring that their scope and content was clearly
set out, all themes were given appropriate names and definitions. The final step of the
analysis included a process of mapping and interpretation, clustering themes together
in order to make sense of the responses in a holistic way.
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Figure 5.10: Occurrences of the word “friends” in the justifications for the Facebook
scenario.
Figure 5.11: Occurrences of the word “trust” in the justifications for the Wikipedia
scenario.
5.3.1 Interpreting the results of the qualitative analysis
During the final stage, themes were clustered together. To that purpose, we employed a
two dimensional matrix. The horizontal dimension is a simple categorisation based on
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whether the participant had answered positively, neutrally or negatively to the location-
sharing question. The vertical was inspired by structuration, and the duality of agency
and structure.
All the themes placed into the matrix are shown in Table 5.10. In the structuration
dimension we placed each theme in one of three categories: Agency, Contextual and
Situated Aspects.
Agency Aspects. The first category of Agency Aspects deals with people’s opinions
and views. Almost all the themes within this category reflected participants’ negative
opinions with regards to online location sharing. In other words, people who did not
wish to publish their location tended to make justifications based on their general views,
rather than some feature or aspect of the scenario. They were therefore acting largely
as agents. For example, many people stated that they are simply not willing to publish
their location online, some said that they are not interested in doing so, whereas others
said that they do not feel comfortable with it:
“Because I don’t like to tell the world where am I at any given time. ”
Many also claimed that privacy and safety are the main reasons for their desire not to
share online their location:
“I would not want to put information regarding my whereabouts on the internet. I feel
this information could be misused could possibly result in a harmful situation for me.
Also I like to keep aspects of my life private, I do not like to plaster my life across social
networks for all to see.”
Similarly, other studies have shown that people with high levels of privacy concern are
less likely to engage in online sharing (Staddon et al., 2012). Several participants also
stated that they saw no use from online location sharing, such as:
“I never use the location facility. I think using this is quite sad really! Why would you
want to tell everyone where you are every minute of the day? You’d be checking in
everywhere!”
Contextual Aspects. The second category Contextual Aspects contains themes that
highlight how people’s decisions were influenced either positively or negatively from
the context in which they share their location with each application. They show the
confluence of personal views with the specifics of the application, revealing how both
agency and structure are used to reach decisions. Themes in this category mostly refer
to contextual factors related to the application. For example, the theme Existence of
alternative options refers to cases where the participants stated that they would not
share their location with an application because there are better alternatives.
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Many participants, who gave positive responses in this category, stressed the benefits of
the applications, and how helpful and convenient they are. The two main applications
that received such justifications were Wikipedia and IMDb.
“Wikipedia makes no attempt to alter the pages I see based on a user profile. I get the
same information augmented with some extra suggestions I can turn on or off that’s fine
providing it’s my choice to use this feature.”
Wikipedia was also considered a trustworthy application, whereas Facebook was consid-
ered not trusted.
“I don’t trust Facebook, their security or their advertisers. I would rather keep this in-
formation to myself. My friends would probably already know where I am. Unfortunately
my decision might be undermined by friends’ activity.”
Some participants also expressed concerns over their data being manipulated through
Facebook and/or Twitter.
“It seems this data is more useful to companies using the Twitter API than to me or the
people I’m communicating with.”
In comparison to this, some participants were happy to use applications like Wikipedia,
because, as they claimed, their data was not manipulated.
“Because I believe it’s safe for Wikipedia not to keep my current location any further.”
Significantly, for some people the fact that their location was not shown to other users
in some of the applications (Wikipedia and IMDb) was a positive factor, whereas for
other people the fact that their location was shared with others (in social network sites
such as Facebook and Twitter) was a positive factor.
“It is more convenient than manually searching. This information is only revealed to
Wikipedia rather than publicly.”
“So that other people can see that I am at the event. It might save me some characters
when writing the tweet because I wouldn’t have to say where I was.”
In the case of IMDb some participants stated that there are other alternatives to that
application, they would prefer to use — e.g. Google search.
“Trust is the reason again. There are better ways to know about cinemas around without
using an app like the IMDb. A simple search in internet will serve the purpose.”
Situated Aspects. The third category, called Situated Aspects, refers to the aspects
that influenced participants’ decisions within the context of the specific scenario that
was presented to them. In that sense, situated aspects include themes that deal with
the specifics of the situation in the given scenario. In this category the majority of the
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themes refer to participants whose answer in the scenarios was “Maybe”. Participants
would act under the influence of the set of structures given in the context of the specific
scenario. All the themes deal with situated aspects of the scenarios, such as people’s
mood, or the location they are at, if it is a public or private, and so on.
“If the public event refers to a work-based event I would tweet my location. If it would
be a personal activity no.”
Many participants stated that they would publish their location, if they wanted to make
it visible to others, for example their Twitter followers. Figure 5.12 shows the frequency
of the word “event” in the Twitter scenario and highlights the effect that the nature of
the event has on their decisions.
“I am happy to share my location when I am at a big public event which is probably
attended by hundreds of others of people. I also only use Twitter for general posts which
are suitable to be viewed by a wide audience. I never tweet private stuff. Therefore using
my location in such tweets makes it easier for my followers to associated them with a
place.”
Some people wished to share their experience — as described in the scenario — with
their friends in a social network:
“The place must be cool I’m excited about it and maybe I want to show the place to other
friends.”
Figure 5.12: Tag Tree with the word “event” in people’s responses to the Twitter
scenario.
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Taking into account these three categories, it is evident that only a small number of
people acted largely as independent agents, whereas the majority was influenced by the
structures present in the scenario. This indicates that in practice most people tend
to negotiate their privacy, and weigh the costs and benefits of the privacy trade-off
depending on the context. In addition to this, the matrix clearly illustrates the dynamic
nature of privacy decision-making. People decide to share their data online dynamically
based on a set of contextual and situational aspects. This contradicts the assumptions
behind the current online privacy settings which are static and do not take into account
the dynamic nature of privacy disclosure mechanisms.
Answer Agency Aspects Contextual Aspects Situated Aspects
Yes 3 274 21
Maybe 0 12 46
No 119 48 4
Table 5.11: Number of justifications coded in the themes.
Table 5.11 shows the total number of justifications that were coded in all the identified
themes per cell. The table verifies the analysis; participants who acted largely as agents
gave negative responses, whereas the responses of the participants, who were influenced
by the structures, were more dispersed among the three possible answers and tended to
be more positive in their answers.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented a survey designed to investigate whether the privacy paradox
holds for location data, and to explore the reasoning behind location privacy decisions.
With that in mind, we performed a quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis of the
survey data. The results of the quantitative analysis suggest that there is no correlation
between people’s stated views on privacy and their privacy decisions within a number
of every-day scenarios. This is evidence that the privacy paradox does apply to location
data.
We also found gender differences regarding privacy decision-making, as female partici-
pants were less inclined to share their location in applications such as Wikipedia and
Twitter. These findings can be justified by current research on gender and online sharing
— presented in Chapter 2 — as there are several studies that support that women are
more privacy concerned than men (e.g. Wills and Zeljkovic, 2011; Hoy and Milne, 2010;
Fogel and Nehmad, 2009; Youn and Hall, 2008).
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We also performed a thematic analysis of the participants’ justifications of their privacy
decisions, in order to illuminate the decision making process. The analysis shows that
privacy decisions can be seen as part of a process of structuration, where attitudes and
values (people’s free agency) are tempered by situation and context (external structures).
The coding also suggests that agency is often a negative influence on sharing, whereas
structures tend to be a more positive influence. In turn, this could potentially justify
the discrepancy between people’s stated attitudes and their actual disclosure behaviour.
In discussing structuration Giddens refers to the duality of structure meaning that struc-
ture can be both the medium as well as the outcome of activities that recursively take
place. Seeing privacy decision-making as a process of structuration also implies that
agency leads to new structures, in other words that decisions establish new norms that
become new influencing structures. In that sense, privacy decision-making can be seen
as a cycle, where people expect certain rules to apply when they share information about
themselves and therefore new rules and resources may be developed. A potential exam-
ple could be the introduction of Facebook’s audience selector tool which offers users the
ability to manage their audiences every time they make a sharing decision since there
was an obvious need for better managing audiences per post.
The analysis presented in this chapter, and the role it implies for structuration, informs
the on-going work of Privacy by Design (Cavoukian, 2012) and has implications for the
design of privacy systems. More specifically, our analysis questions the way that privacy
preferences are currently recorded, since it implies that privacy preferences should not
be static, as users’ sharing decisions are dynamic and dependent on external structures
that only become apparent in a given context. In the following chapter we aim to extend
this analysis through a series of focus groups to verify the survey outcomes, explore in
more depth the role of context in privacy decisions, and also highlight potential gender
differences.
Chapter 6
An In-Depth Study into
Disclosure Decisions
In the previous chapter we presented the outcomes of an online survey that aimed to
gain an understanding of people’s online sharing decisions, with a particular focus on
the theories of the privacy paradox, the privacy trade-off and structuration. The study
provided evidence for the existence of a privacy paradox regarding location data and
highlighted that privacy decisions are heavily influenced by contextual factors.
In this chapter we aim to achieve a deeper understanding of people’s disclosure decisions
through a series of focus groups. We also seek to refine and clarify the role of context
within privacy decisions, as well as investigate in more depth the findings of the previous
study. This study consists of several steps: a) designing the focus groups, b) organising
and running separate sessions, c) the data transcription, and d) the analysis of the data.
All steps of the process, as well as their outcomes are described in the following sections.
6.1 Using focus groups as a follow-up study
This study comprises of a series of focus groups that act as a follow-up to the survey and
aim to explore how people articulate their location sharing attitudes. More specifically,
our aim is to explore in more detail the contextual factors identified in the survey
analysis by gathering qualitative data during the sessions. The reasoning behind this
combination is based on Morgan (1996) and his framework on combining focus groups
and surveys as complementary research methods. According to Morgan, focus groups
can offer deeper insight into how the participants discuss the topics of a survey (since
a survey has a limited set of questions). Apart from this, the purpose of both studies
(online survey and focus groups) is to contribute to the development of a conceptual
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model of privacy. In that sense, the practical outcome of the current study is to provide
more input for the design of the model.
Focus groups constitute an established research method that can be used to elicit de-
tailed information about a certain subject. A survey is able to provide a large number
of responses, yet these responses are usually close-ended with limited options for the
respondent to select from. On the other hand, focus groups offer a means to explore
a topic in detail. With regards to privacy decision-making, they can reveal critical
differences among the participants concerning the conditions under which a privacy de-
cision was made. The most important advantage of focus group studies is the fact that
they are based on the interactions between the participants, who exchange opinions and
experiences and comment on them. As focus groups explore people’s knowledge and
experiences, they also offer a means to explore not only people’s thoughts but also how
they reason their thoughts and why (Kitzinger, 1995). This can be extremely useful
when studying privacy attitudes, as they have the potential to offer interesting details
regarding people’s reasoning of their privacy attitudes and disclosure behaviours.
We conducted three separate focus group sessions, each one with a different set of par-
ticipants (in total 19 participants). The participants in the first two sessions were un-
dergraduate students of the University of Southampton, aged between 18-21 years old;
from fields unrelated to Computer Science and who use location-aware smart enabled
devices. The first session included only female participants, whereas the second only
male participants. The third focus group session took place with participants who are
postgraduate research students of the Web Science Doctoral Training Centre. All partic-
ipants of this group conduct interdisciplinary studies related to the Web (topics around
privacy, open data, cybercrime, and security), and have good knowledge of the ongoing
debate around privacy.
There are two main reasons behind this recruiting approach. Following the findings of
the online survey, where we found that women were less inclined to release their location
in several Web applications (such as Twitter and Wikipedia), it became apparent that
fruitful findings may come up from conducting separate sessions for women and men.
In addition to this, we hoped to explore potential differences in privacy attitudes and
behaviour between people who think actively about privacy (in this case in their research
and study) and young people who are more or less enthusiastic users of web-based
applications.
In the first two sessions (with undergraduate students) participants were also requested
to fulfil the following criteria:
• use the Mobile Web in their daily life (i.e. users of smartphones, and tablets)
• publish their location online, and
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• are frequent users of social network sites (e.g. Facebook, Twitter).
The first focus group consisted of 7 female participants, the second of 6 male participants,
whereas the third one consisted of 6 research students. The duration of each session was
approximately one hour.
Each session focused on a set of questions about participant’s online sharing decisions,
hoping to uncover the reasoning behind their decisions, and to explore any differences
in privacy decision-making from different demographics. With the aim to observe how
participants would discuss and interact on topics covered in the survey, we employed
a similar approach. Hence, the largest part of each session included different real-life
scenarios aimed to explore the privacy trade-off in practice — similarly to the scenarios
of the survey. Participants were prompted to answer the question “Would you share
your location in this scenario?” with “Yes”, “Maybe”, or “No” and afterwards justify
their responses within the context of a discussion. The study gained ethics approval by
the University of Southampton Ethics Committee 1 (Ethics reference number: 5482).
In more detail, each session was structured in the following format:
• An introductory discussion regarding the subject, where the moderator used a
PowerPoint presentation to make the participants familiar with the topic of dis-
cussion and then asked the participants to fill in a short questionnaire (both of
them are presented in Appendix C). The purpose of the questionnaire was to pro-
file each participant with regards to their location sharing attitudes and their use
of privacy settings.
• Three scenarios — one on Facebook, one on Twitter and one on Wikipedia, similar
to the ones included in the online survey — were presented to the participants
through the Powerpoint presentation, asking them whether they would share their
location in the scenario presented. A discussion followed during which participants
were asked to justify their responses. Apart from this, the discussion focused on
the importance of context in the participants’ willingness to share their location
online.
• Wrap-up of the session.
Following the focus group sessions, all data was anonymised and transcribed into digital
format. A thematic analysis took place using NVivo 9 based on the six-step approach
proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006). After getting accustomed with the data, the
coding process began during which we identified patterns within the data. Once the
list of coded data was produced, we began identifying themes. Then, the themes were
evaluated, and if necessary we went back to the original data and developed new themes
1www.ergo.soton.ac.uk
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(and sub-themes). The next step involved the appropriate naming and definition of
the themes, to ensure that their scope and content were clearly set out. Finally, the
emerging themes from the coding process were grouped together and formed a set of
categories. The categories were analysed in terms of their relationship with the topic
and contribution to the understanding of the data.
6.2 Initial Findings
The first part of the session involved a questionnaire that was handed to the participants
to fill in, containing the following Likert-scale questions:
• Question A. Are you satisfied from the privacy settings offered to you by web
applications?
• Question B. Most of the broadly used privacy settings are based on the concept
of “who has access to see your data”. Are you satisfied with them?
Participants were prompted to choose between a range of five different answers: “Agree
completely” - 1, “Agree” - 2, “Neutral” - 3, “Disagree” - 4, and “Disagree completely”
- 5. Table 6.1 shows the mean answers to these questions per group.
Group Question A Question B
Male student 2.0 (Agree) 2.0 (Agree)
Female student 2.1 (Agree) 2.3 (Agree)
Research student 3.8 (Disagree) 3.2 (Neutral)
Table 6.1: Mean answers to questions A and B per group.
Discussing whether they are satisfied with the current privacy settings, the research
students appeared to be rather dissatisfied expressing that they do not understand them:
“I’m unhappy more because I don’t understand, rather than because they may or may
not satisfy my needs.”
For the final two Likert-scale questions the different options were: “Never” - 1, “Rarely”
- 2, “Once a month or so” - 3, “More than once a week” - 4, and “All the time” - 5. The
mean answers to these questions are displayed in Table 6.2.
• Question C. In your mobile device do you ever turn on the location settings?
• Question D. How often do you post your location in a social network (e.g. Face-
book, Twitter, Google+)?
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Group Question C Question D
Male student 4.7 (All the time) 3.2 (Once a month or so)
Female student 3.9 (More than once a week) 3.4 (Once a month or so)
Research student 3.4 (Once a month or so) 2.0 (Rarely)
Table 6.2: Mean answers to questions C and D per group.
Although quantitative outcomes cannot be produced through focus groups, the purpose
of the questionnaire was to conduct an initial screening of the participants in each session.
It appears that the participants of the first two groups (male and female undergraduate
students) were more satisfied with the current privacy settings and at the same time
they were more eager to share their location online than the research students. These
findings are somewhat expected, as the research students actively study topics related
to privacy and security, hence it is sensible to assume that they might question more
the efficiency of current online privacy systems than any other user of these systems.
As described briefly in the previous section, the main part of each focus group session
consisted of a discussion around the participants’ location sharing decisions in different
scenarios. The following subsections describe the findings of the qualitative analysis of
the focus group data.
6.2.1 Scenario-based questions
During each session three scenarios were presented to the participants:
• a Facebook scenario where they were asked whether they would share their location
if they were at the airport about to go on holidays,
• a Wikipedia scenario asking them whether they would share their location with
Wikipedia in order to explore interesting things around the campus of the univer-
sity, and
• a Twitter scenario where they were asked whether they would share their location
with their Twitter followers if they were at a concert.
Each scenario was presented through a small description along with some visual aid
(e.g. pictures from the user interface of each application, which are included in the
handout that was given to the participants, see Appendix B). Participants were expected
to answer “Yes”, “Maybe” or “No” and then justify their answer in the context of a
discussion.
92 Chapter 6 An In-Depth Study into Disclosure Decisions
Answer Facebook Twitter Wikipedia
Yes 11 4 15
Maybe 5 7 4
No 3 4 0
No Answer 0 4 0
Table 6.3: Answers to scenarios from all the participants of all three groups.
Table 6.3 illustrates the answers of the participants to these questions. It is evident that
in the Facebook and Wikipedia scenarios people were willing to negotiate their privacy
and potentially share their location online. In the case of Twitter several participants
either stated that they do not know how to post tweets with their location or that they
would write where they are (or what they are doing) in the 140 characters of their tweet
(instead of using the geo-tagged functionality of Twitter).
Note: In the Twitter scenario there were a few participants who did not have a Twitter
account, therefore did not answer the question.
6.2.1.1 Analysis per application
Facebook Scenario.“You are travelling abroad with a friend of yours (also your Face-
book friend) and at the moment you are at the airport. Would you post your location on
your Facebook wall?”
Facebook
Group Yes Maybe No
Male student 4 2 0
Female student 6 1 0
Research student 1 2 3
Table 6.4: Participant answers to the Facebook scenario.
The answers from the participants of each group are presented in Table 6.4. As the Table
illustrates, the majority of the male and female undergraduate students were willing to
share their location on Facebook in the scenario given.
Twitter Scenario.“You are attending a concert in London and thinking about tweeting
about it. Would you tweet with your location?”
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Twitter
Group Yes Maybe No
Male student 2 2 1
Female student 2 0 3
Research student 0 5 0
Table 6.5: Participant answers to the Twitter scenario.
In this scenario most participants — male and female — argued that most probably
they would not tweet with their GPS location on, but they would rather state within
their tweet where they are. As stated earlier, some female participants argued that they
did not know how to use the geo-tagged functionality of Twitter.
Interestingly, all research students (who are Twitter users) would debate tweeting with
their location depending on the scenario.
Wikipedia Scenario.“You are visiting Southampton for the first time with a friend
and wish to visit the sights of the area near the university. Your friend suggests using
Wikipedia, as it shows on a map links to the Wiki pages of all the nearby sights. Would
you allow Wikipedia to determine your location?”
Wikipedia
Group Yes Maybe No
Male student 5 1 0
Female student 6 1 0
Research student 4 2 0
Table 6.6: Participant answers to the Wikipedia scenario.
This scenario was by far the one where participants felt more comfortable to share their
location. Therefore, most of the participants from all three groups answered “Yes”.
6.3 Qualitative analysis
Following their answers to each scenario-based question, the participants of all groups
were asked to justify their answer in front of the rest of the participants and the mod-
erator. In this section we will go through the outcomes of the qualitative analysis of
these discussions. All themes that were developed through this analysis are presented in
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Table 6.7. Following the coding stage, the themes were grouped together to form three
separate categories: social capital, trust, and functionality.
Identified Themes
Category Themes
Social Capital Self-presentation (24), Interacting with others (7), Who sees my
location (9), Interesting location (out of the ordinary) (18),
Apathy (not interested in location sharing) (5)
Trust Debating trust /Not sure (28), Trust in the app (15), Not
considering trust (3), Rational Ignorance (11), Valence effect
(10), Lack of control (11), Concerns over data (4), Priv. settings
issues (16), Suggestions for priv. settings (5)
Functionality Application Benefits (21), Benefits in this scenario (17), Costs in
scenario (4), Safety issues (8), Implicit Location in Twitter (not
geo-tagged) (8)
Table 6.7: Themes developed during the analysis.
6.3.1 Social capital
For the undergraduate participants their social circle has a strong influence on their
sharing decisions. Participants use social network sites as a means of interacting with
their friends, thus the equivalent theme was developed (Interacting with others). For
example, a female undergraduate student suggested that:
“It’s nice to interact with people, let’s say if you are in a group and they are there as
well it’s nice to have a look back.”
All of the undergraduate participants enthusiastically shared their location with their
friends especially when they were at a “cool location” — for example, they stressed that
they usually share their location during a holiday abroad, but not when out having a
normal lunch. Some research students also pointed that they would share their loca-
tion at an out-of the ordinary location (e.g. conference). Based on these reports, the
theme Interesting Location was created. For instance, a male undergraduate participant
justified his location sharing by saying that:
“So that people know I’m going to an exciting place.”
In addition to this, a female student explained in more detail her reasoning behind this:
“Well, it’s fun like when you post something you want to get lots of ’Likes’ and stuff
like that. If you gone to a cool place, you want people to be like.. I don’t know, if you
are about to go travelling you’d hope that some people to respond, by liking or say ‘Oh
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I’m so jealous’ or something. You know, I wouldn’t post a status about, if I was like in
Costa or something, cause no one is going to get excited about that. So there will be no
point. But, if you are going away somewhere, travelling or something, you’d hope that
lots of people could see it and responded in a positive way... I guess.”
Our findings are in agreement with a study consisting of interviews and a survey targeting
people who use location-based applications, which found that people wish to share their
location in places outside of their daily routine (Lindqvist et al., 2011).
Students mostly ignored the invisible audiences (boyd, 2008), their rationale focused on
their friends that would see their data, leading to the development of the theme Who
sees my location. To them, disclosure decisions seemed to mostly depend on who would
have access to their data in terms of specific people — e.g. friends and family, however
some participants also mentioned job recruiters. For instance, some undergraduate
participants stated that sometimes when they make disclosure decisions they think about
specific people they would rather keep their location secret from — e.g. their mother or
a specific friend. For example, a female student thought of her mother and stated that:
“If my mum doesn’t know I’m going somewhere, I don’t want to be caught out.”
Several studies have explored the dynamics between different types of relationships and
their presence in social network sites. Through a series of focus groups, Fusco et al.
(2012) addressed the question with whom people would willingly share their real-time
location in a social network site. Five separate types of relationships were investigated:
family members, friends, people from working environment, commercial, and government
relationships. The study had a special focus on interpersonal trust and found that
location-based applications can potentially have a negative impact on trust in different
relationships.
Several researchers have specifically studied location sharing and its effect on family
dynamics. Mancini et al. (2011) used a location-tracking application to study this re-
lationship in a qualitative study with two different families. They found that tensions
between family members are highly likely to take place due to the affordances of location
sharing. Another study found that although such technologies may be used as a means
of digital nurturing (i.e. ensuring safety of other family members), they have strong
potential to result in a domestic panopticon, where family members spy upon each other
and therefore trust between them is undermined (Boesen et al., 2010). Bearing that in
mind, it becomes clear why being able to control who has access to one’s data online is
important to individuals.
Apart from being watched by family members, participants discussed the possibility
that people, with whom they have a professional relationship, might have access to their
location data. For instance, a male student discussed the possibility of academic staff
viewing their location:
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“You don’t want to, let’s say lecturers, if you know that one of your Facebook friends is
a lecturer then you wouldn’t want to share some of the location.”
This issue arises due to context collapse, a characteristic of many online applications,
such as Facebook, where many different audiences are merged into one single group
(boyd, 2008; Vitak, 2012).
Some of the participants also showed a few concerns with regards to their online presence
when it comes to job seeking. They were aware that some companies check people’s
online presence during the screening process, one male student stated that:
“It’s the whole thing about certain businesses check your Facebook during a job applica-
tion. Since then I’ve actually untagged myself from certain photos drunk..”
The research students also discussed the matter of companies having access to potential
employees’ online presence:
“Can’t you, when you start applying for jobs just block stuff from people who aren’t your
friends? Because by the time you start looking for a job you realise ‘Oh yes, maybe all
that stuff I posted when I was younger’.”
Similarly to the participants of the focus groups, Hargittai and Litt (2013) found that
young people are likely to change their privacy settings with the expectation that po-
tential employers might look up for more information about them. Their study also
revealed that women and people with stronger online privacy skills (i.e. the level of
understanding of several terms related to online privacy management) are more likely
to do so.
Participants from all three groups wished to share their data as a means of self-presentation
and consequently the equivalent theme emerged. It was striking how willing all young
undergraduates were to publish their data in social network sites, especially when they
were involved in an activity that would attract people’s attention. Some undergraduate
students confessed that they do it for “showing-off”:
“If you are about to go travelling you’d hope that some people to respond by liking or say
‘Oh I’m so jealous’ or something.”
and “I suppose it’s just showing off.”
Previous research has also examined the relationship between young people’s narcis-
sistic traits and self-disclosures online and found that higher levels of narcissism are
associated with more frequent self-promoting disclosures (Buffardi and Campbell, 2008;
Mehdizadeh, 2010; Ong et al., 2011). The research students stated that they often do it
for professional reasons, yet they admitted that they care about how others view them
(one research student referred to this as “brand management”). In the literature this is
called impression management (Goffman, 1959; boyd, 2008). As already mentioned in
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Chapter 3, self-presentation is a concept that has long been studied. Erving Goffman
introduced it by affirming that people wish to control the way others view them during
their interactions (Goffman, 1959). The Social Web has offered an ideal ground for peo-
ple to present themselves to others, as it happens with great ease — with a click of the
mouse — and it may be projected to multiple audiences simultaneously. According to
the focus-group participants, self-presentation was a strong positive factor for location
sharing.
A few participants stressed that usually they are not interested in sharing their location
in social network sites, arguing that nobody really cares about where they are. A male
undergraduate participant claimed that this is due to lack of interest:
“Because I don’t care for anyone to particularly see it. I don’t think people want to see
where I am at or whatever, so no I’m not bothered about it. I’m not interested.”
Similarly, a research student suggested that this happens due to apathy. As a result,
the theme Apathy was developed:
“A lot of my decisions to post my location are down to apathy... it’s not a privacy
concern it’s more of that I don’t think anyone really cares or I can’t be bothered to put
the location on.”
As described earlier in this section, for many participants publishing their location online
to attract the attention of their friends often depended on the location they were at.
They would share their location when they were at an interesting place — e.g. on
holiday, or at a concert — out of their ordinary life. Research students would share
their location at a public event often for professional reasons. It appears that context
played a key role in their decision-making process, ergo depending on the context they
would decide to share or not.
All the themes presented in this section were grouped together under a single category
called Social Capital. As discussed in Chapter 2, social capital is a concept that deals
with the benefits that arise from people’s social interactions (e.g. emotional benefits,
new information, and so on). The diagram presented in Figure 6.1 shows all the themes
that are part of this category.
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Figure 6.1: Themes under the ‘Social Capital’ category.
6.3.2 Trust
The concept of trust in the applications that handle people’s data was evident in all the
focus groups. However, the participants of the different groups approached this matter
differently. For instance, the undergraduate students had an entirely different viewpoint
on the matter to the research students. During the sessions with the undergraduate
students trust was a challenging topic, as participants were not willing to provide a lot
of input. The most probable reason behind this is that, as participants admitted, they
do not actively think on trust in the application when they make privacy decisions. A
male student stated that he trusted online applications suggesting that:
“Yeah, I’d probably say so. They’ve done nothing for me to not trust them.”
A female student suggested that there have not been any privacy violation cases online, a
statement that indicates possible lack of knowledge or understanding around this topic:
“You think that, like you know, if there was anything dodgy going on it would have been
hopefully found out by now.”
A few female participants stated that trust to the application was a topic that they had
not considered before, thus the theme No consideration about trust was formed. The rest
of the participants stated that although they were aware of the general privacy concerns
relating to these applications they did not pay so much attention to them, as they do
not understand many of their aspects, so they decided to ignore thinking about the issue
of trust altogether. Several male participants stated that the benefits clearly outweigh
the costs. Undergraduate participants actively decided to ignore the issue, rather than
Chapter 6 An In-Depth Study into Disclosure Decisions 99
learning more about it, a concept called rational ignorance. For instance, a couple of
female students suggested that:
“People don’t really understand, like the security of it as much, so it goes over your head
the idea yeah.” and
“I think it’s more like Ignorance is Bliss. We don’t really care. [...] I do hear news
stories but I can sort of ignore them.”
Apart from that, participants stated that nothing bad has ever happened to them, a con-
cept known as the valence effect. Example quotes on this topic from female participants
are the following:
“Most of the stuff I post about is not that interesting anyway, so..”
“It’s unlikely that something bad will happen.”
A common claim from their part was that the things they share online are of minor
importance to anyone. Other researchers have suggested that both biases may influence
privacy decisions (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2007).
As stated before, the most important thought that would cross the undergraduate partic-
ipants’ minds when sharing their data online was who would see their data. Participants
did understand that on Facebook they shared their data with their friends (or anyone, as
they did express doubts about the visibility of their data), on Twitter with anyone (un-
less they have a private account), but several participants from all three groups showed
lack of awareness regarding Wikipedia. As a result, a few of them wondered whether
by allowing Wikipedia to access their location, their data would be broadcast to their
online friends. That can be explained by the fact that they were all regular sharing users
of the first two applications but did not generate input to Wikipedia. For instance, a
research student stated that:
“Whereas when I think about Wikipedia I don’t know anything about what they do with
my data. In a way you can have trust in an application, even if trusting it in a way
that you know it’s going to do something horrible with what you are putting in there, at
least you know what’s happening. With Wikipedia I don’t think I would give them my
location, cause I just don’t know.”
Privacy management was another issue discussed during the focus group sessions with
both female and male undergraduate participants. The opinions varied; many did not
show a lot of interest in the topic, however some of them had experiences where infor-
mation about them (location, photos, or activities) was shown to online friends without
their knowledge.
For example, in a discussion between the female students, two of them stated that they
do not often change their privacy settings:
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A:“Mine was set to private, but I never set it to private again, so it’s probably non-
private (laughs).”
B: “Yeah, everybody’s probably like that!”
A few of them expressed ideas about changing current privacy settings to make them
simpler, hence the theme Suggestions for priv. settings was created. A female student
suggested simplifying the privacy settings options:
“I think it would be easier if it was just public or private, but then how it is probably
suits more people cause it’s more flexible.”
Another female student referred to the issue of the frequent changes in the privacy
settings of Facebook: “I think that they should notify you if your privacy settings have
changed..”.
The research students also discussed the issue of transparency:
“I would just want perfect transparency over exactly what I’m sharing with who up-to-
date. So, it’s not so much what I’m sharing, sharing information, I’m happy to share
but I just want to understand it and I don’t understand it and I really do think that
you can see other people’s profiles but I can’t see myself objectively what other people see
about me. So, like an app where I can do that but I want perfect transparency and easy
terms to understand what actually means.”
As this quote indicates, in contrast to the undergraduate participants, the research
students had strong opinions regarding online trust. They were all up-to-date with the
latest advances relating to privacy and security issues and were rather critical about
them. Participants were aware of the privacy issues regarding Facebook and appeared
to be more relaxed regarding trust in Twitter and Wikipedia. The fact that Twitter
is completely public made the participants more assured about what to expect from
it as an application. Wikipedia was by far the most trusted application of the three.
The research students did not show any signs of rational ignorance or the valence effect.
Instead some of them acknowledged as a matter of concern the fact that they feel unaware
of the consequences of their privacy decisions, especially the long-term consequences:
“So, I think most of us go around thinking we have a partial way of understanding the
ways in which the context initiates publishing information about ourselves.”
Nonetheless, participants from all three groups shared the opinion that they need to feel
more accountable of the affordances of their data. They all discussed, for example, the
constant changes in the privacy settings of Facebook and showed discomfort about that.
The research students expressed their opinions on this matter more strongly (as discussed
above), yet the other two groups expressed certain annoyance as well, particularly when
they do not feel in control of their online data. For instance, in a discussion about
Facebook privacy a couple of male students stated that:
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Figure 6.2: Themes under the ‘Trust’ category.
“And also they start to... in the Timeline 2, in the history, they are starting to implement
that... where you can actually check in 2010 where you’ve been, so maybe that’s not good
when someone else is checking.”
“They’re not that clear sometimes about differences between like posts and other things.
Sometimes I’ve seen, I’ve just done something set public and I don’t really like things
being public. I’ve had to change it manually myself. I’d rather they made it a little bit
more simple and actually privacy settings homepage about how we can specify..”
All the findings presented here were grouped together under a single category called
Trust (see Figure 6.2).
6.3.3 Functionality
It is evident from the responses of the research students that they usually base their
decisions on the benefits they would receive in return. Their justifications were usually
based on the pay-off the trade-off would have for them in the specific scenario. As a
consequence, they share their data when the perceived benefits outweigh the costs:
“Less risk with being away from home too long, and anyone who chooses to follow my
twitter account would be home, interested.”
2Facebook feature, part of the user profile page
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Still, some of them did admit that at times their decision is rushed and task-focused:
“But I think it’s decision making, rushed decision making and we have different hats on
different roles that you take on as different people. Sometimes I think it doesn’t really
matter what my friends say.”
They were much more positive in their answers in the Wikipedia scenario, stating that
allowing Wikipedia to access their location would have clear benefits to them. Of course
their decision was based on the benefits in tandem with the fact that they trust Wikipedia
more than other applications:
“I’m tit for tat when it comes to things like this. So, the Wikipedia example is a good
example of where I would give out my location because I’m getting something back in-
stantly. Whereas sharing my location on Facebook what do I get from that? I don’t get
anything, so why do I do it?”
The undergraduate students did not appear to have much experience of trading data
for practical gains, except for specific cases where the benefits of the trade-off were
rather explicit. Wikipedia was a good example, as is not a social network and has clear
advantages to them (the context of the scenario assisted to this):
“In this situation you wouldn’t need an account, wherever would be your location, it’s
nothing, but when I say nothing, they can track you not you as a person but your location
at the time yes, but it’s not related to me, it could be anyone.”
Participants of the female undergraduate group also stressed the advantages of sharing
their location in exchange for vouchers or directions:
“You are to redeem vouchers, you have to say where you are, like if you are with O2 3
and you want to get a deal or something you have to show your location to see where
the nearest deals are.”
A study on location sharing practices conducted by Patil et al. (2012) also confirmed
that people share their location in order to receive rewards for “checking-in”.
Finally, a few research students but also a couple of male participants stressed safety
issues when posting their location, thus the equivalent theme was created:
“In that scenario, I would agree with participant X that I wouldn’t post I was in the
airport because it would imply that my house is empty. So, that would put me off doing
that.”
All the above-mentioned findings were coded together under a common category called
Functionality and are displayed in Figure 6.3. Functionality is defined as the quality of
having a practical use, in our study it refers to cases where there is a practical gain
3Telecommunications, internet and financial services provider in the UK
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Figure 6.3: Themes under the ‘Functionality’ category.
from trading one’s information, usually in the form of a functionality of the application
(such as receiving info that is filtered by location) but occasionally in monetary terms
(e.g. by sharing their location on twitter they would win vouchers). It is worth pointing
out that social capital was developed separately, rather than as a functionality, this is
because of its importance in terms of the participants’ thinking, but also because it does
not always provide a concrete practical outcome from its trade-off.
6.4 Revisiting the theory of cognitive dissonance
The justifications of the undergraduate students can also be associated with the theory of
cognitive dissonance, presented in Chapter 2. This theory refers to a state of tension that
people experience when their decisions are in conflict with their belief system. When
faced with such situations people naturally attempt to find a balance between their
decisions and their beliefs in order to minimise the dissonance, either by changing their
beliefs, or their decisions, or by changing their own perception of their decisions. The
justifications of the participants can easily be seen as attempts to reduce the dissonance
caused by their positive decisions to location sharing and their privacy-related concerns;
in fewer words, the tension caused by the privacy paradox.
For example, some students stated that the overall benefits significantly outweigh the
costs:
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“I think always the benefits of these things completely outweigh the tiny risk that you are
ever exposed to, but then that might be me being naive but I wouldn’t associate any risk
at all really.”
As we already pointed out, some students undermined the importance of their shared
information:
“Most of the stuff I share is not that interesting anyway.”
and
“Some people can guess your location anyway.”
The use of such justifications can be seen as an attempt to rationalise their behaviour,
and in turn reduce the dissonance. In the case of our participants, through these justi-
fications online location sharing is consistent with their ideas around privacy and trust
in online applications.
Still, someone may argue that these justifications are simply indications of apathy to-
wards privacy. However, the participants indicated that they care about their privacy,
especially their social privacy. As mentioned before, most of the participants cared about
who would access their data and in some cases they did not wish specific people to ac-
cess them. The question, however, remains when it comes to privacy and trust in online
applications. As we will describe in more detail in the forthcoming section, the research
students appeared to be more confident in their discussion on trust in web applications,
whereas the undergraduate students appeared not as confident. In addition to this when
it came to trust, the undergraduate students showed signs of rational ignorance and the
valence effect. This implies that their justifications were not based on apathy but on a
set of behavioural biases. Still, the relationship between cognitive dissonance and the
privacy paradox needs to be studied in more detail.
6.5 Comparing the three groups
Apart from the above-mentioned observations, a number of commonalities and differ-
ences were identified among the three groups. We observed no strong differences in
people’s attitudes and behaviours between participants from different genders, however
there were strong differences between undergraduate students and research students.
One notable difference is that the research students articulated their opinions in a so-
phisticated way using privacy-related vocabulary, while the undergraduates struggled
to describe their reasoning or express their views. The research students highlighted a
number of known privacy issues (e.g. social issues such as teenagers’ sharing behaviour
in social networks and related risks, legal issues, as well as news stories) revealing that
they were well informed around numerous topics around privacy and security. On the
other hand, the discussions between the participants of the other two groups indicated
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that it was not easy for them to articulate their thoughts on privacy. Many of them
showed lack of confidence in discussing the topic. It became clear that they lacked the
vocabulary to discuss their perspectives fully, as they often began to talk but did not
complete their sentences. From this, one might expect the research students to be rather
hesitant to share their data online and consequently their answers in the three scenarios
to be negative. However, when presented with the scenarios, they all tended to negotiate
their privacy depending on the benefits they would receive. Some of them acknowledged
that they think differently about privacy when they act as professionals than when they
actually make privacy decisions themselves in a specific context. In the second case they
admitted that they think as users and decide to trade their privacy over convenience.
In complete contrast to the undergraduate students, the research students took into
account the role of third parties (i.e. applications that may access their data), whereas
to the undergraduate students third parties were invisible. In that sense, the research
students felt that the degree to which people are in control of their data is debatable.
“Cause that only controls which of your friends can see that information. Facebook still
has it and can still use it when you’ve been tagged, they just won’t show your mother.”
Studying a privacy related subject appears to have a strong impact on people’s privacy
attitudes and it enables them to make a more conscious privacy trade-off. Yet, all
the participants from all the groups admitted that not only do they share their data
in different contexts, but they also share their data in social networks as a means of
maintaining their social capital.
6.6 Discussion
In this chapter we undertook a detailed analysis of a series of focus groups, which
showed that rational ignorance and the valence effect affect people’s decision making
about sharing their location.
According to the findings of our study, there were no strong differences in people’s at-
titudes and behaviours between participants from different genders, however differences
between undergraduate students and research students were evident. Undergraduate
students cared more about who would see their data rather than what applications did
with their data. Similarly to our findings, Young and Quan-Haase (2013) found that
young students do manage their social privacy (how others view them), yet they are
not concerned about how applications handle their data. Johnson et al. (2012) showed
that 37% of their survey respondents did not wish specific people to see their profiles
or content posted about them. Page et al. (2012) explained that this happens because
people wish to control the boundaries of their relationship with these people (e.g. actual
relationship with co-workers).
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On the other hand, the research students focused on the greater picture regarding what
happens with their data. They commit themselves in a trade-off, during which they
think about the consequences of their privacy decisions — although they did admit
that their decisions might often be rushed. Regardless of their different approaches
towards sharing, participants from all groups based their sharing decisions on a variety
of contextual factors.
A factor that influences people’s disclosure decisions significantly and appeared in the
justifications of the participants of all three focus groups is context. During the analysis
it became evident that all the themes were related to context. For instance, partici-
pants would share their location if they were at an interesting location (out of their
every day life) but not at the local coffee shop. In case any contextual factors changed
(from application-related to scenario-specific factors), their privacy decision could easily
change as well. In that sense, context played a primary role in participant’s decisions,
as in different contexts participants could have different disclosure behaviour. As a con-
sequence, there were no themes developed specifically about context, yet context was a
key factor in all themes.
Sharing decisions were often based on the consequences they may have on the way their
selves are presented online (self-presentation). Participants considered sharing in social
network applications such as Facebook and Twitter as a means to maintain their social
capital. In fact, based on the outcomes of the study, social capital appears to be a
driver for sharing in social network sites. This resonates with previous research, such
as the study of Buckel and Thiesse (2013), as well as the work of Vitak (2012) on self-
disclosures in social network sites for relationship maintenance, but also with studies on
self-promoting disclosures (e.g. Buffardi and Campbell, 2008; Mehdizadeh, 2010; Ong
et al., 2011).
6.7 Conclusion
The research presented in this chapter has focused on the mechanisms that people employ
when making disclosure decisions. We conducted a series of focus groups that acted as
a follow-up to the survey and focused on exploring how people articulate their location
sharing attitudes. Following that, we undertook a detailed qualitative analysis of the
data that led to the grouping of all themes into three main categories: social capital,
trust in the applications involved, and functionality (i.e. the functional value of their
privacy decisions).
Up until this chapter we have explored existing theories of privacy decision-making and
their relation to location data; we provided evidence of the privacy paradox on location
data along with a deeper analysis of the privacy trade-off. Both of the studies presented
in these two chapters (the online survey, and the focus groups) have highlighted the
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role of context in privacy decisions. Context appears to be a key mediator in privacy
decisions and it becomes far more varied and complex when these decisions are made
away from the desktop. The following chapter aims to bring together these two studies
and develop a theoretical model based on the findings.

Chapter 7
The Isorropic Model of
Contextual Privacy Decisions
In an attempt to point out the disconnect that often exists between people’s beliefs
about the exposure of their data online and the reality that lies behind their actual
online behaviour, in Chapter 4 we developed a model called the Distance Model of
Belief, Behaviour and Affordance (DMBBA). The model represents the discrepancy
between people’s privacy attitudes and their actual disclosure behaviour through its
“Belief-Behaviour distance”. We wished to shed light upon the paradoxical nature of
privacy decision-making depicted through this distance. To that purpose, we conducted
two studies: an online survey (presented in Chapter 5), and a series of focus groups
(in Chapter 6). The studies unravelled the complex nature of privacy decisions and
highlighted that context is a key mediator in these decisions.
In this chapter we aim to explain people’s privacy decision mechanisms through the de-
velopment of a conceptual model, called the Isorropic Model. The model brings together
the findings from both the survey and focus group studies with the hope to uncover how
disclosure decisions arise and the paradox occurs.
7.1 The matrix revisited
The motivation behind our research is to inform the design of privacy systems by exam-
ining the underlying mechanisms that people employ when they make privacy decisions.
The first stage — reported in Chapter 5 — involved the investigation of the existence of
the privacy paradox in location sharing through an online survey. Survey participants
were presented with a number of scenarios and in each of them they were asked whether
they would share their location and afterwards they were prompted to justify their re-
sponse. A qualitative analysis of the justifications took place, which were coded in order
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to develop a set of themes that point out the reasons behind people’s privacy decisions.
Following the analysis, all themes were interpreted and mapped together leading to the
development of a matrix shown in Chapter 5, Table 5.10. The study showed that the
privacy paradox does apply to location data and that although people state that they
care about their privacy, in practice their decisions are heavily influenced by contextual
factors.
The study that followed the survey involved a series of focus groups — presented in
Chapter 6 — which is a useful method for eliciting detailed information on the subject.
Three separate focus groups took place, followed by a qualitative analysis of the data
during which a number of themes emerged. The different themes were then grouped
together into three separate categories — social capital, trust, and functionality — and
can be found in Table 7.1.
Identified Themes from Focus Groups
Category Themes
Social Capital Self-presentation, Interacting with others, Who sees my
location, Interesting location (out of the ordinary), Apathy
(not interested in location sharing)
Trust Debating trust/ Not sure, Trust in the app, Not
considering trust, Rational Ignorance, Valence effect, Lack
of control, Concerns over data, Priv. settings issues,
Suggestions for priv. settings
Functionality Application Benefits, Benefits in this scenario, Costs in
scenario, Safety issues, Implicit Location in Twitter (not
geo-tagged)
Table 7.1: Themes developed during the analysis of the focus groups.
As the survey and focus group tables illustrate, many themes were common in the
survey data and the focus group data. For instance, a common theme was Helpful
Application, which showed that in the cases that an application provides a clear and
usable benefit, many participants would be willing to share their location with this
application. However, as the quantity of the survey data was far greater, the themes
derived from the survey are much more numerous than the themes derived from the
focus groups. Yet, the focus-group themes provided much greater depth, because the
participants were given the opportunity to discuss in detail their answer in each scenario
presented to them.
An important finding from the focus groups was that data sharing is often a tool em-
ployed by participants in order to maintain their social capital. A theme related to this is
Self-presentation, which shows that people share their location as a means of impression
management — as some undergraduate participants admitted for “showing off”. Part
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of this impression management process is also a theme called Interesting location, which
highlights that participants wished to share their data when they were at a location of
interest, not at home and not at a location where they go on an every day basis.
Another difference between the findings of the two studies is that in comparison with
many of the survey participants and the research students, who cared about the af-
fordances of their data from the application side (e.g. themes Lack of trust in the
application, and Concerns over data), the majority of the undergraduate students who
took part in the focus groups actively ignored this aspect. As described in the previous
chapter, these participants showed signs of the valence effect and rational ignorance.
Grouping into Final Categories
Category Themes
Social Capital Self-presentation, Interacting with others,
Location visible to others, Interesting location - out of the
ordinary, Who sees my location, Sharing experience with others,
Apathy - not interested in location sharing,
Willing to share with friends only
Trust Debating trust/Not sure, Trust in the application,
No consideration about trust, Rational Ignorance, Valence effect,
Lack of trust in the application, No data manipulation by the
application, Concerns over data (Data useful only to companies),
Lack of control, Priv. settings issues, Suggestions for priv.
settings, Wishing control over data
Functionality Application Benefits (Helpful, Convenient, Speed of access),
Benefits in specific scenario, Benefits in specific scenario,
Costs in scenario, Weighing the benefits versus costs in this
situation, Privacy Reasons, Safety issues,
Sensitive Locations, Location not visible to others (as a positive
aspect), Existence of alternative options, No benefits from
location sharing, Unwilling to share location
Table 7.2: Grouping the themes from both studies into the categories. Themes rele-
vant solely to the survey are presented in italics.
At this stage, having conducted two separate studies that both generated a number
of themes related to the factors that influence people’s privacy decisions, it appeared
indispensable to revisit matrix 5.10 and map the identified themes of the survey against
the themes that were developed in the focus groups.
By combining the themes of the focus groups along with the themes of the survey we
developed a combined matrix of all the contextual and situational factors that influence
people’s decision-making processes (Table 7.2). The themes were grouped together into
the three main categories that emerged in the analysis of the focus groups; social capital,
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trust, and functionality. Themes that are relevant solely to the survey are presented in
italics.
Social Capital. Social capital is a concept that deals with the benefits that arise from
people’s social interactions; therefore this category encompasses all the themes that help
people manage their social capital. Managing different audiences that would access their
information or managing the ways through which their self would be presented to these
audiences was a significant part of this category (e.g. the themes Who sees my location,
Self-presentation). Similarly to our study, Palen and Dourish (2003) distinguished the
identity boundary as one of their three privacy boundaries, which reflects on how people
manage their self-presentation in different audiences. Our findings are also in agreement
with the work of Patil et al. (2012); in a study focusing on location-sharing services they
showed that people share their location as a means of self-presentation, but also as a
means to connect with social and professional circles.
Trust. Trust in online applications was a common topic in both studies that we pre-
sented in the previous chapters. A number of different themes related to trust (either
as lack of trust, positive trust, or indifference towards trust as a subject altogether) and
concerns arising from lack of trust (concerns over people’s data, or the privacy settings
used) emerged during the studies.
Functionality. The third category, functionality, defined earlier as the quality of having
a practical use, refers to all cases where there is a practical gain from trading one’s
information, usually in the form of the functionality of an application. A variety of
themes were included in this category, all of which dealt with either benefits or costs in
people’s disclosure decisions (e.g. Application Benefits, Safety Issues, and Existence of
alternative options).
In the analysis of the survey data a few situational factors were identified as themes of
their own (such as public event, private event, work-related event), however during the
process of mapping these themes along with the themes from the focus groups it became
apparent that all these themes belong to a greater category, which is context. Therefore,
Table 7.2 does not explicitly contain a theme about context, but this is because it was
a key factor in all themes.
Grouping all the study data into these categories of privacy decision-making does not
mean that the issue of online privacy management has now been simplified. Instead,
each of them represents a group of themes; hence it includes a plethora of different
factors that affect privacy decision-making. In fact, the existence of so many different
factors poses significant challenges for the design of privacy systems. This matter is
discussed further in another section of this chapter.
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Through the interpretation of the outcomes of the analysis, we developed a theoretical
model for contextual privacy decision-making, which we present in detail in the following
section.
7.2 The Isorropic Model
Based on the qualitative analysis from the survey and the focus groups we developed the
model presented in Figure 7.1. The model builds on the three main categories that arose
from these studies: trust, social capital, and functionality. It is depicted as a scale that
represents the trade-off process with its two ends representing the costs and the benefits
of a privacy decision. We call it the Isorropic Model for privacy decision-making —
from the Greek word “isorropia” that means balance — as it represents the cost-benefit
evaluation that is often stressed in related research. However, we go beyond previous
work in de-constructing the mechanisms involved in that balance. At the centre of the
scale the three factors of the model are displayed: trust, social capital, and functionality.
Depending on their values these can become weighted as either costs or benefits. At all
times the balance of the scale is eventually controlled by the balancing point, which
conceptually can be thought of as the context. This happens because each of the three
factors is largely affected by context. In that sense the balance of the scale depends on
the weighting of the three factors for a given decision, and the context in which that
decision is being made.
The key idea captured by the Isorropic model is that privacy decisions can be factored
into elements of trust, social capital and functionality (each of which may be positive or
negative), and that all three are mitigated by the context of the decision. The Isorropic
Model is an entirely reflexive model, in the sense that the factors that affect people’s
privacy decisions are entirely personal; these are based on the fact that the benefits
accrue to the individual solely. Naturally, it can be argued that in practice privacy is
not only a private good but also a public good and it can affect not only individuals
but society as a whole (O’Hara, 2010). However, this research explores privacy decisions
from the viewpoint of the individual with a focus on their perceived costs and benefits
to the individual (not the society).
7.2.1 The role of context in privacy decision-making
Context as a factor for privacy decision-making is related to all three factors of the model
— social capital, trust in the application, and functionality. Ultimately, the balance of
the scale of the Isorropic Model (Figure 7.1) is controlled by context. The three factors
can move about on the scale depending on the scenario. That means that this model
does not regard social capital, trust and functionality either as benefits or costs at all
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Figure 7.1: The Isorropic Model.
times. Each of them can be seen as positive or negative depending on the specific
scenario. For instance, a person may wish to share their location with their Facebook
friends when being on holidays, but not when being at a local cafe, because it will not
attract the interest of their friends. For a given person in a given scenario the three
factors (i.e. trust, social capital and functionality) resolve into a position upon the scale
of the model, but the final decision may be different depending on the context in which
that scenario plays out. That also means that while context is key to all three factors,
it is also independent, which is why we have depicted it as the pivoting point of the
Isorropic Model.
The fundamental role of context has also been highlighted by several scholars, as de-
scribed earlier in Chapter 4. Nissenbaum (2010) argues for “the right to appropriate flow
of personal information” and introduces the theory of contextual integrity and its con-
stituents: social context, and context-relative informational norms. Both are dependent
on the types of information in the given context, the roles of all the actors in this infor-
mation exchange and the principles under which this exchange takes place. When these
norms are broken, privacy is violated. Similarly to our approach to privacy, Barkhuus
(2012) argues that context needs to be taken into account by privacy technologies and
employs Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity in practice. More specifically, she
uses empirical data on personal information management in order to explain contex-
tual integrity online. Grudin (2001) talks about a “steady erosion of a clearly situated
action” while he argues that people lose control over their privacy due to the ability
of digital technologies to store contextual information indefinitely. Significantly, Palen
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and Dourish (2003) argue that the privacy boundaries move dynamically as the context
changes. This is in complete agreement with the role of context in the Isorropic Model,
because as the context changes all three factors — social capital, trust, and functionality
— change the way in which they weigh on the decision.
The following subsection presents a case study aiming to illustrate how privacy decisions
are depicted by the Isorropic Model.
7.2.2 Case Study
This is a case study of a participant, who took part in the focus groups presented in the
previous chapter. The purpose is to depict the underlying reasoning mechanisms of a
participant through the Isorropic Model. The pseudonym ‘Jane’ is used to refer to the
participant.
Scenario “Wikipedia”
In this scenario participants were asked whether they would share their location with
Wikipedia in order to explore interesting things around the campus of the university.
Jane pointed out that she does not trust how private Wikipedia is. She also stated
that there are alternative services online she can use instead of Wikipedia in order to
retrieve location-based information (Google Maps was used as an example). On the other
hand, the fact that many people use Wikipedia was a positive factor for the participant.
Therefore, her answer in the scenario-based question (the question was “Would you allow
Wikipedia to determine your location?”) was “Maybe”.
Scenario “Facebook”
In the Facebook scenario participants were asked whether they would share their location
if they were at the airport about to go on holidays. Jane was eager to share her location,
hence her response in this scenario was “Yes”. Sharing her location offers Jane a means
to present herself to other people and attract their attention. In that sense, she stated
that she would share her information if she were at an interesting location (e.g. on
holidays). She particularly cared about her social privacy, as she commented on cases
when she did not wish a friend or her mother to know her location. She pointed out
that as long as her privacy settings are set to private, other people will not have access
to her information. In that sense, she also noted that in the past Facebook has changed
the privacy settings on various occasions resulting her settings not to be set to private
any more. However, this did not have any serious effects on her trust levels towards
Facebook, offering signs of a biased behaviour, such as rational ignorance. In Jane’s
own words:
“You think, because it is such a big, like expensive thing, it must regulated quite a lot.
You think that, like you know, if there was anything dodgy going on it would have been
hopefully found out by now.”
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Jane’s decisions depicted by the Isorropic Model
Based on the information provided by Jane we describe how the Isorropic Model depicts
her reasoning mechanisms in both cases (Wikipedia and Facebook).
In the case of Wikipedia, functionality was a factor that was evidently perceived as a
cost by Jane. Similarly, trust to Wikipedia was a negative factor for her, yet the fact
that it is a popular service turned it into a less negative one. In the specific scenario
that was presented to Jane her answer was “Maybe”, as she was not certain whether
she would share or not her location. Therefore in the given context the balance of the
Isorropic Model, as shown in Figure 7.1, did not move towards a specific direction.
In the second scenario, functionality did not appear as a factor in her reasoning, since
there was no practical outcome expected from her location sharing on Facebook. How-
ever, depending on the context there could be a positive or a negative outcome to her
social capital. More specifically, in case she were at an exciting location she would want
to share it with her friends. Yet, in case she were at an ordinary location (e.g. at the
university) or she did not wish specific people to see her whereabouts, the effect on her
social capital would be negative. In addition to this, she did not show any signs of lack
of trust towards Facebook. In the scenario presented to Jane her answer was positive,
meaning that she was willing to share her location on Facebook. Therefore, in this
context the scale of the Isorropic Model (Figure 7.1) would move towards the benefits
end.
It should be noted, however, that as context ultimately controls the balance of the scale
in the Isorropic Model, each sharing decision is highly-context dependent. This implies
that if the participants were presented with different scenarios, their answers could easily
be different and eventually the balance of the model would change.
7.2.3 Comparing our model with others
Prior studies in the privacy trade-off research area have presented (and some tested)
theoretical models of the trade-off. Table 7.3 includes some representative models of
latest research and highlights key commonalities and differences to our model. Most
of the models make use of the two main characteristics of the trade-off; distinguishing
between costs and benefits from disclosure. In a similar way to our research, Krasnova
et al. (2010) made a clear distinction in their model between perceived risks and perceived
benefits. Our work confirms their findings, however it adds a few significant factors for
disclosure decisions as it addresses the privacy trade-off directly. The balance of the
Isorropic Model depends on context, as it can easily affect all three factors of the model
(trust, social capital, functionality). In addition to this, our model focuses explicitly on
the impact perceived social capital may have on disclosure decisions.
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A key difference in comparison with the rest of the models of privacy in Table 7.3 is that
we consider all factors to be potentially beneficial or costly depending on the context,
whereas other models categorise them under either costs or benefits. For instance,
sharing one’s location with their Twitter followers when attending a professional event
could be seen as beneficial to the participants of our studies; however location sharing
when at a private gathering was perceived as negative. In that sense, self-presentation
at a public, work-related event was a benefit but when at a private event it was viewed
as a cost. Our model aims to depict the privacy trade-off, and in that sense it represents
people’s actual privacy decision-making. Therefore, privacy attitudes are not represented
in the Isorropic Model. Rather these are absorbed into the factors. For example, if an
individual falls into Westin’s class of privacy fundamentalist (Kumaraguru and Cranor,
2005), then we might assume them to be more distrustful of companies, or to weigh
utilitarian gains lightly.
Many studies do not take context into account (for instance the work of Krasnova et al.,
2010; Buckel and Thiesse, 2013). Some studies focus on specific situated factors, such
as emotions and affect, and their role in the privacy calculus (Buckel and Thiesse, 2013;
Li et al., 2011a). For instance, Li et al. (2011a) showed that initial emotions formed
from the first interaction with an application along with the presentation of relevant
information, later on have an impact on people’s privacy decisions. Other research has
combined this aspect of the trade-off along with the issue of incomplete information
(Kehr et al., 2013). Our study places context at the centre of privacy decisions, as it
regards context to play a key role in privacy decision-making. For clarification purposes,
in our model context encompasses all the aspects that are parts of the setting of an event,
so emotional state, physiological state, temporal aspects, related activities, co-location,
presence of other people and so on. We see these as pervasive, and influential across all
three factors of our model.
7.2.4 The need for dynamic privacy systems
As new platforms and applications emerge the incentive to share private data will con-
tinue to increase. Despite this trend, privacy systems themselves (and the ways in which
individuals express their preferences) have changed very little.
There is an on-going debate regarding the privacy settings of the most popular online
applications. The main issue is that people’s internal privacy preferences do not match
the ones offered to them (boyd and Hargittai, 2010; Madejski et al., 2012). In other
words, the ways in which systems expect people to express their privacy preferences,
which are mainly access-control based, do not match people’s actual privacy decision-
making.
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Several researchers have advocated that access control is inadequate for online privacy
management (e.g. Kagal and Abelson, 2010; Mondal et al., 2014). Madejski et al. (2012)
showed in practice this mismatch between participants’ sharing intentions on Facebook
and potential privacy breaches by comparing their reported privacy preferences, their
actual privacy settings and their Facebook posts. Another study on Facebook revealed
that in photos of people on the network where the settings were modified, only 37% of the
time did the settings match the expectations of the participants. As a consequence, the
audience of these photos was often larger than expected (Liu et al., 2011). On the other
hand, a seven-year long study that collected Facebook profile data (such as hometown,
birthdate, contact information, and interests) showed that as time passed the amount of
profile data displayed publicly on the network decreased (Stutzman et al., 2012a). Still,
a study on Google+ showed that 85.7% of the participants — who are active users of this
application — occasionally share posts publicly (Kairam et al., 2012). This means that
the issue of privacy management of people’s day-to-day disclosure behaviour in different
applications (such as Facebook posts, location check-ins, tweets with location etc.) is
rather complex, therefore it requires a more analytical approach.
Recently, researchers began developing tools in order to assist users at grouping audi-
ences and their corresponding privacy settings (e.g. Mazzia et al., 2012; Amershi et al.,
2012; Egelman et al., 2011; Lipford et al., 2010, 2008; Reeder et al., 2008; Adu-oppong
et al., 2010). van den Berg and Leenes (2010) call this concept audience segregation.
Based on our own findings, Location visible to others, Willing to share with friends only
and Who sees my location were significant factors for disclosure decisions. In addition to
this, social network sites themselves started to implement such solutions (e.g. Google+
circles1, and Facebook lists2). However, addressing this issue solves only partially the
problem of privacy management. Mondal et al. (2014) also argued that current access
control systems are insufficient and developed a privacy model based on exposure (i.e.
the set of people expected to discover a piece of information). The model aims to pre-
dict and also control exposure while being transparent with the users. Although it has
significant advantages, as it focuses on the people who may eventually access a piece
of information instead of the people who have direct access to it, it does not explore
the potential of the information itself (e.g. its potential for further inferences) and does
not focus on the contextual nature of online data sharing. Krishnamurthy (2013) pro-
poses a semantic-based approach in which people take a more active role in privacy
management by indicating their desired levels of privacy, before these are automatically
translated into privacy settings. As an example to this effort his team began developing
a Facebook application (still work-in-progress), which displays visually to the user the
audiences of their shared content along with the effects of their past privacy settings.
The idea is promising, as it is a transparent privacy method that could potentially raise
1Feature of Google+ that lets the users group people into different audience groups (i.e. circles).
2Similar feature to the previous one, it has three default audience groups: close friends, acquaintances,
and restricted.
120 Chapter 7 The Isorropic Model of Contextual Privacy Decisions
user awareness of their privacy behaviour, however it does not offer insight into new
privacy mechanisms that would move away from access control.
As already mentioned in Chapter 4, recent approaches to the issue of privacy man-
agement are using recommender systems based on machine learning techniques as a
potential solution to the issue of privacy management with interesting results, as they
offer a more dynamic approach to this issue (e.g. Ghazinour et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011c;
Fang and LeFevre, 2010; Li et al., 2011b). Machine learning techniques have the poten-
tial to provide simple and useful privacy settings. Still, these approaches have yet to
achieve a holistic approach to privacy management, as they strive to offer better privacy
settings, but do not take into account all the factors that contribute to the contextual
nature of privacy decisions. They are mostly based on user profiles, privacy settings
history, and community characteristics instead of focusing on the variety of contextual
factors that influence people’s privacy decisions.
As we discussed in the previous section, the role of context in privacy decision-making
is fundamental. As Nissenbaum (2010) suggests, privacy violations take place when
the contextual norms of information flow are disrupted. These issues pose challenging
questions for researchers and practitioners on how to develop privacy systems that can
capture people’s actual privacy preferences.
The study presented in Chapter 5 provided evidence that the privacy paradox holds for
location data, and sought to (at least partially) explain the paradox by viewing privacy
disclosure decisions as part of a process of structuration. The themes identified in this
study along with the themes from the study presented in Chapter 6 (as displayed in
Table 7.2) were grouped together to form the three main factors of the Isorropic Model
and they emphasise the dynamic and contextual nature of privacy decisions. People do
not have a standard behaviour towards online sharing; sometimes they wish to share
data online and sometimes they do not, depending on the context. Not only are the
themes a strong indicator of people’s justifications on their privacy decisions, but they
also provide insight into the actual factors that influence their decisions.
The Isorropic Model highlights the weakness of current privacy systems to capture peo-
ple’s privacy decision-making mechanisms, as these systems do not take context into
account. Privacy systems that rely on static preferences are thus inherently weak and
likely to fail as the context of privacy decisions changes. This disconnect between peo-
ple’s sharing mechanisms and the ways in which systems expect them to make decisions
poses significant challenges for the design of future privacy systems. The most impor-
tant question is how we develop dynamic privacy systems that take context into account
when considering complex factors such as social capital. This is particularly challenging
given that the complexity of the social situation/relationships could well be beyond any
simplistic attempt to sense or model.
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7.3 Conclusion
This chapter has brought together the results of the two main studies of this research
aiming to highlight the commonalities and the differences in their results. The sur-
vey provided a significant number of different themes around privacy decision-making,
whereas the focus groups provided fewer themes but with more depth. As a consequence,
the survey findings indicated the plethora of different contextual and situated factors
that affect decision making, whereas the focus groups highlighted the primal role so-
cial capital plays in people’s decision-making, as it is often the main driver for location
sharing. Finally, the incorporation of all the themes into the final matrix (displayed in
Table 7.2) shows the importance of context in privacy disclosure decisions and stresses
the need for more dynamic privacy settings.
Based on these research findings an Isorropic Model for contextual privacy decisions was
developed. The key characteristic of this model is that we make no assumptions that
any of the three factors (i.e. social capital, trust, functionality) is either a cost or a
benefit by default. For a given scenario and individual each of them resolves to either a
cost or a benefit (or no value at all) on the scale of the model. However, this can change
when the context of a privacy decision changes. Thus we argue that context is pervasive
but independent of the three factors; hence it is represented as the pivoting point of
the scale rather than as a factor in its own right. This poses a significant challenge for
privacy systems, as they are overall static whereas privacy decisions are highly dynamic.
There is an increasing need for the development of dynamic privacy systems that reflect
the way that people’s preferences change as their context changes.
In comparison with related work, decisions in this model are based on a combination of
situated and contextual factors. These play a primary role when it comes to location
sharing — e.g. being co-located with someone, at a public event, and so on — and they
affect all factors of the model (social capital, functionality and trust). Despite the fact
that the model shows that these are balancing factors, we observed that self-presentation
within the theme of social capital is a positive factor for sharing.
The privacy of individuals online is of pressing concern, and made even more important
when considering the spread of location-enabled smart devices. This research has shown
that existing theories of privacy decision-making do apply to location and contextual
data (we have seen evidence of the privacy paradox, trade-off, rational ignorance and
the valance effect), but also that context is a key mediator of privacy decisions. The
analysis of the findings of this research along with the Isorropic Model may inform
on-going research in privacy management and, hopefully, may assist into the design of
future privacy systems to cope with the increasingly contextual privacy decisions.

Chapter 8
Conclusion
People will continue — sometimes grudgingly — to make trade-offs favouring convenience
and perceived immediate gains over privacy; and privacy will be something only the
upscale will enjoy.
—Digital Life in 2025, Pew Research Centre 2014
In today’s connected world people share a variety of information on the Web; with their
friends in social network sites, but also in exchange for services. The advent of smart
enabled devices signified the opportunity to exchange such information from any location
along with the location information itself. Although these information exchanges provide
several benefits, they do raise a number of privacy concerns. People are called to perform
a privacy trade-off, a cost-benefit evaluation of their sharing decisions. It is suggested
that these disclosure decisions are often in discordance with people’s privacy attitudes,
a concept known as the privacy paradox. The focus of this thesis was on the trade-off
process and its potentially paradoxical nature, as well as its discrepancy from the actual
data collection and usage practices of systems.
In this final chapter we present a summary of the studies we conducted for this thesis,
along with the main contributions. The chapter concludes with some directions for
future work and final remarks.
8.1 Summary
The first part of this research, presented in Chapter 4, was the development of a frame-
work for analysing location data, which was tested with the analysis of a sample of 32
research-based systems. The study highlighted the power of location data to act as a
catalyst in inferring and aggregating other types of information. It also highlighted the
role of context as a technical concept that enables systems to make complex inferences
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based on location (2nd and 3rd degree). Most importantly, the analysis raised an im-
portant issue related to privacy, which is people’s lack of awareness regarding the actual
affordances of their data. Following this, we developed a conceptual model, called the
Distance Model of Belief, Behaviour and Affordance (DMBBA), which brought together
the findings of the analysis with the studies that we went on to explore in the rest of this
thesis. The model uncovered the issue that is raised by the existence of two “distances”:
the discrepancy between people’s attitudes and actual behaviour (the privacy paradox),
and the discrepancy between people’s attitudes and the actual affordances of their data.
The next logical step was the design of a study that would explore the existence of
the paradox on location data and the underlying reasons behind people’s disclosure be-
haviour. To achieve this, we focused on how people justify their sharing decisions based
on the theories of the privacy trade-off and structuration, as described in Chapter 2. The
study was presented in Chapter 5 and comprised of an online survey with 150 respon-
dents, which revealed that the paradox does apply to location data and that people’s
privacy decisions are moderated by contextual and situational factors in a similar man-
ner to the theory of structuration. This chapter also highlighted the role of context as
a social concept that involves all the contextual and situational factors that underlie a
privacy decision and gives those decisions a dynamic nature.
The analysis of the survey findings led to the design of a follow-up study consisting
of a series of focus groups. The follow-up study was presented in Chapter 6 and its
purpose was to investigate in more depth the reasons why people decide to make certain
privacy decisions and more specifically the role of context in these decisions. The last two
studies (the online survey, and the focus groups) highlighted the importance of context
in privacy decisions, as context appears to be a key mediator in privacy decision-making.
Finally, based on the outcomes of these studies we developed a conceptual model for
privacy decisions, presented in Chapter 7. The Isorropic Model depicts the process of
making privacy decisions as cost-benefit evaluations. It takes into account three different
factors; social capital, trust, and functionality. For a given scenario and individual, each
of them resolves to either a cost or a benefit (or no value at all) during the decision
process. The most prominent role is played by context, as it controls the balance of the
model and ultimately is responsible for people disclosure decisions.
8.2 List of contributions
At this point the contributions of this thesis are briefly listed:
• A framework for analysis of location data. Through the development of the frame-
work for analysing location data, which was described in Chapter 4, this thesis
highlighted the catalyst role of location data in inferring and aggregating a variety
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of other types of information that are often related to the context of the location
sharing decision (e.g. related event, co-located people), but may also be unrelated
to the context (e.g. health information, social ties). This implies that the exposure
of location data in Web applications poses threats to people’s privacy, as there is a
clear discordance between the impression people have regarding the affordances of
their data and the actual affordances of their information through web technolo-
gies. The framework that was developed for the analysis of location data can be
further employed and extended in other studies that aim to analyse other types of
data and their affordances. The analysis of location data in the sample of systems
we selected can also be reused and extended. It can be found in Appendix A.
• A Distance Model of Belief, Behaviour and Affordance (DMBBA). The disconnect
between people’s beliefs with regards to their data and the actual affordances
of their data was clearly illustrated by the DMBBA model in Chapter 4. The
model also highlighted another disconnect that arises from the privacy paradox ;
the discrepancy between people’s privacy attitudes and their actual disclosure
behaviours. This contribution highlights a gap that currently exists and needs
to be addressed by the research community; the discrepancy between people’s
attitudes and beliefs and the reality of their disclosure decisions.
• An online survey studying privacy attitudes and sharing decisions. The survey pre-
sented in Chapter 5 addressed the second disconnect that is raised by the DMBBA
model with a focus on location sharing. In other words, the survey focused on peo-
ple’s trade-off decisions and the existence of the privacy paradox on location data.
The results of quantitative analysis of the survey provided evidence that a paradox
between people’s privacy attitudes and their actual disclosure decisions does exist,
and it applies to location data as well. The qualitative analysis of the survey —
in Chapter 5 — found that the theory of structuration can be applied to privacy
decision-making. Our findings showed that in practice people tend to negotiate
their privacy (free agency), as their privacy decisions are tempered by situation
and context (structures). This contribution comprises of the survey questionnaire
that was disseminated to the participants (presented in Appendix B), and the
qualitative analysis undertaken that resulted in the development of the matrix of
themes (shown in Table 5.10).
• A study comprising of a series of focus groups. We conducted a series of focus
groups — presented in Chapter 6 — aiming to gain a deeper insight into people’s
privacy decisions and the ways they articulate their justifications on their deci-
sions. The findings of the focus group sessions showed that the research students
committed themselves in a trade-off where they thought about the consequences
of their decisions and were all well-informed on issues around privacy. In contrast
to this, the undergraduate students cared more about who would access their data
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and not on privacy issues related to the affordances of their data. The contribu-
tion of this study consists of the design of the study, the questionnaires that were
given to the participants (presented in Appendix C), and the thematic analysis
undertaken.
• The Isorropic Model of contextual privacy decisions. The themes developed during
the qualitative analysis of the survey as well as the focus groups were grouped
together, interpreted and resulted in the design of a conceptual model, called the
Isorropic Model. The three main factors of the model are social capital, trust in
the application, and functionality of the application, which represent the categories
developed through the interpretation process of the themes. All the themes of both
studies also indicated that they are related to a greater category, which is context.
The research findings point out that privacy decisions are based on a combination
of contextual and situational factors. These play a primary role when it comes
to location sharing e.g. being co-located with someone at a public event. The
contribution here consists of the model itself, along with the analysis of all the
themes that we developed in the two studies.
The contributions took place with the hope to address the original hypothesis of this
research. This was:
The privacy paradox applies to location data, yet it does not adequately describe the
distance between people’s beliefs regarding their data and the actual affordances of their
data. Privacy disclosure decisions around location can be understood based on discrete
factors, including agency and structures, that are mitigated by context.
The research questions that emerged from the hypothesis are the following:
1. What are the affordances of location data and to what extent are people aware of
them?
2. How do people perceive and value their location privacy in theory?
3. How do people value their location data in practice during the privacy trade-off?
4. To what extent do people act as agents and to what extent are they influenced by
certain structures during the privacy trade-off?
5. Can we develop a model that takes into account the contextual and dynamic nature
of location privacy?
6. What are the key factors of this model?
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The first question was addressed through the analysis of the sample of technical systems
based on the framework we developed, as well as the development of the conceptual
model, called DMBBA in Chapter 4. The analysis showed that location data play
a primal role in inferring other types of information. Although in the majority of the
systems the 1st degree data were exposed with the individual’s explicit consent, there was
not sufficient information to suggest that the consent of the users was requested before
making 2nd and 3rd degree inferences on their data. This implies that the exposure of
location data on the Web may cause a number of privacy related issues, as it enables a
number of inferences to be made about which people are often unaware. The DMBBA
model also highlighted this through the Belief-Affordance distance, which stressed that
people are unaware of the actual affordances of their data.
The following three questions — i.e. questions 2, 3, and 4 — were addressed through
the design and analysis of the survey, as presented in Chapter 5. The survey outcomes
found that people do value their privacy in theory. More specifically, as Figure 5.3
shows approximately 80% of the participants answered that they are concerned about
their privacy. Yet, their privacy decisions are paradoxical in comparison with their
stated attitudes. As the statistical analysis of the survey showed, there is no strong
correlation between people’s attitudes towards privacy and their disclosure decisions.
This happens because — as the qualitative analysis of the survey showed — in practice
their privacy decisions are driven by situation and context (structures). In that sense,
they do not act entirely as free agents, but their decisions are tempered by the structures
that govern their privacy decisions. The study also suggests that agency most often has
a negative influence on people’s disclosures, whereas structures tend to have a more
positive influence.
The final two questions — i.e. questions 5, and 6 — were addressed by interpreting
the outcomes of the qualitative analysis of the survey and focus group data, as well as
through the development of the Isorropic Model in Chapter 7. The model was developed
based on all the contextual factors that moderate privacy decisions using the themes that
emerged in the qualitative analysis of the previous two studies. It consists of three main
factors; social capital, trust in the application, and functionality of the application. The
model does not regard these three factors either as benefits or costs at all times. Each
of them can be seen as a positive or a negative depending on the context. In that sense,
each privacy decision is ultimately dependent upon the context.
8.3 Publications
A number of publications came out from the work presented in this thesis.
• A poster paper, entitled Privacy Implications of Location and Contextual Data
on the Social Web, was presented at the ACM Web Science Conference 2011.
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The paper argues for the privacy concerns that are raised from online location
sharing that have effects beyond location, since other contextual information can
be inferred through location information (Zafeiropoulou et al., 2011).
• The framework for analysis of location data as well as the analysis of the technical
systems based on the framework were put together as a book chapter, entitled
Location Data and Privacy: A Framework for Analysis (Zafeiropoulou et al., 2012).
• A paper, entitled Unpicking the Privacy Paradox: Can Structuration Theory Help
to Explain Location-Based Privacy Decisions?, was presented as a full paper at
the ACM Web Science Conference 2013. The paper presents the outcomes of the
quantitative as well as the qualitative analysis of the online survey (Zafeiropoulou
et al., 2013).
Finally, a paper that aims to explain people’s privacy decision mechanisms and presents
the Isorropic Model, entitled To Share or Not to Share: The Isorropic Model of Contex-
tual Privacy Decisions has been submitted to a journal and is considered by reviewers.
8.4 Future work
The outcomes of this research call for further extension and improvement. The frame-
work for analysis of location data that we presented in Chapter 4 can be further extended
with more properties to unveil different aspects of the analysed information. For exam-
ple, new properties could address questions such as what are the functionalities/purposes
of the inferred information, or more technical questions such as what are the computa-
tional costs for 3rd degree inferences and so on. The framework also addresses the issue
of transparency that we discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. As soon as people release their
data to an application, they lose control over it. However, in a scenario where the data
manipulation was completely transparent, people would be held accountable of the data
manipulations and the second distance of Figure 4.5 (between people’s beliefs and the
actual affordances of their data) would not exist. In that sense, the framework may offer
a transparent means of uncovering the different aspects of data manipulation.
A further examination of the relationship between structuration theory and privacy
decision-making could also provide fruitful insight. As described in Chapter 2, struc-
turation frames behaviour as a balance between structure and agency, where the struc-
ture refers to the rules and resources that shape people’s behaviour, whereas the agency
refers to people’s ability to act based on their free choices (Giddens, 1984). The findings
of the qualitative analysis of the survey in Chapter 5 revealed that privacy decisions can
be viewed as a case where the mechanism of structuration theory can apply. According
to the “duality of structure”, structures are the medium for decision making but at the
same time they are also the outcome of the agents’ decision-making. By placing “duality
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of structure” in the context of online privacy decisions, we could develop a study that
would examine in more detail the relationship between structures and agency in privacy
decision-making. The outcomes could prove to be useful into enforcing structures (i.e.
rules and resources) upon people that would help them make better-informed privacy
decisions on the Web.
In Chapter 7 we argued for the importance of developing dynamic privacy systems by
presenting the current limitations in online privacy management, reviewing research
studies that point to these gaps but also offer potential solutions, as well as by present-
ing our own conclusions from the studies described in this thesis. As we explained, the
main problem is that the ways in which systems expect people to express their privacy
preferences, which are mainly access-control based, do not match people’s actual pri-
vacy decision-making. The Isorropic Model highlights this weakness of current privacy
systems to capture people’s decision-making mechanisms, as these systems do not take
context into account. Therefore, ideally, the next logical step is the development of a
contextual system for location privacy management.
Such a system would take into account the highly contextual and dynamic nature of
privacy decisions, as well as the user’s generic privacy preferences. It needs to focus
on the mechanisms that drive people to make certain privacy decisions online. The
findings of the focus groups and the survey, as outlined in the previous chapters, can
provide the foundation for the model design, as they provide numerous examples of
people’s justification process for their sharing decisions in various contexts. Not only
are the themes a strong indicator of people’s justifications on their privacy decisions,
but they also provide insight into the actual factors that influence their decisions. In
Chapter 4 we reviewed the latest studies in online privacy management discussing their
tendency to find more dynamic approaches using machine learning techniques. Taking
these background studies into account, the core of the system could be a machine learning
algorithm that focuses on context. More specifically, it would use as a basis people’s
generic privacy preferences, as well as the contextual factors revolving their past privacy
decisions as a basis to make better recommendations for their future decisions. In that
sense, the overall aim would be to assist individuals into taking better informed privacy
decisions by making them aware of their actual disclosure behaviour.
8.5 Final remarks
To conclude, this thesis has focused on unravelling a rather complex topic, which is online
privacy, and more specifically it has attempted to shed more light on privacy decision-
making. According to the predictions of scientific experts, put together in Pew Research
Centre’s report on digital life, in 2025 people will continue making privacy decisions
favouring immediate gratification and convenience over privacy. In addition to this,
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privacy will be “something only the upscale will enjoy” (Anderson and Rainie, 2014).
This implies that both distances presented in the DMBBA model — in Chapter 4 — will
continue to grow. People will continue to exchange their privacy for immediate benefits,
and at the same time systems will take advantage of people’s information without their
knowledge. The latter means that accountability and transparency mechanisms are now
more important than ever to avoid such scenarios. In any case, these future predictions
are rather alarming and call for immediate attention.
This thesis raises a number of issues that need to be addressed in order to successfully
manage online privacy. First and foremost, a key argument is that all future research
directions (as well as the designed privacy systems) on privacy need to place context at
the centre of their attention. It should be, once again, clarified that when we refer to
context, we mean a broad and dynamic concept that is both technical and social and
incorporates the plethora of different types of contextual and situational factors under
which a privacy decision takes place, but also all the information that can be inferred
through a piece of information (in the case of this research that is location data).
Secondly, it offers an extensive analysis of privacy justifications that reveal the plethora
of contextual factors that affect people’s privacy decisions. The qualitative analysis of
the survey and the focus group series provided a deeper insight into people’s reasoning
behind their privacy decisions, as we analysed a significant number of justifications from
the participants’ responses. The interpretation stage of these two studies resulted in
the development of the Isorropic Model. This model groups all the different factors for
decision-making into three main categories social capital, trust, and functionality.
Finally, this thesis points out the failures of current privacy systems, which are mainly
static and based on access control. Yet, as privacy decisions are highly dynamic and
contextual, it calls for the design of dynamic privacy systems that take the contextual
nature of privacy decisions into account. The Isorropic Model provides significant input
for the design of new and more sophisticated privacy systems that can be better at
understanding the decisions of their users in different contexts.
The issues around privacy on the Web are not going to go away, in fact they are going
to become even more evident in our lives and it is vital that we find proper ways to
address them at a global level through a collaboration between all the possible stake-
holders, including governments, research bodies, and commercial institutions, and with
a combination of socio-technical and legal approaches.
Appendix A
Analysis of location data in the
sample of systems
Table A.1 contains the list of papers selected for the analysis of location privacy, which
was presented in Chapter 4.
Paper Authors Conference
1 Sohn et al Mobile HCI ’10
2 Wagner et al Mobile HCI ’10
3 Cherubini et al MobileHCI ’09
4 Robinson et al MobileHCI ’08
5 Von Watzdorf and Michahelles MobileHCI ’09
6 Harper and Taylor MobileHCI ’09
7 Ankolekar et al MobileHCI ’09
8 Yoon et al MobileHCI ’08
9 Preuveneers et al MobileHCI ’08
10 Clawson et al MobileHCI ’08
11 Lovett et al UbiComp ’10
12 Dearman et al UbiComp ’10
13 Lin et al UbiComp ’10
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Paper Authors Conference
14 Tang et al UbiComp ’10
15 Toch et al UbiComp ’10
16 Cranshaw et al UbiComp ’10
17 Madan et al UbiComp ’10
18 Lim and Dey UbiComp ’09
19 Cui et al MobileHCI ’10
20 Zheng et al UbiComp ’08
21 Stewart et al UbiComp ’08
22 Bamford et al MobileHCI ’08
23 Hang et al MobileHCI ’08
24 Herbst et al MobileHCI ’08
25 Robinson et al MobileHCI ’09
26 Hutter et al MobileHCI ’08
27 Froelich et al MobileHCI ’08
28 You et al MobileHCI ’08
29 Melto et al MobileHCI ’08
30 Anguera and Oliver MobileHCI ’08
31 Brush et al MobileHCI ’10
32 Meschtscherjakov et al Ubicomp ’08
Table A.1: Papers selected for the analysis.
The following part contains the analysis table. The table includes the data categories
that were analysed in each system based on the set of properties that are part of the
framework for analysis (presented in Table 4.2). Each system that we analysed has a
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key number that corresponds to one of the sample papers, for example the first system
has the key “PAPER 1”, which corresponds to the first paper of Table A.1.
PAPER%1 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data 1st% EC UF U SNS
a.%Location%name%(Location9based%Lens) 1st% IPII EC UF U AFFECTS%0.5
3.%People%associated%with%location 2nd DPII IC UF U
4.%Content%associated%with%location 1st% EC UF U
PAPER%2 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data location9based%app
a.%Country%data 1st DPII EC UF U SNS
b.%City%data 1st DPII EC UF U Explicit%Access%Settings%(who%has%access%depending%on%where%the%user%is)
c.%Street%data 1st DPII EC UF U AFFECTS%1
2.%Associated%action%(activity) 1st DPII EC UF U PRIVACY%FACTOR
3.%Availability%level 2nd IPII IC UF U Locaccino
PAPER%3 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Phone%Picture 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 U photo%/multimodal
2.%Location%data 1st IPII A1C1T1 S AFFECTS%0
3.%Datetime 1st NPII A1C1T1 S
4.%UserID 1st DPII A1C1T1 S
PAPER%4 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data 1st IPII EC A1C1T1 U U POI
2.%Geotagged%data%(GPS%coordinates) 3rd NPII EC A1C1T1 U S 3rd
3.%Points%of%Interest 1st NPII A1C1T1 U S AFFECTS%1
PAPER%5 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data%(GPS%or%CellID) 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 U S health%&%environment
2.%Location9related%risk%data 2nd HPII EC T1 U S AFFECTS%0.5
PAPER%6 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Photo%(Glance) 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 UF S photo
2.%Location%of%glance 2nd DPII IC T1 UF U Yes/No%access%toall%phone%contacts
3.%Activity%during%glance 2nd DPII IC T1 UF U AFFECTS%0
4.%Availability%status 2nd DPII IC T1 UF U
PAPER%7 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data SNS
a.%Country%data 1st DPII EC%DD UF%/FOAF U access%to%the%context9sharing%functionality%only%for%connections%made%by%mutual%consent
b.%City%data 1st DPII EC%DD UF%/FOAF U plus%settings%for%%diff.access%for%diff.people
c.%GPS9based%Street%data%(GPS%coordinates) 1st DPII EC%DD UF%/FOAF U AFFECTS%1
2.%Datetime 1st IPII EC%DD UF%/FOAF S PRIVACY%FACTOR
3.%Personal%status 1st DPII EC%DD UF%/FOAF U
PAPER%8 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Photo 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 U%Edit U photo
2.%Location%data AFFECTS%0.5
a.%GPS%coordinates 1st DPII IC A1C1T1 U S
b.%Location%keyword 1st IPII EC A1C0.5T1 U U
3.%Datetime 1st NPII IC A1C1T1 U S
4.%Presence%of%co9located%phones IPII S
5.%People/%event%keyword 1st IPII EC T1 U U
PAPER%9 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data health
a.%Current%location 1st DPII IC A1C1T1 U S 3rd
b.%Next%location 3rd DPII IC A0C1T1 U S New
2.%Current%activity 3rd DPII IC A0.5C1T1 U S AFFECTS%0.5
3.%Next%activity 3rd DPII IC A0C1T1 U S
4.%Location%recognition 3rd DPII IC A0.5C1T1 U S
5.%Similarity%of%location,time,%activity%combinations3rd IC A1C1T1 U S
PAPER%10 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Photo 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 UF U photo
2.%Co9location 2nd DPII IC A1C1T1 UF U AFFECTS%0
3.%Datetime 1st NPII A1C1T1 UF S
PAPER%11 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data social%network%&%loc.
a.%Actual%location%data 1st DPII IC A1C1T1 UF S SNS
b.%Calendar9based%location%data 1st DPII IC A1C1T1 UF U 3rd
2.%Location9related%event 1st DPII IC A1C1T1 UF U New
3.%Timestamp 1st NPII IC A1C1T1 UF U AFFECTS%0.5
4.%Co9location 2nd DPII A0.5C0.5T1 S
5.%Interrelationship%between%users%(online%relationship)2nd DPII A0.5C0.5T1 S
6.%Real9time%social%event 3rd A0.5C0.5T1 S
PAPER%12 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data 2nd HPII A1C1T1 U S location9based%system
2.%Set%of%location9supported%activities 3rd NPII U S 3rd
3.%List%of%errand9based%locations 3rd IPII U S AFFECTS%1
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PAPER%13 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data location9based%system
a.%WiFi%and%GPS%coordinates 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 U S
b.%Location%name 3rd HPII EC A0.5C1T1 U U 3rd
2.%Physical%distance%between%user%and%recipient%(system%admin)2nd DPII NO S
3.%Distance%from%home/%work 2nd DPII NO S AFFECTS%1
4.%Timestamp 1st NPII IC A1C1T1 S
5.%Duration%of%stay%at%location 2nd DPII S
6.%Frequency%of%visits 3rd DPII S
7.%Number%of%users%having%visited%the%location 3rd NPII S
8.%Entropy 3rd NPII
PAPER%14 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data
a.%Location%name%(label) 1st HPII EC A1C0.5T1 UF%/%U%/%E U location9based%system
b.%GPS%coordinates 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 S S
c.%Actual%physical%location 3rd DPII NO A0.5C0.5T1 S S 3rd
2.%Location9related%activity 1st IPII EC A1C0T1 UF%/%U U AFFECTS%1
3.%Location%label%semantics 2nd IPII NO A1C1T1 S S
PAPER%15 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data AFFECTS%1
a.%WiFi%and%GPS%coordinates 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 U/%UF%/%E S location9based%system
b.%Location%name%(semantic%tag) 1st HPII EC A1C0.5T1 U U SNS
2.%Entropy 3rd NPII NO S Locaccino
3.%Location%viewers%(who%is%allowedto%view%one's%location)1st DPII EC A1C1T1 U U 3rd
4.%Users%comfort%in%location%sharing 2nd NPII NO S S PRIVACY%FACTOR
PAPER%16 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data PRIVACY%FACTOR
a.%GPS%coordinates 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 U/%UF%/%E S%/%U location9based%system
2.%Entropy 3rd NPII NO S S SNS
3.%Co9location 2nd DPII NO S S
4.%Number%of%co9locations 3rd DPII NO S S
5.%Social%tie%between%2%co9located%users 3rd DPII NO A0C1T1 S S Locaccino
6.%Number%of%social%ties%within%a%SNS 3rd DPII NO A0.5C1T1 S S AFFECTS%1
PAPER%17 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data 1st NPII S S NPII%%(Data%are%anonymised%a.s.a%collected)
2.%Co9location 2nd NPII S S health
3.%Physical%Proximity%Entropy%with%others 3rd NPII S S 3rd
4.%Behaviour%changes%due%to%health%problems 3rd NPII S S New
5.%User's%health%status 3rd NPII S S AFFECTS%0.5
PAPER%18 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data 1st DPII IC U U
2.%Co9location 2nd DPII IC U U location9based%system
3.%Timestamp 1st NPII IC U U 3rd
4.%Availability%status 1st DPII IC U U AFFECTS%0.5
5.%Reminder%(trigger) 3rd DPII IC U S 2%systems%presented
6.%Navigation%data 2nd NPII U S
PAPER%19 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data 1st DPII EC UF%/%U S SNS
2.%Social%event%(activity) 2nd IPII EC UF%/%U S AFFECTS%0
PAPER%20 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data AFFECTS%1
a.%GPS%coordinates 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 S S 3rd
2.%Users'%transportation%modes%(driving,%cycling…) 3rd DPII EC A0.5C1T1 S S New
PAPER%21 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data
a.%GPS%coordinates 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 S S location9based%system
b.%Location%name%(tag) 1st EC U U POI
2.%Location9specific%generated%content 1st NPII EC A1C1T1 U U AFFECTS%1
3.%Points%of%Interest 1st%/%2nd NPII EC A1C1T1 U S%/%U
PAPER%22 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data
a.%GPS%coordinates 1st DPII A1C1T1 U S 3rd
2.%Temporal%data 1st NPII A1C1T1 S photo
3.%Phone%Picture 1st IPII EC A1C1T1 U U New
4.%User%polution%exposure 3rd DPII S S AFFECTS%0.5
PAPER%23 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data location9based%system
a.%Start%location 1st DPII EC U U AFFECTS%1
b.%Destination 1st DPII EC U U
2.%Location9based%task 2nd EC U S
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PAPER%24 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality% Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data
a.%GPS%coordinates 1st DPII EC A1C0.5T1 U S mixed%reality%game
2.%Physical%proximity%to%location 2nd DPII A0.5C0.5T1 S S AFFECTS%1
3.%Temporal%data 1st NPII A0.5C0.5T1 U S
4.%Co9location%data%(social%presence) 2nd DPII A0.5C1T1 U S
PAPER%25 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data
a.%GPS%coordinates 1st DPII EC U S POI
b.%Target%location 1st DPII EC U U AFFECTS%1
c.%Location%marking 1st DPII EC U U
2.%Route%on%map%data 2nd DPII EC S
3.%Distance%from%target%location 1st NPII EC U U
4.%Points%of%Interest 1st DPII EC U U
PAPER%26 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data
a.%Geolocation%data 1st DPII A1C1T1 U S POI
b.%User's%current%location%on%map 1st DPII A1C1T1 E S
2.%Location9based%Campus%information 2nd NPII A1C1T1 U S 3rd
a.%Location%entropy%(room%occupation) 3rd NPII U S AFFECTS%1
b.%Presence%of%people%in%location 2nd DPII U S
3.%Points%of%Interest 2nd NPII A1C1T1 U S
4.%Distance%from%location%(POI) 2nd NPII U S
PAPER%27 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data
a.%Geolocation%data 1st DPII A1C1T1 U S POI
2.%Points%of%Interest 2nd NPII U S
3.%User%orientation%awareness 2nd IPII A1C1T1 U S 3rd
4.%Location9based%recommendations 2nd NPII U S AFFECTS%1
PAPER%28 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data
a.%GPS%coordinates 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 U S mixed%reality%location9based%mobile%treasure%hunt,
2.%Picture%of%location 1st IPII EC A1C1T1 U U 3rd
3.%Picture9based%location%recognisition% 3rd IPII EC A0.5C1T1 U S AFFECTS%1
PAPER%29 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 U U multimodal%app.:%multitap%text%input,%predictive%text%input%optimized%for%the%address%data,%and%speech%recognition
2.%Public%transport%data 3rd NPII EC A0.5C1T1 U S 3rd
AFFECTS%1
PAPER%30 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Phone%Picture 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 U U photo
2.%Location%data%(of%picture) 1st DPII EC U U multimodal%app
AFFECTS%0
PAPER%31 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data
a.%GPS%coordinates 1st DPII EC U S POI
b.%Map%data 1st DPII EC U S AFFECTS%1
2.%Phone%Picture 1st DPII EC U U
3.%Activity 2nd DPII EC U S
4.%User%trail 2nd DPII EC U S
5.%Navigation%data 2nd DPII EC U S
PAPER%32 Degree%Level Personal%Identifiable%Information User%knowledge Data%quality Data%Access Data%Source Comments
1.%Location%data AFFECTS%1
a.%Product%location 1st NPII EC A1C1T1 U S POI
b.%User%location 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 U S
2.%User%activity 1st DPII EC A1C1T1 U S
No.%of%Data%Categories%= 196
No.%of%Papers%= 32
Abbreviations explained:
User knowledge/consent.
EC: Explicit Consent, IC: Implicit Consent
Data Quality (values 0 to 1).
A: Accurate, C: Complete, T: Timely
Data Access/Data Source.
U: User, S: System, UF: User Friend

Appendix B
The survey questionnaire
We are conducting a survey on people’s online privacy attitudes and particularly their
location sharing attitudes. If you are a smartphone or tablet user we would really
appreciate your participation in this survey.
The survey will take you about 5-10 minutes. Your identity will remain anonymous;
your answers are confidential and will be added for statistical analysis with the answers
from other people we are surveying. You may withdraw at any stage of this survey
without saving your answers. (Ethics reference number: 1521).
If you want to take part in the prize draw to win one of the three 20 Amazon vouchers
please leave your email address at the end of the survey. For further enquiries please
contact us at az4g09@ecs.soton.ac.uk Thank you very much for your collaboration!
Please tick (check) this box to indicate that you consent to taking part in this
survey.
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Section 1. Demographics
1. Are you Male or Female?
• Male
• Female
2. What is your age?
• 18-25
• 26-34
• 35-43
• 44-52
• 53-61
• 62-on
3. Where do you permanently live in?
Choices are presented in a drop-down list from ISO 3166.
4. What is your country of origin?
Same choices as the previous question.
Section 2. Applications Usage
Which of the following applications do you use in your mobile device?
• A. Wikipedia
• B. Social Networks (Facebook, Google+ etc.)
• C. Movies, Music and Event Planner (IMDb, Flixster, athinorama.gr etc.)
• D. Microblogging Applications (Twitter, Weibo etc.)
• E. Location-based Social Networks (Foursquare, Gowalla etc.)
Depending on the applications they choose, participants are directed to answer different
scenario-based questions and justify their answers afterwards. The following section
shows the scenario questions.
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Section 3. Scenarios
A. Wikipedia
Consider the following scenario. You are visiting Berlin for the first time with a friend.
While walking around the city centre you wish to explore the museums of the city. Your
friend suggests to use Wikipedia on your device and allow it to determine your location.
Wikipedia has a ”Nearby” feature that shows on a Google map links to Wikipedia pages
about locations around you. All the nearby museums of Berlin will appear on the map
and through their wikipedia page you may decide which one you wish to visit. Would
you allow Wikipedia to determine your location?
• Yes
• Maybe
• No
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B. Facebook
Consider the following scenario. You are visiting a friend (who is also your Facebook
friend) in another city. You are going to dinner in a very popular restaurant of that city.
Would you post your location on your Facebook wall?
• Yes
• Maybe
• No
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C. Foursquare
Consider the following scenario. You are at a train station of your city and wish to
eat a hamburger first. You want to check if there are any good choices of fast-food
restaurants in the area. Would you check-in on Foursquare (i.e. publish your location)
to find a nearby restaurant recommended by other Foursquare users?
• Yes
• Maybe
• No
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D. IMDb
Consider the following scenario. It’s Saturday night, you are out and want to go to
the movies but you don’t know any cinemas in your area. You may use IMDb to see all
the cinemas in the nearby area plus the different showtimes given that you allow IMDb
to determine your location. Would you allow IMDb to determine your location?
• Yes
• Maybe
• No
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E. Twitter
Twitter’s Tweet With Your Location feature allows users to selectively add location
information to their Tweets. Now please consider the following scenario. You are at-
tending a big public event, which takes place at your city and want to tweet about it.
Would you tweet with your location?
• Yes
• Maybe
• No
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Section 4. Scenario Justification
At that point participants are requested to justify their responses to the scenario-based
questions they have answered. Only the justification questions for the scenarios that
have been answered appear on the screen of the participants.
A. Wikipedia
Your answer to the “Wikipedia” scenario was: Yes/ Maybe/ No
Please explain why you gave this answer. For your own convenience, you may use
keywords or short phrases in your explanation.
B. Facebook
Your answer to the “Facebook” scenario was: Yes/ Maybe/ No
Please explain why you gave this answer. For your own convenience, you may use
keywords or short phrases in your explanation.
C. Foursquare
Your answer to the “Foursquare” scenario was: Yes/ Maybe/ No
Please explain why you gave this answer. For your own convenience, you may use
keywords or short phrases in your explanation.
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D. IMDb
Your answer to the “IMDb” scenario was: Yes/ Maybe/ No
Please explain why you gave this answer. For your own convenience, you may use
keywords or short phrases in your explanation.
E. Twitter
Your answer to the “Foursquare” scenario was: Yes/ Maybe/ No
Please explain why you gave this answer. For your own convenience, you may use
keywords or short phrases in your explanation.
Section 5. Privacy Attitudes
The following questions deal with the way you control your privacy online. The image
below illustrates the Facebook privacy settings as an example of privacy control. For
each of the following indicate whether you agree or not.
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Now, for each of the following activities identify how often you do them. The image
below illustrates the location settings on iPhone and Android phones.
For each of the following indicate if it is a concern to you or not.
Location-based websites may use your location to make assumptions about you. Please
indicate how important it is for you to control these assumptions for each of the following
types of information:
Section 6. Email
Would you like to take part in the prize draw for an Amazon voucher?
• Yes
• No
If yes, please enter your email address.
Appendix C
Focus group supplementary
material
C.1 The focus group handout
Schedule
15:00-15:10 Welcome
15:10-16:00 Main Discussion
16:00-16:10 Wrap-up
Questions
The following questions deal with the way your privacy is managed online.
For each of them please indicate whether you agree or not (tick in the appropriate cell):
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Agree
completely
Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree
completely
Are you satisfied from
the privacy settings
offered to you by web
applications?
Most of the broadly used
privacy settings are
based on the concept of
“who has access to see
your data”. Are you
satisfied with them?
Now, please answer the following questions:
Never Rarely Once a
month or
so
More
than once
a week
All the
time
How often do you post
your location in a social
network (e.g. Facebook,
Twitter, Google+)?
In your mobile device do
you ever turn on the
location settings?
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A. Facebook Scenario
You are travelling abroad with a friend of yours (also your Facebook friend) and at
the moment you are at the airport.
Would you post your location on your Facebook wall? Tick the box that suits you best.
• Yes
• Maybe
• No
Feel free to add any comments about your choice of answer in the area below.
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B. Twitter Scenario
You are attending a concert in London and thinking of tweeting about it.
Would you tweet with your location?
• Yes
• Maybe
• No
Feel free to add any comments about your choice of answer in the area below.
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C. Wikipedia Scenario
You are visiting Southampton for the first time with a friend and wish to visits the
sights of the area near the university.
Your friend suggests using Wikipedia, as it shows on a map links to the Wiki pages of
all the nearby sights.
Would you allow Wikipedia to determine your location?
• Yes
• Maybe
• No
Feel free to add any comments about your choice of answer in the area below.
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C.2 Presentation
The presentation slides used in the focus group discussion can be found below:
Focus Group Discussion
Moderator: Aristea Zafeiropoulou
Web Science DTC
University of Southampton
Privacy Settings
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Examples
Wikipedia “Nearby”
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Location Settings
Example of the location settings in 
iPhone (left) and Android (right)
Scenario “Facebook”
You are travelling abroad with a friend of yours (also your Facebook friend) 
and$at$the$moment$you$are$at$the$airport.$
Would$you$post$your$loca4on$on$your$Facebook$wall?
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Scenario “Twitter”
You are travelling abroad with a friend of yours (also your Facebook friend) and 
at the moment you are at the airport. 
Would$you$post$your$loca4on$on$your$Facebook$wall?
Scenario “Wikipedia”
You are visiting Southampton for the first time with a friend and wish to visits the 
sights of the area near the university. Your friend suggests to use Wikipedia, as it 
shows on a map links to the Wiki pages of all the nearby sights.
Would$you$allow$Wikipedia$to$determine$your$loca4on?
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